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ABSTRACT
Over five million service personnel were demobilised by Great 
Britain and her four self-governing Dominions after World War I. For 
some their reintroduction to civilian life was straightforward and 
uneventful. Many simply returned to the jobs they had previously 
occupied before the war. For others their readjustment to civilian life 
was difficult, full of despair and bitter disappointment. Similarly, 
the repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation of the empire's 
soldiers and sailors presented post-war administrations with a host of 
social, political and economic problems. So far as they were concerned 
reconstruction was a daunting challenge which had to be met with the 
greatest possible energy, efficiency and decisiveness. Moreover, 
solutions developed by the Imperial and Dominion authorities were seen 
as the cornerstone of a new and dynamic post-war society and empire. 
Soldier settlement was one of these solutions.
This period in imperial history provides a detailed study of the 
political manoeuvres and economic initiatives which formed the basis of 
a new period in Commonwealth relations. Primarily a study of social and 
economic policy, it draws together previously untapped primary sources 
and explores several important aspects of the transition of Anglo- 
Dominion relations between the onset of World War I and the beginning of 
the Great Depression.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1987 Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright published Winning the 
Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life. 1915-
1930. in which they argued that the demobilisation of large citizen 
armies was one of the greatest, and yet one of the most ignored, social 
processes of the twentieth century. I too was struck by this apparent 
lack of interest, academic or otherwise. Despite the fact that a large 
university library could be filled to capacity with the material on war 
and warfare, it seemed remarkable how little there was on topics such as 
demobilisation, repatriation and rehabilitation of service personnel.
The subject has attracted increasing academic interest of late, 
particularly among social rather than military historians, but it is 
patchy and still remains one of enormous scope today. Soldier 
settlement was an important component of some of the Allied combatants' 
post-war reconstruction strategies after both World Wars. However, here 
too only a few writers have examined the question with any thoroughness.
Morton and Wright's book is the first detailed study of Canadian 
repatriation and rehabilitation policies after World War I, in which 
soldier settlement receives close attention. Good as it is, the authors 
did not tap important archival sources in western Canada, instead 
confining their analysis to official sources and archival material 
obtainable in central Canada. In Australia, the historical geographer, 
J. M. Powell, and the social historian, Marilyn Lake, have seriously 
addressed Australian soldier settlement policy. It must be emphasised 
that they were significantly influenced by the pioneering work of L. J. 
Pryor's thesis on Australian repatriation policy completed in 1932. 
Powell's penetrating analysis and his encouragement of comparative 
studies have greatly stimulated my own work. Marilyn Lake's solid but 
controversial study, The Limits of Hope: Soldier Settlement in
Victoria. 1915-38. is the first detailed study of one state's attempts 
to grapple with the complex problems of post-war land settlement and 
rehabilitation. Nonetheless, despite a rich number of important 
regional studies in the form of unpublished and unobtainable honours, 
masters and doctoral theses, no national policy study or inter-state 
comparison exists.
New Zealand has received scant attention. Once again, Powell 
provides the only up-to-date examination. Soldier settlement is
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discussed in three useful New Zealand masters theses but in the context 
of the rise of the New Zealand Returned Soldiers' Association and the 
depression of 1920-22. Although outside the scope of this thesis, 
another study by C. J. D. Duder on soldier settlement in Kenya provided 
me with some important insights. More importantly, however, nothing 
exists on South Africa.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore in greater detail the 
issue of soldier settlement. Using a comparative framework, the thesis 
examines two parallel but complementary themes: the settlement of
British soldiers in the overseas or ’white' Dominions (Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and South Africa) between 1915 and 1930; and the 
resettlement of Dominion soldiers in their countries of origin and the 
problems they encountered which allows for a better understanding of the 
difficulties faced by British veterans. Although the primary focus is 
the resettlement of British ex-servicemen overseas in the post-World War 
I era, it is necessary to first analyse previous attempts at an imperial 
soldier settlement policy and discuss the motives behind these schemes. 
Furthermore, it is important to place soldier settlement within the 
larger context of imperial migration prior to 1914 in order to 
demonstrate the changes in attitude and policy which occurred after the 
Armistice. Such an examination raises other issues as well. For 
example, what changes occurred in the relations between Britain and the 
Dominions concerning the incorporation of British ex-service personnel 
into a host of overseas soldier settlement programmes? Equally 
important, what were the Dominions' responses to British initiatives?
And what were the political, economic and social ramifications? Did 
imperial soldier settlement lead to a transformation with respect to 
Anglo-Dominion relations? Did attempts to find the ’right type' of 
British soldier settler have an impact on future imperial migration and 
settlement policy? And if it did, how significant were the changes in 
Anglo-Dominion relations, if any?
Until recently, soldier settlement was seen as just another facet 
of Dominion land settlement policy; a logical extension of a tried and 
proven method to enhance the economic development of the ’white' 
Dominions. With the advent of Lake's book a new dimension was added—  
social control. The attempt by the conservative and reactionary forces 
of post-war society to use soldier settlement to diffuse social unrest 
is an important theme which needs further analysis. This must be 
examined within an imperial framework as well. Why did the British
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government, which had steadfastly refused to intervene in the migration 
field prior to 1914, suddenly embark upon a vigorous programme of state- 
aided migration after 1918? The war galvanised the British government 
into committing itself to a large-scale free passage scheme for its ex- 
service personnel between 1914 and 1922. What is not fully understood 
is the pressure private interest groups, such as the Royal Colonial 
Institute and ex-servicemen's organisations, brought to bear on the 
Imperial and Dominion governments. The internal pressures and debates 
within the higher echelons of the respective bureaucracies and the 
changes in attitude and policy formulation that resulted have also 
attracted little attention. Similarly, the impact of key imperial and 
national visionaries on soldier settlement policy, particularly L. S. 
Amery who stamped his personal mark on the free passage scheme in the 
attempt to establish a landed imperial yeomanry overseas, has until now 
not been fully explained. This study attempts to address these issues.
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CHAPTER ONE
MILITARY COLONISATION: PAST POLICIES AND PRECEDENTS
'Colonisation by discharged soldiers', pronounced The Veteran in 
1918, 'is as old as time itself'.1 And so it is. Throughout ancient 
history disbanded soldiers played a key role in the settlement and 
development of expanding empires. The Romans, for instance, expanded 
and consolidated their empire by employing a system of military 
colonisation. Tacitus, the Roman historian and chronicler, recorded in 
his Annals the failure of one such Roman soldier colony.2 Security was 
the principal reason the ancients settled disbanded soldiers on farms on 
the frontier. The settlement of a loyal, trained and disciplined 
garrison force bolstered the defence capability of a frontier territory 
and could be used as a militia in times of internal strife. Land was 
also a convenient form of payment for services rendered; a reward for 
the hardship and sacrifices soldiers encountered on campaign. A third 
reason was often to supplement civilian efforts to develop the economic 
potential of a newly acquired territory.
In North America during the struggle between the colonial empires 
of France and England, the settlement of French and British forces in 
their respective colonies became an important facet of colonial defence 
policy. After the expulsion of the French from Quebec in 1763 the 
British government maintained this policy in Canada in order to meet the 
very real threat of American aggression. Similarly, British soldiers 
stationed in New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and India were 
encouraged to settle in these territories upon receipt of their 
discharge to meet increased demands from colonial settlers who were 
constantly threatened by attacks from hostile, indigenous tribes or from 
incursions, real or imagined, from rival imperial powers.
After 1815 a change of emphasis emerged with regard to soldier 
settlement. Social and economic considerations had always been closely 
associated with the strategic factors. Both the French and British had 
employed soldier settlement as a supplement to their respective colonial 
development policies in North America. However, government expenditure 
and assistance had been small. Defence rather than development remained 
paramount though many government officials realised that the development
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argument gave soldier settlement wider popular appeal. But with the 
return to peace in 1815 the drastic cutback on military expenditure and 
manpower led to spiralling unemployment, in response to which the 
British government launched the first large-scale, government assisted 
emigration scheme to Canada and South Africa in which a small number of 
soldiers participated.
The intervention by the British government into the migration 
field, albeit on a very limited scale, demonstrated the increasing 
importance of soldier settlement as a tool of colonial development and 
social relief. By 1914 the arguments for soldier settlement on the 
grounds of imperial defence and of empire development had reached a 
level of equality. To understand this change of emphasis, the present 
chapter is mainly devoted to the colonial and imperial soldier 
settlement programmes in Canada prior to 1914, since the Canadian 
experience provides the most numerous and detailed accounts of soldier 
settlement policy.
SECTION 1: RESETTLING DISBANDED AND DISCHARGED SOLDIERS, 1650-1867
Prior to the British occupation of Quebec in 1763 the French 
colony of New France possessed a form of land tenure called the 
seigneurial system. The seigneur was a private individual, usually 
possessing considerable standing and influence in the community, who 
received concessions of land from the Crown. In return, the seigneur 
was obliged to settle a required number of tenants or habitants on his 
concession. The seigneur was the civil and military leader of the 
community and as a rule the largest landowner. He possessed wide- 
ranging powers and rights which governed all aspects of the colony's 
social, economic and political life, the most important being the right 
to collect rents on land, levy fees on the transfer of tenure and charge 
tithes on his tenants' produce. The entire system was closely regulated 
and tightly knit with everyone knowing exactly his function within the 
community.
The seigneurial system provided a systematic approach to 
colonisation in New France along feudal guidelines imposed from 
Versailles. It was a land settlement rather than a land tenure system 
and though reflecting the social and political ideals of French society 
it was primarily conceived as a military solution to the problems of
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colonial defence.3 Soldiers were encouraged by the grant of free land 
to settle in the colony but they were disbanded rather than discharged 
because disbandment did not exempt them from future military duties. 
Consequently, they provided an important contribution to the 
reinforcement and strengthening of the colony's defences, and 
contributed to its economic growth and prosperity. The architects of 
the seigneurial system believed that if enough soldiers were disposed to 
settle in New France its defence would be ensured. Settlements were 
established along the St. Lawrence River and its major tributaries to 
defend the colony's navigable communications network from Indian attack 
or British incursions from the thirteen American colonies or the smaller 
Canadian settlements. The largest and most notable soldier settlement 
project in New France was initiated in the late 1660s by veterans of the 
Carignan-Salieres regiment who established themselves along the 
Richelieu river as a buttress against the Iroquois.
British soldier settlement in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and 
Ontario followed the pattern earlier set in New France. Detachments of 
troops were disbanded in these colonies with the express hope that they 
would increase the productivity of the colonies and provide a first-rate 
militia for colonial defence. The strategic port of Halifax had been 
populated by disbanded soldiers in 1749 and was the first major British 
example of a conscious soldier settlement plan.4 Following the 
conclusion of the American Revolutionary War in 1783 the presence of a 
large, restless and potentially dangerous enemy on the southern borders 
of its North American possessions posed a troublesome and taxing problem 
to the British government: how best to defend an already long and
exposed border? The expulsion of France from Quebec had eliminated one 
component from the problem but it contributed another by extending the 
border area which needed defending. One solution was the settlement of 
disbanded regiments on the south bank of the upper St. Lawrence River 
which relieved, to a certain extent, the problem of defending Quebec 
from attacks launched from upstate New York. The United Empire 
Loyalists (American colonists loyal to the Crown who had fought with the 
British as militia and fled to Canada after the American Revolutionary 
War) were similarly assisted to settle along the St. Lawrence and the 
St. John River in New Brunswick in order to provide a trustworthy pool 
of irregulars.
In the years prior to the War of 1812 a large number of Americans, 
other than Loyalists, migrated north and settled in southern Ontario.
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Canadian politicians became alarmed at this influx of settlers because, 
being unmistakably anti-British in temperament, they posed a real threat 
to the colony's internal security and could not be trusted in time of 
war. The British government reacted by instituting a settlement policy 
designed to inculcate a sense of loyalty within the new arrivals. 
Wherever possible discharged soldiers were settled amongst the American 
settlers to act as a deterrent against rebellion and insurrection. The 
seriousness with which the British authorities regarded this problem was 
clearly demonstrated by the generous grant of land for each soldier and 
the liberal financial concessions for stocking and outfitting each 
homestead.5
Demands for the reduction of the army estimates after the 
Napoleonic Wars forced the British government to initiate a programme of 
severe military retrenchment. This aggravated the growing unemployment 
that accompanied the deep depression which followed in the wake of 
peace. What remained to be done with these ex-soldiers? One imperial 
publicist believed the veterans provided an excellent source of manpower 
for the development of the colonies and advocated their emigration to 
these territories.6 The British government agreed but instead of 
initiating a military emigration policy it began immediately to disband 
and discharge soldiers stationed in Canada. Partly as a reward for 
military service, partly to encourage permanent settlement and colonial 
development, and more importantly as a cost-cutting measure, discharged 
soldiers wishing to stay in Upper Canada were encouraged to settle as 
farmers. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Drummond, Administrator of Upper 
Canada, was given full responsibility by the British government to 
encourage, assist and advise the new settlers. Gifts of freehold land 
were granted to officers and men, with concessions varying from 100 
acres for a private to 1,200 acres for a Lieutenant-Colonel. Several 
new townships were established along the strategically important lake 
and river networks of the Ottawa river with a small party travelling 
further west to take up land near Fort Douglas in the Selkirk settlement 
of Manitoba. A similar but smaller scheme existed for discharged naval 
officers along the north shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario.7
There were many obstacles preventing the conversion of theory into 
practice regarding Britain's military settlement policy between 1812 and 
1854. Despite the British government's assumption that discharged 
soldiers and sailors made good settlers, the evidence strongly suggested 
that the contrary was true. 'Unused to agricultural labour and
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inexperienced in pioneer life, [the soldier settler] had neither the 
resourcefulness nor the industry to succeed on the frontier'.® The 
disbanded soldier of 1815 was no different than his predecessor who had 
fought during the Seven Years War (1856-63) or the American 
Revolutionary War. Hardened by war, adventurous and restless, he was 
ill-prepared for the drudgery and tedium of farming. Yet the British 
government was more determined than ever after 1812 to make the military 
land grant a permanent feature of its colonial settlement policy.9
The strategic motive dominated the minds of British and colonial 
officials alike during the post-Napoleonic period. This was borne out 
by the fact that military settlements were located at strategic points 
along the Canadian-American frontier or at sites which straddled 
important communications routes. If an area happened to combine the 
advantages of both strategy and agricultural potential it was sheer good 
fortune. More often than not if an area proved suitable it took a lot 
of back breaking work to clear and prepare the land for cultivation.
Poor roads, inadequate supplies, inaccessibility to markets and lack of 
capital compounded the plight of the soldier settler.10 It was no 
wonder many of these men saw salvation in the land speculator.
The tenacity with which British authorities clung to the Idea that 
ex-soldiers made excellent colonists, capable of improving the 
productivity of a colony during peacetime and defending it in time of 
war, was astonishing. Of course distance played a pivotal role, as one 
Canadian historian has pointed out: 'It was easy enough to sit in a
London club and draw a picture of a beautiful little Utopia somewhere 
out in America where the citizens were the best of soldiers and the most 
industrious of pioneer farmers at one and the same time'.11 When 
reports of large-scale failure and abject misery were despatched by 
colonial administrators in Canada the reservations about the policy 
which surfaced in London were more than 'offset by a strong sense of 
obligation to those who had risked life and limb' for their country.12
The idea of military settlement as a viable colonisation and 
imperial defence policy persisted throughout the 1820s and 1830s. 
However, it was becoming evident that despite the noble claims made by 
its promoters that military settlement strengthened the physical and 
economic bonds of empire, the Imperial government wanted mainly to save 
money. The worst example of military settlement which combined attempts 
to reduce Treasury expenditure and promote imperial defence was the 
settlement of British army pensioners in Canada during the 1830s.
8
Legislation was passed in 1830 which allowed all non-commissioned 
officers and privates entitled to a pension from the Chelsea Hospital 
and desirous of emigrating the opportunity to commute their pension to 
the sum not exceeding four years' pension into a final cash 
settlement.13 The War Office outlined a rigorous set of conditions and 
qualifications that each pensioner and his family had to meet to ensure 
maximum success. Age, physical fitness and additional capital were the 
basic criteria used to select prospective settlers. Free passage and 
free land grants of between 100 and 200 acres were included as an added 
inducement for the pensioners.
The entire scheme was a fiasco. Of the 1,500 pensioners who 
landed in Upper Canada between 1830 and 1839 only 158 were reported to 
be supporting themselves in 1844.1* In its haste to reduce pension 
payments the War Office ignored its own selection criteria. Those 
selected were old, infirm, unskilled and unsuited to tackle the harsh 
realities of life as pioneers. Government support and supervision were 
negligible. Ill-equipped for farming many veterans squandered their 
commuted pensions and quickly became destitute. The larger towns and 
cities seemed to offer an opportunity for the veteran to start afresh, 
but with no money or skills he had to throw himself on the mercy of 
local relief agencies. This aroused the disgust of local taxpayers, and 
according to one colonial administrator disgraced the colony of Upper 
Canada and discredited the colonial government. The Imperial 
government, reluctant to accept responsibility for the disaster, 
eventually acknowledged its obligations to the poverty-stricken 
pensioners in 1840. Relief supplies were issued and a small weekly 
allowance was authorised. But it was too little too late.15
Undeterred, the idea of pensioner settlements was revived in 1846 
by Earl Grey, the Colonial Secretary in Lord John Russell's 
administration. The scheme, like its predecessors, encountered its 
share of difficulties, but it succeeded because of good planning and 
supervision. Pensioners were carefully selected for their character and 
determination. They were concentrated in large groups near urban areas 
which ensured easy and proper supervision, and they were given 
sufficient capital. Settlement near urban areas possessed the added 
benefit of allowing the colonial authorities to assemble quickly the 
pensioners in times of civil unrest. Similarly, it gave the pensioner 
direct and easy access to domestic markets. Once again the parallel 
objectives of cutting military expenditure and developing colonial
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society provided the impetus for Grey's policy. By 1853 all British 
regulars west of Kingston had been withdrawn and replaced by 750 
pensioners on active and reserve status. An overall reduction in Canada 
of 3,000 regulars was achieved between 1847 and 1853, in part made 
possible by Grey's military settlement programme. Furthermore, the use 
of pensioners on active duty as troops or police allowed Canadian 
authorities time to make the transition between dependence on British 
troops for continued security to self-reliance on Canadian resources and 
manpower.16
From a strategic standpoint it was South Africa which received the 
British government's closest attention in the post-Napoleonic period. 
Continual unrest on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony between Cape 
colonists and the Xhosa nation was a major source of concern ever since 
British occupation of the Cape Colony in 1806. The latest series of 
Xhosa raids in 1819 clearly demonstrated British weakness and insecurity 
on the eastern frontier. In the face of this threat, and as an attempt 
to alleviate the domestic unemployment problem, the British government 
offered free passages and land to men who would settle in the Albany 
district of the eastern frontier.17 Each man who recruited parties of 
ten or more men was granted 100 acres per settler. A total of 4,000 
settlers arrived at the Cape in 1820. The settlement party consisted 
largely of farmers and artisans, victims of post-war unemployment, 
interspersed with a few professional people, soldiers, teachers and 
clergy.18
Security along the eastern frontier remained a constant problem in 
the Eastern Cape throughout the mid-nineteenth century and this prompted 
another attempt by the British government to consolidate its position. 
The Albany settlement was further reinforced in 1856 by a large 
contingent of German soldiers disbanded from the British-German 
Legion.19 These soldiers had been recruited for service in the Crimean 
War but became a financial burden now that the war was over. The 
British government hoped that their settlement in Africa would satisfy 
demands for military retrenchment at home and colonial pleas for 
improved security on the turbulent eastern frontier. The terms of 
settlement were quite generous, but disciplinary problems arising from a 
disparity of numbers between men and women limited the success of the 
scheme.20
Between 1830 and 1870 the debate on colonial defence and the 
changing nature of imperial responsibility was part of the larger issue
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of Britain's future relationship with her overseas possessions. As 
successive British administrations wrestled with ideas for reducing the 
overall expenditure on imperial forces overseas, military settlement and 
the land grant system began to attract increased criticism. It was 
argued that group settlements were costly, ineffective and unnecessary.
A large number of influential businessmen, politicians and political 
economists, known collectively as the Manchester School, saw little use 
in spending vast sums of money in overseas territories which did little 
to justify their possession. A political empire based on the direct 
control and administration of territory found no justification within 
laissez-faire economics. The 1860s were the highwater mark of the free 
trade era in Britain which had witnessed the steady erosion of internal 
and international trade barriers since the 1820s. The Corn Laws were 
repealed in 1846 followed shortly by the abolition of the Navigation 
Acts in 1849. The Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1862 crowned 
triumphant the era of free trade over international protectionism by 
significantly reducing tariff barriers on a variety of industrial and 
luxury goods.
Free trade, it was argued, promoted peace, international harmony 
and goodwill. Unrestricted access to world markets removed the need for 
military commitments overseas and participation in dangerous foreign 
entanglements.21 W. E. Gladstone, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer 
in Lord Palmerston's administration and a future British Prime Minister, 
was one of the imperial garrison system's most ardent critics. He 
argued that as long as Canada relied on Britain for its defence it would 
never achieve true nationhood.22 Like many other free traders, he 
believed that the acquisition of self-government implied responsibility 
for new duties such as defence. It fostered self-reliance and self- 
confidence in the colony; essential qualities which would relieve 
Britain of the financial burden of colonial defence and release garrison 
troops for home defence or continental duty. He therefore saw Canadian 
demands for continued maintenance of a large British garrison in the 
colony inconsistent with their parallel demands for increased 
responsible government, and was determined to rectify this 
inconsistency.
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SECTION 1.1: CANADIAN POLICIES 1867-1900
On becoming Prime Minister, Gladstone championed the doctrine of 
laissez-faire economics. His doctrinaire approach to the problems of 
empire had been successfully employed for political ends in the election 
of 1868. His administration was elected on a programme of domestic 
reform, retrenchment, and peaceful co-existence in foreign affairs.23 
In North America the withdrawal of imperial troops would satisfy British 
domestic pressure for restraints on imperial spending, fulfil Britain's 
army reforms and justify the effort and ideal behind Canadian 
confederation. Equally important, it was vital that Britain improve 
relations with the United States so that she could concentrate her 
attention on European affairs.24
Upon assuming office Gladstone wanted the remnants of the garrison 
system to be dismantled as soon as possible. Edward Cardwell, Secretary 
of State for War and the architect responsible for sweeping military 
reforms during this period, proposed to reduce the imperial garrison in 
Canada by 10,000 men.25 However, frontier duty in Manitoba in 1870, 
and delays in the refortification of Quebec prevented the withdrawal of 
imperial troops from central Canada until 1871.26 Nevertheless, the 
reforms fulfilled Gladstone's election promise of adopting a policy of 
colonial retrenchment. More importantly, Cardwell's policies 
demonstrated Britain's determination to readjust and respond to the 
worsening diplomatic and military situation in Europe.
The entire policy caused great anxiety in Canada. Many Canadians 
believed that Britain was abandoning her imperial responsibilities and 
exposing Canada to eventual American annexation. This did not happen, 
but fear of American annexation, particularly of Manitoba and the North- 
West territory, was a motivating factor behind Canadian post­
confederation settlement and economic development in western Canada.
In 1870 the new province of Manitoba was created and Sir Garnet 
Wolseley was despatched with a force of British regulars and Ontario 
militia to reinforce Canadian political authority in the region. When 
the adventure was completed the Canadian government offered scrip to 
each member of the expedition as a reward for services rendered. The 
scrip granted each soldier the right to claim 160 acres of land, the 
majority of which was taken along the Red River. The Canadian 
government hoped the expedition would stave off any American
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annexationist designs on western Canada, whilst also acting as a 
deterrent against pro-American agitation or native unrest. However, 
most of the soldiers promptly sold their scrip to hungry land 
speculators and returned to eastern Canada.27
In 1885 the North-West territory was engulfed by rebellion and an 
expeditionary force was despatched to quash it. The campaign was 
successful and the veterans of the North-West Rebellion, like their 
predecessors in 1870, became eligible for land grants. The terms were 
generous and consisted of two adjacent quarter sections totalling 320 
acres; or for those who did not want to become settlers scrip was 
awarded valued at $80. Obviously, the proposed compensation was a 
patriotic response for services rendered and inconveniences suffered in 
putting down the insurrection. Once again, security on the frontier was 
another factor in determining policy. However there was a subtle but 
important shift in emphasis away from military strategy in favour of 
economic development which was emphasised by the doubling of the land 
grant. The success of the military operation had demonstrated Canada's 
determination to protect its sovereignty in the region. However, long­
term security could only be maintained through an effective economic 
strategy in which large-scale settlement was an important component. 
Canadian politicians therefore saw soldier settlement as supplementing 
the overall development strategy. It was designed to open up the vast 
regions of the Canadian west ’to the young men of that soldiery who have 
seen the North-West, who know its advantages, and desire to settle 
there. It is of great importance... to that country and to the whole 
Dominion, that a considerable portion of that body should take up their 
habitation in the North-West, to which they have gone as loyal soldiers 
and as supporters of the supremacy of the law and of the Government of 
Canada'.28 Unfortunately for Canada's nation-builders, the added 
inducement of an extra 160 acres did not prove as attractive to the 
campaign's victors as the scrip.
Soldier settlement in Canada was scarcely more important or 
extensive after 1867 than before. What was markedly different about it 
after confederation was that land grants ignored rank and adhered to a 
more systematic approach to colonisation and the economic development of 
the Canadian prairies. As noted above, there was a change in emphasis. 
Whereas prior to 1870 military presumptions dominated economic 
considerations as the primary motive for military settlement, the 
emphasis had shifted in favour of the latter by the 1880's. The
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initiation of a free homestead system after confederation was dictated 
by the necessity to safeguard national interests, promote western 
expansion and realise the goal of a transcontinental Dominion 'against 
the march of 'manifest destiny' south of the border'. Therefore the 
emphasis on land selection was shifting from military strategy and 
defence to planned settlement and agricultural productivity, with the 
economic motives becoming rather more prominent as the century 
progressed.29
SECTION 1.2: A NEW DEPARTURE 1900-1914
Canada was the only Dominion to maintain a soldier settlement 
policy until 1914. After the Boer War (1899-1902) Canada expanded her 
soldier settlement policy in conjunction with the overall expansion of 
her immigration and free-homestead policies. The newly founded 
Commonwealth of Australia did not offer any inducement for its Boer War 
veterans to settle as farmers after the war.30 The issue was discussed 
in New Zealand, but unlike Canada no special legislation was enacted for 
returning New Zealand soldiers or British veterans desirous of settling 
there. R. J. Seddon, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, made it clear 
in 1903 that no distinction or preferential treatment would be given to 
any prospective settler, 'whether returned troopers, or persons now 
resident in our colony, or persons of the farming class coming here from 
the Mother-country'.31 Everyone would be given equal treatment. South 
Africa was a special case and will be described in a subsequent chapter.
In March 1902 the Liberal government of Wilfrid Laurier was asked 
in Parliament if it intended to make land grants available to Canadian 
volunteers who had participated with British forces in the South African 
campaign. Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, replied 
that the Dominion government had not yet considered the matter.32 The 
federal government was cautious for several reasons. The settlement and 
economic expansion of western Canada had been a major objective of 
successive federal governments since confederation. In order to 
facilitate an orderly and uniform settlement and development policy in 
the prairie region the administration of Crown land remained under the 
supervision of the federal government. Though there remained on the 
prairies millions of productive, virgin acres ready to yield to the 
settler's plough, any initiative by the federal government on behalf of
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the veterans would be confined to the limited regions under its 
jurisdiction. This was a problem in itself. Because Crown land was a 
provincial jurisdiction outside the prairies, veterans from the maritime 
provinces, Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec would be discriminated 
against and would have to rely on their respective provincial 
governments to implement a resettlement policy.
In December 1906 the volatile Sam Hughes, a future Conservative 
Minister of Militia, tabled a resolution calling for a land grant system 
to be established on the Dominion lands in the three prairie provinces 
for veterans who had resided in those provinces prior to the Boer War. 
The resolution was, in part, a response to the steps recently taken by 
the provincial governments of Ontario and British Columbia who saw fit 
to reward their own veterans. Moreover, it was an attempt by Hughes to 
increase the pressure on the federal government for a policy. The 
entire issue of veterans' land grants on the prairies had been stalled 
since 1900 because, as the Liberals pointed out, until autonomy had been 
granted to the North-West territory it was not certain who would be in a 
position to issue such grants, whether the federal government or the 
newly constituted provincial governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan. 
Provincial status was obtained in 1905, but control of the Dominion 
lands remained in the hands of the federal government.33 Volunteers 
from the maritimes, Quebec and the Yukon territory were not so 
fortunate. The federal government reserved the right to expand the 
scope to veterans outside the original resolution but made it clear to 
the opposition that it would confine its efforts to the three prairie 
provinces. However, it acknowledged the Ontario and British Columbia 
examples and encouraged similar participation from Quebec and the 
maritime provinces.3*
It was obvious that the federal government was determined to 
promote land settlement in areas under its jurisdiction even at the 
expense of the development of the older provinces. Nevertheless, the 
federal government had little to fear in the way of criticism from its 
provincial counterparts. Their Crown land was heavily forested, 
inaccessible and would take years of perseverance and painstaking labour 
to make it agriculturally productive. On the other hand, the prairie 
region was rapidly being opened up by ambitious railway branchline 
construction. New areas of easily cleared land were being surveyed and 
sold to eager settlers. Veterans comprised an insignificant number 
compared to the flood of American, British and East European immigrants
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arriving daily. But politically it was important to give them a fresh 
start for the sacrifices they had endured on Canada's behalf. At the 
same time the veterans' resettlement policy contributed to the federal 
government's main objective: an economic development programme designed
to strengthen the nation. Yet, it was a contribution which took a long 
time to be realised.
In 1908 the Volunteer Bounty Act was enacted authorising the grant 
of two adjoining quarter sections or 320 acres of Dominion lands to 
volunteers who had served with British forces during the South African 
conflict. Surprisingly, the act made no mention of a prairie residence 
requirement.35 The usual fees levied for homestead entry and land 
patents were waived. However, each applicant was obliged to meet the 
homesteading provisions prescribed under the Dominion Lands Act of 1872. 
Under these provisions each applicant was required to submit a homestead 
entry before 31 December 1910 and begin residence and cultivation on his
claim within six months after the deadline. Alternatively, the
applicant could surrender his rights to the homestead and receive scrip 
valued at $160. Scrip, which was transferable, was issued by the 
Minister of the Interior on warrants issued by the Minister of Militia. 
The value of the scrip was later increased to $500 in 1912.36 The
final result was a tremendous windfall for the land speculators as the
land grant system deteriorated into the worst form of military gratuity. 
The Liberals, in opposition after the election of 1911, sharply attacked 
R. L. Borden's Conservative government, condemning the cash bonus system 
as nothing more than a 'big rake-off' which allowed the speculator 'an 
opportunity to make money without the volunteer doing what the country 
intended should be done'.37 For example, of the 1.25 million acres of 
scrip taken up in Saskatchewan..more than 95% was patented by 
speculators, and in Alberta the figure was even higher at 96%: 'a
tribute to the acquisitiveness of the speculator rather than to the 
pertinacity of the South African volunteer',38 Problems continued to 
haunt the Conservative government as the deadline for the date of 
homestead location was continually being extended. Finally, 31 October 
1913 was chosen as the last possible date for filing entry. Scrip could 
be claimed until 31 December 1914.39
In parallel with Canadian efforts to implement a policy for its 
own Boer War veterans were attempts to promote the immigration and 
settlement of discharged British soldiers, reservists and pensioners on 
the Canadian prairies. Accompanying Hughes's demands in 1906 for a
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veterans' settlement policy in western Canada was an ’old favorite 
[sic]' of his: a request that the interests of Canada and the empire
would be better served with the settlement of honourably discharged 
British soldiers and their families. He lamented that private 
enterprise had not devised a system of introducing this very valuable 
immigrant to Canada when it was acknowledged by the railway companies 
interviewed by him that ex-soldiers made good railway foremen and 
section hands. Hughes even suggested that the government should 
subsidise a settlement programme on the prairies for these men.*0
The Canadian government had taken some interest in the issue since 
before the Boer War. J. A. Smart, Deputy Minister of the Interior, 
believed that many discharged British soldiers possessed a limited 
amount of capital and, ’if they knew that they could be located on 
farms, [they] might have sufficient experience to enable them to go on 
these lands or place their sons on them' .*1 The Canadian High 
Commission in London reported that an increasing number of enquiries had 
been received from discharged soldiers contemplating emigration to 
Canada. Past policies had concentrated on distributing pamphlets and 
emigration propaganda to the libraries at the numerous regimental 
depots. However, in August 1899 it was announced that the propaganda 
campaign in Britain would be intensified and expanded to focus the 
attention of this desirable class of settler on Canada.*2 The outbreak 
of war in October of 1899 delayed its implementation.
After the Boer War the Canadian government launched its publicity 
campaign. A special edition of an emigration pamphlet aimed at British 
ex-soldiers and reservists was released in October 1902. ’The British 
soldier in the last war has given ample proof of his capacity for 
endurance and adaptability during the vicissitudes of a most arduous 
campaign. The same spirit shewn in civil life in Canada will most 
certainly bring its assured reward'. Rhetoric aside, the pamphlet's 
real focus was on Canada's need for experienced agriculturists with 
capital, tenant farmers and farm labourers.*3 However, those soldiers 
who believed they had the proper experience and who wanted to emigrate 
were usually unable to pay for their overseas passage because they were 
unemployed. As a result, demands for an assisted passage scheme or a 
fare subsidisation programme were forwarded to the Canadian government. 
Smart warmed to the idea. He informed Frank Willard, secretary of the 
Imperial Yeomanry Self-Help Employment Association, that it was not the 
policy of the Canadian government to grant assisted passages or grant
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free transportation to Canada. However, if there were a large number of 
willing young men eager to work as farm labourers in western Canada, it 
might be possible to make arrangements with a steamship company and 
secure a reduced rate.*4
Discussions between Canadian immigration authorities and a group 
of British officers interested in establishing a settlement colony for 
discharged veterans and reservists occurred immediately after the war.
W. T. R. Preston, Commissioner of Emigration in London, was extremely 
enthusiastic about the idea. He found the organisers motivated by the 
highest ideals; men especially interested in settling fellow brother 
officers. Completely satisfied that there were no selfish aspirations 
behind the scheme, Preston sent a hearty endorsement to Ottawa.45 The 
officers represented the Rifleman's Aid Society. The project involved 
the formation of a syndicate in which prospective emigrants would become 
shareholders. This would provide the financial security and working 
capital the society needed to purchase farm land in Canada. They were 
anxious to obtain a list of railway companies which had land for sale, 
but they also sought the government's assurance that each settler was 
entitled to the free land grant of 160 acres provided under the Dominion 
Lands Act. Furthermore, the promoters were interested in procuring a 
certain number of townships or a large block of land which would be 
reserved for the syndicate.46
The government was willing to cooperate with the society and 
provide suitable land for its scheme. However, it was opposed to 
setting apart whole townships or reserving large tracts of land for a 
specific colonisation project. 'The difficulty', explained Smart, ’is 
that most persons who desire to have lands reserved for a large colony 
want a considerable time to carry out their scheme and if this is 
complied with it simply means that lands are locked up for a long period 
which might otherwise be settled on',47 Settlement had to be 
scattered. The promoters attempted to reassure the Canadian authorities 
that their project was organised on a sounder footing than previous 
group settlements. They spoke of establishing training depots in 
England which would prepare the settler for the task ahead. But the 
federal government remained adamant that it would not countenance the 
reservation of large tracts of land for an undetermined period of time. 
Previous experience with similar group settlements did not warrant an 
exception.
British army pensioners and time-expired soldiers received
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attention from Canadian authorities as well. In 1905, the Department of 
Militia and Defence considered the question of enlisting time-expired 
soldiers in Britain for service in the Canadian permanent force. They 
initiated preliminary discussions with the Department of the Interior to 
ascertain the cost of passage and whether the immigration branch would 
be interested in cooperating with them on this venture.*8 The matter 
was temporarily dropped but resurfaced several years later under 
different circumstances. The pensioners posed a more difficult problem.
The commissioners of the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, approached the 
Canadian government in 1906 on the issue of commuting army pensions of 
those pensioners desirous of emigrating to Canada. They had received 
enquiries from pensioners who had emigrated to Canada and were anxious 
to get as much of their pension commuted in order to buy land, stock and 
implements for their farming operations. Enquiries were also received 
from pensioners who wanted to use their commuted pension to pay for the 
cost of moving themselves and their families overseas to begin 
homesteading.*9 The Department of Militia sought the Department of 
Interior's advice on the feasibility of settling army pensioners in 
western Canada, but the reply was cautious and non-committal. Each case 
would have to be judged on its merits and was the sole responsibility of 
the British government. Although these men might possess some capital 
and a sincere desire to homestead, according to W. D. Scott, 
Superintendent of Immigration, *[t]he only thing we can do is to advise 
the interested parties that there are plenty of openings in Canada for 
farmers, farm labourers, or persons capable of engaging in agricultural 
pursuits, and that any capable Army Pensioners will be very welcome as 
immigrants to this country'.50
The outspoken J. Obed Smith, Assistant Superintendent of 
Emigration in London, regretted the federal government's refusal to 
encourage and assist the army pensioners beyond the customary conditions 
offered to all other emigrants. He strongly urged his superiors in 
Ottawa to reconsider the matter. *1 am quite sure there will be very 
considerable disappointment all round at the inability of the Department 
to agree to what [was considered] a very simple proposition' .51 Smith 
was convinced of the contributions these experienced men would bring to 
the betterment of the militia units in the districts in which they 
settled. He proposed that the Department of Militia institute a 
monitoring programme in order to keep track of them just in case there 
was a call to arms. These proposals were forwarded and accepted by the
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Department of Militia with the fullest endorsement of the Department of 
the Interior. Names and addresses of immigrant army pensioners were 
forwarded to the Department of Militia with particulars of the branch of 
service in which they had previously served. This information was 
communicated to the commanding officers in each district and corps in 
the vicinity where these men resided.52
SECTION 1.3: THE BRITISH NATIONAL EFFICIENCY MOVEMENT AND MIGRATION
The increasing interest in the plight of the ex-soldier, pensioner 
and reservist evident in Britain between 1900 and 1914 stemmed from the 
lessons of the Boer War. The military catastrophes suffered by British 
arms in the opening stages of the war jolted an overconfident and 
complacent people. It provided an impetus for critical national self- 
examination and spawned numerous political, social and philanthropic 
organisations and societies aimed at reforming and improving Britain's 
national ideal. As George Bernard Shaw, the novelist and social critic, 
observed, ’Whatever else the war may do or undo it at least turns its 
fierce searchlights on official, administrative and military 
perfunctoriness'.53 ’National Efficiency' became the battle cry and 
catchphrase for such critics.54 Tariff reform, compulsory military 
service, the Boy Scout movement, eugenics and more broadly the concept 
of social imperialism were promoted as means of rebuilding Britain's 
resolve and national character.
Social imperialism was a creed which inspired its adherents to 
perceive the empire as an instrument for solving urgent socio-economic 
issues in Great Britain. Though its roots extended back to the 1880s it 
was the Edwardian era that witnessed the refinement, extension and 
intensification of its ideas and appeal among a broader, politically 
more influential section of British society. Social imperialists 
emphasised greater national efficiency, imperial co-operation, 
integration and unity. Animated by social Darwinism, they were alarmed 
at the declining birth rates among the propertied classes, the high 
birth rates of the poorer classes, and the poor physical condition of 
army recruits during the Boer War who were drawn largely from the 
poorer, urban sections of British society.55 Shocked by the military 
unpreparedness of the nation during the Boer War, increasingly worried 
about the violent labour and industrial unrest which plagued Britain
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after 1902, they saw Britain's salvation in terms of a physical and 
spiritual rejuvenation of the nation. They discussed, planned and 
initiated schemes which would alleviate the stress on the social fabric 
of Britain and almost invariably looked to the empire for solutions.
Many social imperialists saw state-aided or assisted emigration as 
an important tool in their overall strategy. The pressure of mass 
unemployment and social unrest could be safely de -fused in Britain by 
indirect government sponsorship, or assistance of philanthropic 
emigration organisations, or through more direct state intervention such 
as subsidised passages or grants-in-aid. This in turn would create 
direct benefits in the Dominions by accelerating their economic 
development which complemented the social imperialists' goal of 
strengthening the physical and emotional bonds of empire. Trade unions, 
various denominational church organisations, railway and steamship 
companies, and philanthropic agencies actively participated in the 
promotion of emigration within the empire.56
Among the many emigration societies set up after the Boer War was 
the Naval and Military Emigration League (NMEL), founded in November 
1909 to cater to the specific emigration and employment needs of the 
British ex-service element. Though lacking the established reputation 
and connections of the early pioneering agencies, it conducted a 
determined propaganda and lobbying campaign between 1909 and 1914. The 
general aim of the NMEL was to furnish ex-servicemen who wanted to 
emigrate with information on employment and settlement opportunities in 
the Dominions. The organisation was chiefly concerned with the welfare 
of enlisted men, particularly those with little or no pension money. 
Although it did extend a helping hand to officers with little or no 
capital, the agency focussed its attention upon those ex-servicemen who 
were out of work and had no employment prospects or future in Britain.
It took responsibility of finding jobs in the Dominions for its clients 
and advancing the necessary money for passage and incidental expenses.
It also endeavoured to operate on a self-supporting basis; recipients 
were entitled to repay money borrowed. The NMEL strongly emphasised 
this point: it was not ’a commercial institution, and [would]
not...under any circumstances, look to make a profit. At the same time 
it [was] not a charity'.57
The league's central committee in London coordinated fund raising, 
propaganda and lobbying campaigns, while committees were established in 
leading Canadian cities. Australian and New Zealand activities were
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handled through the offices of the British Immigration League of 
Australia headquartered in Sydney. The driving force behind the NMEL 
was E. T. Scammell, its founder and honorary secretary. Field Marshall 
Lord Roberts was the NMEL's president and it was his reputation rather 
than his administrative skills from which the league benefitted most. 
Roberts had commanded the victorious British forces in South Africa. 
Appalled by the sloth and unpreparedness of the British military machine 
during the campaign, he became a staunch advocate of military reform.
In particular he sought the introduction of compulsory military service 
and was founder of the National Service League.
As early as 1907 British and Canadian authorities had discussed 
the immigration of British reservists to Canada. The question arose 
when the Canadian government asked permission to enlist British army 
reservists residing in Canada, in particular, Royal Engineers for its 
permanent force. The Army Council, the formal decision making body at 
the War Office, granted permission.58 However, in the ensuing 
discussions several points were raised which led to a reassessment and 
clarification of the War Office's policy.
At the time when the last remaining British regulars were 
withdrawn from Canada in 1906, the Canadian government had been allowed, 
temporarily, to enlist reservists residing in Canada. Once enlisted in 
the Canadian permanent force these men were immediately discharged from 
the British army reserve. With the growing tension in Europe, the 
maintenance of a large, strong and well-equipped reserve in Britain 
became increasingly important. The War Office remained disposed to meet 
the specialised manpower needs of the Canadian permanent force but not 
at the cost of depleting its own reserve. Compounding the problem was 
the War Office's fear that increased emigration to Canada would further 
deplete its reserves. Once these men joined Canada's permanent force 
and became an integral part of that establishment, they were 
irretrievable and lost to the British army in time of war.
The Army Council decided to terminate the temporary arrangement of 
discharging its reservists upon enlistment in the Canadian forces. 
British reservists who joined the Canadian forces were now liable to 
rejoin the Imperial army on mobilisation. The Canadian government 
raised no objections and promised full cooperation to assist the 
Imperial government ’in calling out and equipping for service on 
mobilisation not only those serving with the Canadian Force, but all 
other reservists residing in Canada',59 In the event of mobilisation
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for war, the Canadian government also became responsible for the 
collection and despatch of the reservists to the required theatre of 
war. In return, the War Office gave Canadian military authorities 
permission to recruit Royal Engineers in the United Kingdom.60
The emigration of men on transfer to the army reserve again became 
an issue with the Army Council in 1909. The discussions were sparked by 
the British Immigration League of Australia which desired to facilitate 
the emigration to Australia of soldiers who were transferred to the army 
reserve in India. Hitherto, free passage to a chosen place of residence 
within the United Kingdom only was granted to those men on transfer to 
the reserve wherever they were last stationed. However, British 
soldiers discharged in India were entitled under Indian government 
regulations to conveyance to a destination of their choice either in the 
United Kingdom or to the nearest port in any British colony within steam 
communication of India. The British Immigration League of Australia 
wanted an extension of this latter privilege to allow men transferred to 
the reserve in India the option of using their free passage to sail to a 
British colony rather than be restricted to returning home.61
The Quarter-Master General pointed out that any concession made to 
men leaving the colours in India would have to be equally conceded to 
men leaving the colours at other overseas stations. In fact, men 
leaving the colours in Great Britain might even claim the privilege of 
free passage to an overseas colony. This was a potentially dangerous 
situation from a manpower point of view as there were already 6,000 
reservists living outside the United Kingdom. The Army Council did not 
object to granting these privileges to discharged soldiers, but 'the 
case of members of the Reserve, who may be called on to meet a sudden 
national emergency, is different [and] while nothing should be done to 
stop reservists living in the Colonies, it would be short-sighted to 
encourage them to do so'.62 The request of the British Immigration 
League of Australia was denied and no alterations were recommended to 
the present system which allowed reservists to live outside Great 
Britain.63
In 1912, the Canadian Department of Militia announced the offer of 
150 vacancies for specialised positions in Canada's permanent force. A 
representative was sent to London to negotiate an agreement with the War 
Office to allow the emigration of reservists to Canada and to acquire 
ninety artillerymen, forty-five engineers, five infantry instructors, 
five departmental corps staff and five army service corps personnel for
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the Canadian military. The men were to enlist in the Canadian permanent 
forces for three years and were granted free third-class passage for 
themselves and their families.64 The Canadian government believed that 
the offer would prove highly attractive to ex-servicemen and reservists 
wishing to establish themselves overseas for it allowed them the 
opportunity of familiarising themselves with Canadian conditions and way 
of life while in secure employment. From a military standpoint the 
advantages the Canadian armed forces obtained from the scheme were 
obvious: experience, expertise and professionalism.
The War Office agreed. It did not want to discourage the 
emigration of those ex-soldiers who had completed their conditions of 
service and were not obliged to serve in the reserve. However, the Army 
Council was unwilling to assist or promote the emigration of men still 
serving in the reserve by offering financial inducements such as 
advances on reserve pay or commutation of pensions.65 Reservations 
were also raised in some quarters of the War Office that emigration was 
a useless exercise if no prospect of employment existed which did not 
utilise the training these men had received in the army. Adaptation to 
new conditions in an unfamiliar environment took time and the War Office 
readily admitted that men withdrawn from civilian life for extended 
periods of time possessed only the very rudiments of training required 
to adapt to changed conditions in the Dominions.66
The Army Council suggested that this difficulty could be overcome 
if the Dominion governments guaranteed employment for these men for a 
period of two to three years in their permanent forces. By establishing 
a transition period in the Dominions from military to civilian life the 
ex-soldier could familiarise himself with his new surroundings and 
ensure a better chance of finding secure employment. Indeed, from a 
military standpoint the Dominions benefitted directly 'as these men 
would form a valuable nucleus of trained soldiers, on which to found the 
more extensive systems of defence... foreshadowed by recent Imperial 
Conferences and local legislation. Such a nucleus would...tend to 
improve the training and discipline, and to promote the cohesion and 
military solidarity of the local forces',67
The Colonial Office concurred with the War Office that the 
contribution of time-expired ex-servicemen who enrolled in the permanent 
forces of the Dominions would prove invaluable. But the activities of 
the NMEL were another matter. Privately several senior Colonial Office 
officials sympathised with Scammell's motives and organisation and its
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emphasis on promoting imperial defence. However, they remained adamant 
that the Imperial government should not interfere with or commit itself 
in any way to the promotion or assistance of emigration. Committed to 
the doctrine of laissez-faire, successive British administrations had 
constantly repelled demands by private emigration agencies and charities 
to undertake a more active role in channelling emigrants to the 
Dominions. People like produce, the Imperial government argued, must 
not be treated any differently in a free trade economy. But it was the 
financial burden which the Imperial government most wanted to avoid and 
any hint of government monetary assistance toward emigration immediately 
raised the ire of the Colonial Office.
In February 1909, nine months before the foundation of the NMEL, 
Scammell had approached the Colonial Office with a proposal to assist 
British army pensioners desirous of emigrating to the Dominions.
Scammell was no doubt probing the permanent officials to see what kind 
of reaction he could expect when the NMEL was launched later that year. 
He advocated the commutation of military pensions, in whole or in part, 
to enable army pensioners to settle in the overseas empire, and urged 
the government to provide cheap passage for the pensioners, 
accommodation and temporary employment upon arrival in the Dominions.
The cash value of the commuted pension would defray the costs of 
passage, accommodation and incidental expenses. As a safeguard the cash 
value of the commuted pension would not be given to the pensioner until 
he had sufficient time to adjust to the colonial environment. This 
would ’enable him to judge his own fitness for colonial life and the 
prospects offered him in that colony'.68 C. P. Lucas, an Assistant 
Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, regarded Scammell's request for 
pension commutation ’a very dangerous thing', and he reported that the 
representative from the Local Government Board 'spoke most strongly' 
against the entire proposition.69
The Imperial government reiterated its opposition in Parliament to 
financial gratuities to assist ex-soldiers and reservists to emigrate. 
Sir Clement Kinloch-Cooke, a leading editor, parliamentarian and an avid 
emigration lobbyist, asked the Secretary of State for War, R. B.
Haldane, whether the government had considered the recommendations 
regarding emigration tabled in 1906 by the Ward Committee on the Civil 
Employment of Ex-Soldiers and Sailors. In particular, had the Secretary 
examined the possibility of negotiating an agreement with the Dominions 
to advance the money necessary to cover the travelling expenses of the
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ex-servicemen? Furthermore, had the Secretary investigated the 
Dominions' views on the matter?70 Haldane replied that no concrete 
steps had been taken to learn the views of the Dominions and he 
emphasised the restrictive nature regarding the emigration of 
reservists. He endorsed, however, the emigration and employment of 
time-expired soldiers in the permanent forces of the Dominions.71
The preliminary enquiries conducted by Scammell and Kinloch-Cooke 
into the Imperial government's attitude toward military migration were 
important for several reasons. First, they forced the Imperial 
government to start thinking seriously about the discharge, transfer and 
employment of its reservists and time-expired men in the Dominions. In 
particular, their enquiries illustrated the use of military migration as 
a method which would enhance unity, cooperation and coordination between 
the military forces of the mother country and the Dominions, and as a 
constructive step toward the improvement of imperial defence.72 
Finally, the enquiries forced the British government to come to grips 
with an increasingly important issue. As we have seen, the War Office 
became alarmed at the potential manpower drain military migration 
implied. Consequently, it rejected the recommendations of both the Ward 
Committee and the Tennyson Committee on Agricultural Settlements in 
British Colonies, to provide state-aided emigration to the Dominions for 
selected ex-servicemen and their families.73 The War Office also 
rejected the suggestion that a central association, subsidised but not 
controlled by the Admiralty and War Office, be created to coordinate the 
efforts of the voluntary agencies and charities interested in the 
welfare of ex-servicemen.7* However, the Army Council approved the 
recommendation of the general officer commanding the London district, to 
convene an informal conference between the employment and charitable 
institutions and the permanent under-secretaries of the departments of 
state concerned with the problem of employment and emigration of ex- 
servicemen.75
Despite initial Colonial Office objections and War Office 
reservations the first eighteen months were encouraging for the NMEL. 
Correspondence from interested applicants seeking information and advice 
reached over 2,100 enquiries. Canada received the lion's share of the 
268 ex-servicemen who did emigrate; 137 embarking on civil employment 
and forty-six joining the Canadian military. Australia took seventy- 
eight while New Zealand and South Africa gained only one ex-service 
emigrant each.76 The numbers for the following eighteen months (July
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1911 to December 1912) more than doubled. Of the 671 ex-servicemen who 
emigrated from England, 421 embarked for Canada while 239 travelled to 
Australia. Once again the numbers destined for South Africa and New 
Zealand proved negligible. What remained surprising about the Canadian 
statistics was that those undertaking military employment outstripped 
those with jobs in the civil sector: 221 compared to 157 respectively.
A new dimension was demonstrated by the statistics with forty-three ex- 
servicemen entering police work in Canada.77
The NMEL was pleased with its accomplishments in three years of 
operation. Approximately 1,500 men, women and children had emigrated 
under the auspices of the league. Even more gratifying was the close 
cooperation the league enjoyed with the various regimental associations 
who contributed to the league's coffers and to the fares of ex- 
servicemen and their families. This was of considerable importance 
because it relieved some of the financial burden and allowed the NMEL to 
help a number of the less fortunate men who needed greater assistance.
In 1912 the league advanced money to 208 emigrants and obtained 
reductions on passage for a further twenty-five. Not surprisingly, in 
light of the Canadian government's offer of 150 vacancies in the 
permanent force, the federal government paid full fare for seventy men 
procured through the NMEL. In the spring of 1913 the remaining eighty 
candidates emigrated to join the Canadian permanent force. Once again 
they were obtained through the league; fifty-three for the Royal 
Canadian Garrison Artillery and twenty-seven for the Royal Canadian 
Horse Artillery.78
Despite growing confidence within the league, fostered by its 
initial successes, its members remained determined not to sit on their 
laurels. The executive warned that if it had not been for a timely 
contribution from a private enthusiast the entire organisation would 
have ceased operations. Much more could be done for an ever growing 
number of applicants, but inadequate funding was preventing the league 
from effectively carrying out its objectives. An appeal was made to the 
membership to increase the value of its donations and endeavour to enrol 
new members to broaden the financial resources of the organisation.79 
A further appeal was made to the public for a working fund of £10,000. 
The league suggested that it was nothing for the Imperial and Dominion 
governments to contribute £2,000 each to the fund.
What a trifle it is to give new hope in life to some
thousand men who have served their country well each year;
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to add a battalion...each year to the defensive forces of 
the Dominions— men whose vital energies and physical 
strength will be conserved instead of sinking through 
despair into inefficiency, as it too often does under 
conditions at home; to spread a leaven of men of British 
blood, disciplined and filled with reverence for the flag, 
through Canada, Australia, and South Africa!80
Similarly, the league had to ensure that its critics did not 
undermine its reputation as an imperial philanthropic agency. The 
league took great pains to remind its supporters that it did not 
advocate emigration except in those cases where time-expired ex- 
servicemen found it impossible to find employment in Britain. From its 
inception in 1909 the NMEL stressed that no man would be sent to the 
Dominions unless he had a definite offer of employment.81 At the same 
time, the league was determined to give ex-servicemen a chance to 
prosper and become wage earners in another part of the empire rather 
than sink to the depths of poverty and 'human wreckage' ; a condition 
already too prevalent amongst these men.82 This would involve greater 
cooperation from the Imperial and Dominion authorities.
In August 1912 Scammell arrived in Canada for a two to three month 
tour with the express purpose of visiting all the provinces to 
investigate the civil and military openings each offered to the league's 
clients.83 Before any proposals were prepared and submitted to the 
Canadian government, Scammell thought it wise to confer with the 
provincial committees of the league as to the availability of job 
opportunities for an increased number of ex-servicemen; also to 
establish whether arrangements existed between the Canadian government 
and the league for securing immigrants. He addressed meetings all 
across the country receiving wide press coverage and a good deal of 
enthusiastic support. J. B. Walker, Superintendent of Immigration in 
Winnipeg endorsed Scammell's proposals because they constituted 'the 
most sane, sensible and practical immigration policy that had ever been 
submitted to him' .***
Scammell submitted the proposals to the Minister of the Interior 
in late October. He informed the minister that he had been empowered to 
ask the Canadian government if they were prepared to advance fares, with 
or without interest, to carefully selected candidates and if they were 
prepared to arrange, through the immigration officers in cooperation 
with the Canadian committees, to secure repayment of the money 
advanced.85 In a further letter to W. J. Roche, the new Minister of
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the Interior, Scammell proposed that in the event of the Canadian 
government agreeing to the NMEL's fare subsidisation scheme, the league 
would be willing to allow Canadian emigration officials in Britain to 
participate in the selection of prospective ex-servicemen. The league 
would be wholly responsible for guaranteeing advances made to immigrants 
and sought to reassure Canadian authorities that the machinery existed 
to make the system of repayment work.
There was a further consideration. Scammell wanted the applicants 
to be regarded as a special class because of the sacrifices they had 
made to the empire, their potential as good settlers and as a source of 
manpower in future conflicts. The ex-servicemen, he insisted, were an 
investment in the future strength of the empire. Scammell argued that 
monetarily they constituted a ’direct financial advantage' to Canada in 
the neighbourhood of $650,000-$700,000 annually.86 If the Canadian 
government accepted the ’experimental arrangement' with the league for 
the immigration of 1,000 British ex-servicemen, a ’considerable 
addition' to Canada's ’means of defence' would be achieved justifying 
the future expansion of the scheme.87
Canadian immigration authorities found Scammell's request for 
government financial assistance ’somewhat unusual'.88 However, the 
Department of Militia welcomed the NMEL's offer to place one of its 
members from its executive committee at the disposal of the Canadian 
government to assist in the screening and selection of successful 
applicants. Canadian authorities also agreed to let the league make all 
the necessary passage arrangements for the ex-soldiers and their 
families. To facilitate smoother communications between the NMEL and 
the Canadian government in London, the Department of Militia requested 
that Lieutenant-Colonel P. E. Thacker, previously attached to the 
General Staff at the War Office, be temporarily posted as the Canadian 
government's liaison officer with the NMEL. The War Office complied.89 
It also agreed to conduct medical examinations of applicants prior to 
embarkation on behalf of the Canadian government. The War Office 
acceded to this request after a number of men had been refused entry 
into Canada on the grounds of being medically unfit.90 Though the 
cases were isolated they had received wide publicity and had proven 
embarrassing on both sides of the Atlantic.
The majority of the ex-servicemen which the league sent to Canada 
were found satisfactory, but the government was extremely disappointed 
by the very small percentage who embarked upon farming. As early as
29
1903, senior immigration officials had reported that ex*soldiers rarely 
made good farmers in Canada and those who did take up farming seldom 
remained on the land for any length of time 'as most of them do not seem 
to care for steady work'.91 W. D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration 
in Ottawa, reported that 'whether it is the earlier training and lack of 
initiative, I do not know, but in any case they make poor 
farmers....They seldom take to agricultural work, preferring rather to 
stay in the cities where numbers of them can be found working as 
elevator men, janitors, etc'.92 This trend continued right up to the 
outbreak of war. Of the 314 subsidised ex-servicemen who arrived in 
Canada during 1913 only twenty-nine took up farming.93 British army 
pensioners proved to be particularly troublesome and the most 
embarrassing from the Department of the Interior's viewpoint. After 
several disappointing placements Scott warned the Canadian High 
Commission that army pensioners were better left in the mother-country. 
'Our Employment Agents will scarcely touch any more charitable 
organisation or army pensioners....Almost without exception they 
complain that such men are worse than useless, owing to the trouble they 
give in being placed'.9*
Scott advised the government not to contemplate or initiate an 
increased absorption of the ex-soldier class.95 Landing permits would 
be granted to ex-servicemen provided they could pay the $200 landing 
fee. Immigration agents had the authority to waive the monetary 
regulations only if the men were going to assured agricultural 
employment, and not if they were 'destined to employment other than farm 
work' ,96 W. W. Cory, Deputy Minister of the Interior, agreed and the 
monetary regulations were reintroduced. Landing fees would be waived 
only in special circumstances such as agricultural labourers, farmers 
and those enlisting with the Canadian army or the Royal North West 
Mounted Police; or in cases when certain classes of unskilled labour 
were not available in Canada or within easy access of the district where 
the immigrant was being employed.97
In March 1914 Canadian authorities made it abundantly clear to 
Scammell that the 'need of Canada is first and always for men who are 
prepared to work on the land and that...this is the only class of men 
who should be encouraged to emigrate'.9® Scammell posed no objections 
and offered to make a concerted effort to secure ex-servicemen recruited 
in the rural areas of Britain who would have the requisite agricultural 
knowledge and experience as well as the willingness and determination to
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succeed on a farm. In order to ensure success he asked that 
arrangements be made with local farmers to take on inexperienced as well 
as experienced farmers for a twelve month period." Scammell continued 
to maintain that the lack of the necessary passage money was still the 
most inhibiting factor to the entire programme of ex-soldier migration. 
But he was pleased that the Canadian government upheld its policy of 
waiving the monetary regulations for new arrivals undertaking 
agricultural employment or occupations deemed as special 
circumstances.100
The outbreak of war in August 1914 effectively ended the NMEL's 
operations but not before a total of 2,388 men, women and children had 
emigrated to the Dominions under the league's auspices.101 Canada 
remained the favoured Dominion and it would seem that the Canadian 
government did more than any other Dominion to assist its ex-soldiers 
and imperial veterans. Similarly, Canada benefitted most by the 
recruitment of these professional soldiers into its permanent force.
The cooperation displayed between 1900 and 1914 by the Canadian and 
Imperial governments on a small-scale, soldier migration programme was 
commendable because it demonstrated their commitment to maintain a 
healthy imperial defence policy. The use by both governments of a 
philanthropic organisation to promote imperial defence was also 
significant for it demonstrated official willingness to use private 
means to meet specialised emigration requirements. This occurred at a 
time when the British government steadfastly refused to intervene in the 
promotion of everyday emigration.
However, the NMEL's achievements must not be overstated. Despite 
its elaborate network of local, voluntary committees and the 
endorsements from many prominent imperialists throughout the empire, it 
operated on a shoestring and failed to secure steadfast and large-scale 
official support. Moreover, it failed to overcome Britain's commitment 
to laissez-faire. Indeed, the fear of a European war and the need to 
keep military reserves at home was the British government's overriding 
concern which, in the final analysis, was the greatest single factor 
limiting the NMEL's operations. In the end, it did little more than 
assist in recruiting a few specialists for the Canadian army. 
Nonetheless, its activities highlighted the growing importance some 
elements of Edwardian society were taking in the welfare of the empire's 
soldiery. With the advent of war in August 1914, that concern was 
intensified and redirected into new channels.
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CHAPTER TWO
LAISSEZ FAIRE TO STATE INTERVENTION: EMPIRE MIGRATIONt
SOLDIER SETTLEMENT AND BRITISH VARTIME INITIATIVE 1880-1922
’Emigration is in itself only a private affair*it does not,
as such, concern Governments'.
J. R. Seeley, imperial publicist and historian, 1885.1
The Victorian era was the great age of social reform and the 
development of a middle-class social consciousness. Rapid 
industrialisation transformed a predominantly rural agricultural society 
into a highly urbanised industrial society. The transformation was 
certainly not smooth or without its victims. Mass unemployment, civil 
unrest, abject poverty and class struggle seriously threatened to snap 
the existing social order. Unemployment, in particular, was seen as 
industrial society's most frightening disease because from it a whole 
host of other social maladies was spawned. Increasingly, the empire was 
seen as a possible panacea for Britain's economic and social 
disorders.2
The concept of limited state-aided imperial migration, as we have 
seen, was first developed in the post-Napoleonic period as an experiment 
to relieve post-war economic distress. Despite its lack-lustre success 
as a policy, ideologically it continued to generate a powerful hold over 
a small group of influential philanthropists and officials. During the 
1820s and 1830s the emigration programmes of such enthusiasts as Robert 
Wilmot Horton, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (1822-28), and 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield received a great deal of public interest. Both, 
in their own particular way, firmly believed that government-sponsored 
emigration was an effective instrument for relieving the stress on 
Britain's social fabric.3 Early Victorian ’friendly societies', and by 
the 1860s trade unions, began to shift their attention from organisation 
benefits being used to pay for emigration assistance to the active 
participation of the state. The mid-Victorian period also witnessed 
several large public campaigns by trade unionists and working-class
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agitators who were determined to force the government to adopt 
subsidised emigration for the unemployed.* The government, committed 
to laissez-faire, remained unmoved and allowed the public agitation to 
fizzle out.
Despair erupted into mob violence when demonstrators, protesting 
against unemployment, rioted in Trafalgar Square in February 1886. The 
unemployment crisis of the 1880s and the intense trade union militancy 
which resulted once again brought state-aided emigration to the public 
forum. The formation of the National Association by a group of London- 
based philanthropists and clergymen in 1883 signalled the last large- 
scale popular front for state-aided emigration. Supporting the National 
Association were various industrial, craft and agricultural union 
leaders who were convinced that state-aided emigration was the answer to 
the severe economic distress their members were experiencing.5 
Similarly, the 1880s witnessed a proliferation of philanthropic 
organisations who saw emigration as the solution to the unemployment 
issue. Headquartered in London, these societies were closely associated 
with the wave of liberal reform which was sweeping Britain. There was 
another dimension. The campaign for imperial federation was launched at 
the same time and although there were no direct links between these 
societies and the imperial federation movement there were indications 
that a handful of these philanthropic societies were committed to 
promoting imperial emigration as a means of reinforcing imperial 
solidarity.6
The Trafalgar Square riots sufficiently shook the government from 
its usual state of suspended animation to create the Emigrants' 
Information Office (EIO) in October 1886. It was seen as a victory by 
the emigration lobby who regarded the new institution as a vital first 
step in increased government participation in emigration. The National 
Association eagerly anticipated the expansion of the EIO's 
responsibilities from an information bureau to an emigration promotion 
agency. Unfortunately for the enthusiasts their optimistic assumptions 
were short-lived as the British government steadfastly refused to 
subsidise emigration. Politically, the EIO was simply a bureaucratic 
palliative designed to satiate the appetite of the emigration lobby; its 
sole function being 'to ascertain and publish facts'.7 Furthermore, 
once the emigration issue was thus officially recognised and formalised 
into a branch of government, the influence of extra-parliamentary 
organisations such as the National Association was instantly undermined.
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Public agitation for state-aided emigration continued in the late 
1880s, but the emigration lobby was surprised when the government 
announced the appointment of a select committee on colonisation in 
December 1888. The committee's mandate was limited to the investigation 
of Scottish crofter emigration and the progress of continuing colonial 
settlement experiments. Nonetheless delighted, the emigration lobby 
immediately tried to expand the investigatory scope of the select 
committee and secure significant representation. It was successful and 
the committee's terms of reference were widened to include the 
desirability of creating additional emigration machinery.®
The hearings dragged on for three years. When the final report 
was at last submitted in March 1891, the committee concluded that no 
grounds existed for advocating a state-aided emigration programme.9 It 
did, however, recommend an increase in the EIO's operating grant. The 
report fell far short of the expectations of most emigrationists. The 
few active steps advocated by the committee were presented in an 
unassertive manner and lacked unanimity or urgency. This sounded the 
death knell of the National Association which disappeared shortly 
afterwards.10 Falling unemployment induced by economic revival rather 
than government intransigence, however, probably had more to do with Its 
disappearance. Throughout the 1890s a brightening economic picture 
continued to relieve pressure for state-aided emigration. The issue 
received little further public attention until after 1902.
Meanwhile, the officials at the EIO consistently and doggedly 
resisted all demands by private individuals and public lobbies for 
state-aided emigration between 1886 and 1914. The dictum of neither 
encouraging nor discouraging emigration remained lodged in the minds of 
successive EIO chairmen. Charles Lucas, testifying in front of the 
select committee on colonisation in 1889, did not regard emigration as a 
remedy for over-population. Emigration should be allowed to take its 
natural course, he contested, without state interference or 
involvement.11 In 1907 his successor, Henry Lambert, reaffirmed the 
EIO's commitment to supplying impartial and trustworthy information. He 
too emphasised the Imperial government's neutral stance of neither 
promoting nor deterring people from emigrating. 'That intention has 
been steadily carried out, and it has never assisted emigration by the 
grant of free passages or any other pecuniary assistance'.12 With the 
advent of war in 1914 official policy had not changed.
Despite the government's determination to resist pleas for a
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state-aided emigration policy they did not subside, and in fact obtained 
an increasingly imperial flavour in the aftermath of the Boer War.
There were a number of reasons, both domestic and imperial.
Unemployment once again confronted the British government after the 
conclusion of the Boer War and became one of the most politically 
contentious domestic issues until the outbreak of World War I. The 
British economy experienced a steep decline immediately following the 
Boer War which coincided with a dramatic surge in the Canadian economy 
and to a lesser extent in the Australian economy as well.13 The United 
States, previously the largest recipient of British emigrants in the 
nineteenth century, was thought to be filling up and therefore not as 
attractive as in the past. This led to a shift of British emigrants 
from the United States to the empire, coupled by a similar shift in 
investments which accentuated employment opportunities.1*
Similarly, unemployment was fundamental to the problem of national 
efficiency.15 Imperial integration through assisted migration now 
became a prominent demand for many social imperialists. The post-war 
emigration boom re-animated a number of British philanthropic emigration 
societies established during the unemployment crisis of the 1880s, some 
of which belonged to the social imperialist faction of the new reform 
movement. 'Emigration', pronounced one society, 'is the imperial 
solution to the national problem of the unemployed'.16 More 
importantly, emigration was a means of enhancing imperial solidarity and 
economic security in a period of diplomatic flux and growing 
international insecurity.
These concerns were reflected at the imperial level. Australian 
representatives at the Colonial Conference of 1907 introduced a 
resolution advocating that British emigrants be encouraged to proceed to 
British colonies rather than foreign destinations.17 The resolution 
was aimed primarily at redirecting the flow of British emigration to the 
Dominions from the United States and was significant because it marked 
the first time emigration had been tabled at a Colonial Conference.
Emigration had finally reached the main agenda of imperial affairs. The
resolution was unanimously endorsed.
The Australian initiative was significant for several other 
reasons. First, it demonstrated a moderate change in attitude by the 
Australian government toward the value of immigrants. Persistent 
opposition by organised labour and perennial drought had severely
restricted emigration to Australia in the latter part of the nineteenth
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century. But Canada's highly successful propaganda campaign had clearly 
demonstrated to her sister Dominions the economic benefits of a well 
orchestrated immigration policy.18 Secondly, white Australians feared 
being engulfed by a mushrooming Asian population which wanted access to 
Australia. In their determination to exclude Asians from their shores, 
they implemented tighter controls within their already highly 
controversial 'White Australia' policy.19 The exclusion of 'coloured' 
immigration through the implementation of stricter entry requirements 
for non-whites was not enough, however. If the ’White Australia' policy 
was to be effective it had to be supplemented by a substantial inflow of 
British settlers. Financial assistance for British settlers, shelved by 
the various Australian colonies during the 1870s, was renewed by several 
of them just prior to the Boer War with encouraging results. This 
policy was maintained with increased determination by the majority of 
the newly federated Australian states after 1902.20
The redirection of British settlers to the Dominions from the 
United States between 1902 and 1914 heartened social imperialists and 
imperial federationists alike. In their view the empire's security 
depended upon a strong and vigorous population; people were the empire's 
most valuable asset. The loss of British subjects to territories 
outside the British flag remained a grave problem for some who condemned 
the British government for allowing its citizens to leave the country 
for foreign shores. Imperial authorities were charged as ’guilty of a 
wanton and suicidal disregard of the future welfare of the 
community'.21 One of the government's sternest critic's was the Royal 
Colonial Institute (RCI) which coordinated and led the campaign to 
involve the British government directly in assisted emigration.
SECTION 2: THE ROYAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE
Imperial migration had always been a prominent issue on the agenda 
of the RCI and one in which it 'took a consistent and constructive 
interest'.22 Established in 1868, it had attempted to raise public 
awareness of the advantages of redirecting a larger share of British 
emigrants to destinations within rather than outside the empire.
Growing in confidence, ability and prestige, by the 1880s the RCI had 
become an important organisation for imperial enthusiasts, and by 1912 
it enjoyed 'a certain influence in official quarters'.23 But it was
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after the Boer War, and especially after the formation in 1910 of its 
Standing Emigration Committee representing a variety of voluntary 
emigration agencies and organisations, that the RCI assumed a leading 
public role.
It was in the summer of 1910 that the RCI eagerly set out to 
become the leading voice on migration matters. The Council, the 
governing body of the RCI, agreed to a proposal submitted by two of its 
leading members that it convene an emigration conference. The RCI was 
determined that the conference bring together the widest cross-section 
of private, public and government agencies involved with emigration.
The general objective of the conference was twofold: the diversion to
the Dominions of the flow of British emigrants currently going outside 
the empire, and migration between the overseas Dominions and Great 
Britain generally. Subjects tabled for discussion ranged from the 
various schemes of colonisation available, the methods employed by the 
emigration societies, the work of the Dominion governments and their 
emigration agencies and the Imperial government's position on 
emigration. Finally, and most importantly, it was suggested that the 
British government be pressured to call a 'subsidiary' conference on 
emigration to run parallel with the forthcoming Imperial Conference of
1911. It was hoped that the views, proposals and resolutions formulated 
at the subsidiary conference would be submitted to the larger Imperial 
Conference.2*
Foremost in the organisers' minds was the intense desire to 
encourage greater cooperation between the numerous emigration societies 
and to increase their effectiveness and efficiency as lobbyists. They 
argued that this was the best way of securing united action and would 
prevent, if not eliminate, a needless duplication of effort. It was a 
sound strategy, and combined with the desire to find out the Dominion 
governments' relationship with public and philanthropic efforts, was a 
step in the right direction.
The most crucial item on the agenda was the Imperial government's 
attitude toward emigration. Invitations were sent to the Colonial 
Office, Local Government Board, Board of Trade and the Home Office, all 
of which were declined.25 When the RCI's invitation was first 
received, the Colonial Office was unsure if it should accept the offer. 
It quickly emerged that the Colonial Office wanted to avoid direct 
representation at the conference and it was decided that someone from 
the EIO should attend strictly as an observer. The Colonial Office
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would get all the benefits of representation but 'would not be committed 
in any way which would appear to involve a Government emigration 
policy*.26
The conference began on 30 May 1910 with F. G. A. Butler, chairman 
of the EIO, leading the three-man government delegation. A wide variety 
of emigration societies and agencies attended achieving the 
representative cross-section the RCI had hoped to obtain.27 
Unfortunately, besides the Imperial government, the Dominion High 
Commissioners and Agents-General, who were invited, also declined to 
attend. The absence of any official government representation was 
disappointing but did not dampen the RCI's enthusiasm or conviction. As 
expected, the Imperial government came in for searing criticism.
Butler, however, was unmoved and levelled an unflattering broadside of 
his own about the conference to his superiors at the Colonial Office.
The conference, he scornfully remarked, 'afforded a splendid 
opportunity' to the various societies and agencies 'of which full 
advantage was taken, for the blowing of their own trumpets'.28 This 
resulted in little attention being paid to the real emigration issues 
and, the object of the conference 'was saved from absolute sterility' by 
a resolution establishing a standing committee on emigration at the 
RCI.29 Harsh words, perhaps, but there was a ring of truth to them.
Nonetheless, the RCI was pleased with its accomplishments. A 
forum for discussion had been established and many issues had been 
clarified. If nothing else, opinions had been aired in public which 
provided the foundation for a united front and a common policy, and this 
augured well for greater cooperation between the various societies. 
Equally important from a public relations standpoint was the prominence 
the conference gave to the RCI as the leading advocate of greater 
philanthropic cooperation and state involvement in emigration. With the 
Standing Emigration Committee a forum had been created whereby the 
momentum generated at the 1910 conference would be maintained.
In May 1911 the Standing Emigration Committee released a report 
which coincided with the opening sessions of the Imperial Conference.
The report emphasised the growing urgency of the emigration issue and 
reiterated demands made at the 1910 emigration conference that the 
question of imperial migration receive the Imperial Conference's fullest 
attention as part of the main conference agenda or through a subsidiary 
conference. Although informative and well-timed it proved ineffective. 
Imperial migration appeared on the conference agenda but the delegates
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simply reaffirmed the 1907 Colonial Conference resolution of encouraging
British emigrants to proceed to the Dominions. No change of policy was
deemed necessary because of the unprecedented number of emigrants which 
were streaming to the Dominions on their own initiative.30
Disappointed by the cursory treatment imperial migration received 
the RCI remained determined to get its views across. An excellent 
opportunity presented itself when a Dominions Royal Commission (DRC) was 
appointed in April 1912 to investigate the natural resources and trade 
of the overseas Dominions. The RCI argued that to ignore the
examination of the empire's human resources, a key factor in imperial
trade and development, would be a grave oversight which would limit 
severely the scope and impact of the investigation.31 The Imperial 
government agreed and added imperial migration to the DRC's agenda. 
However, the outbreak of war in August 1914 interrupted the DRC's 
investigations and blunted the RCI's initial expectations.
SECTION 2.1: SOLDIER SETTLEMENT, THE FIRST INITIATIVE
The RCI was not deterred from its purpose by the outbreak of war. 
As early as November 1914, the Standing Emigration Committee asked to 
send an official deputation to Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of State for 
the Colonies. The Colonial Office promptly poured cold water on this 
initiative by playing down the importance of post-war emigration in 
general. Officials were certain that the Imperial government would not 
commit itself to any policy pronouncements until the final 
recommendations of the DRC had been tabled. 'An additional reason for 
going slow', minuted Butler, 'is that no one can now foresee whether it 
will be desirable to encourage in any way the emigration of men after 
the war',32 Emigration, another Colonial Office official remarked, was 
not one of the first but one of the last expedients the government could 
implement. The nation could not afford to bleed itself of vital 
manpower during reconstruction. And soldier resettlement was 'only a 
small fractional part of the huge and infinitely more complex problems' 
of imperial post-war population adjustment. What was certain was that 
the RCI initiative could not be sanctioned and it was condemned by the 
bureaucrats as premature, inopportune and mischievous.33
Similar responses awaited the RCI from the chairman of the DRC, 
Lord D'Abernon and C. F. Rey, general manager of the Labour Exchanges
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Department at the Board of Trade. Both agreed that the demobilised 
soldier faced a grave uncertainty about his future at the end of the 
war. D'Abernon predicted that a small number of soldiers could be 
considered for emigration projects during the war but these would be men 
who had been invalided out of the services. In turn they would have to 
be both 'willing and fit' for emigration as far as their injuries would 
allow.34 Rey was even less encouraging. He was correct when he stated 
that the post-war labour situation was highly complex because it 
involved the transfer of labour from industries connected with war work 
to those associated with normal conditions. Moreover, it was too early 
to predict where demands and shortages in the labour market would occur 
after the war. Therefore, it was premature, explained Rey, to discuss a 
post-war emigration strategy geared towards unemployed ex-servicemen.
Rey informed the RCI that the government was unlikely to take the 
initiative for fear of public criticism; that 'after the soldiers had 
fought for their country, the government wanted to get rid of them',35
Preoccupied with the immediate demands of the war it was obvious 
that the Colonial Office had not the time, inclination or enthusiasm for 
such an issue. It maintained that the Imperial government had given no 
indication of changing its pre-war policy of 'neither encouraging [nor] 
discouraging emigration' after the war.36 In fact, the Colonial Office 
was unsure whether post-war emigration even fell within its 
jurisdiction. The Board of Trade, it suggested, with its network of 400 
employment exchanges nationwide, was better suited to undertake 
administrative responsibility once the government had chosen a policy. 
Officials of the Board of Trade were inclined to agree.37
Undeterred, the RCI pushed ahead for an audience. Its president 
at this crucial juncture, the fourth Earl Grey, threw his customary 
energy and determination into the fray. An ardent social reformer with 
a keen personal interest in emigration, and a passionate disciple of 
imperial unity, Grey provided the RCI with strong leadership and 
unquestioned prestige during his five years in office (1912-17).38 He 
was deeply concerned about the potential threat posed by large numbers 
of idle, restless, unemployed ex-servicemen on the nation's social and 
political stability after the war. Alarmed by recent political 
developments in Britain since the turn of the century, in particular the 
rise of socialism, Grey found a receptive audience at the RCI who shared 
the same deep concerns over the 'organic' nature of British society and 
empire. He and his RCI colleagues feared that demobilisation would
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bring unacceptably high levels of unemployment and ensuing political 
unrest which would accelerate socialism to the detriment of the status 
quo. 'It is obvious that when the war is over there will be thousands 
of ex-soldiers and sailors out of employment; industrious, disciplined 
men who if left to themselves may become a social and political 
menace*.39 Like many others, he was convinced that the outdoor 
experience of British troops in the trenches would inculcate a strong 
spirit of adventure which 'will have taken so strong a hold as to make 
them most reluctant to return to the humdrum conditions of their old 
life*.40 To harness this constructive but potentially dangerous energy 
and avert post-war political and social unrest, he advocated large-scale 
overseas soldier settlement projects which would guarantee work and a 
future for returning soldiers.
The first step was the creation of a central exchange in London 
where the various federal, provincial and state governments could 
advertise the number of men they would be prepared to put on the 
land.41 A further possibility was the establishment of a central 
agency with powers to pool land throughout the empire for soldier 
settlement. Grey estimated that transportation costs to the Dominions, 
particularly to the Antipodes, would be the major expense for most 
soldier settlers and their families. However, if the Imperial 
government subsidised sea passages for 200,000 emigrants at £10 per 
person it was a small sum compared with the threatened political and 
social dangers unemployment posed to post-war Britain. He recognised 
that the Imperial authorities would feel squeamish about paying for the 
passage scheme 'because such action would be opposed to precedent which 
is against all State-aided emigration [but] I do not know that precedent 
counts for very much in these exceptional times*.42
The Colonial Office remained sceptical of large land settlement 
schemes. It cited the failure of Lord Milner's resettlement scheme in 
the Transvaal after the Boer War. The size and scale of these
operations required enormous long-term financial resources. 'Who is to
find the capital for any such large scheme of settlement?* asked Sir 
John Anderson, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Enormous sums were spent in S. Africa [with no result].... It 
is not enough to pay passages at £10 a head. That is but
the beginning of it. The men of the New Army are
practically all men who have been in regular... employment in 
this country, and if our industries are to be re-established 
on their former basis their services will be required here.
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Will the Dominions thank us for the maimed veterans who 
cannot resume their former employment? Can we afford at the 
end of the war in addition to the capital required to repair 
the ravages, an enormous sum to effect a large settlement in 
the Dominions, and if so could it not be employed with as 
great [an] advantage to the Empire at home, say, in 
afforestation?43
These poignant remarks indicated the increasing resistance the RCI would 
encounter from the Colonial Office in the near future. At the same 
time, the Colonial Office was not blind to the fact that soldier 
resettlement schemes made 'good copy for the public Press' and 
anticipated that there would be ’considerable pressure later on for the 
adoption of some emigration or colonisation scheme',44 Meanwhile, the 
RCI organised its resources for another assault on Whitehall.
SECTION 2.2: THE NEW OFFENSIVE
Despite the cold reception encountered by Grey at the Colonial 
Office in January 1915 the RCI spent the next four months organising and 
planning its next move. In early 1915 the Standing Emigration Committee 
was replaced by another committee chaired by Lord Grey with the very 
unmanageable title of the 'After the War' Empire Settlement and Rural 
Employment Committee. Later shortened to the Empire Land Settlement 
Committee (ELSC), the new committee was given the dual mandate of 
investigating both overseas and domestic soldier settlement and rural 
employment.45 Anxious to cooperate with the new committee various 
individuals and organisations throughout the United Kingdom and the 
empire came forth with offers of assistance. Not content with these 
generous offers, the committee canvassed organisations it thought would 
be useful in its new campaign against Whitehall. These included the 
Veterans' Club, Evening News Soldiers' and Sailors Employment Bureau, 
1914 War Society (Self-Help for Maimed Soldiers and Sailors), Never- 
Forget League, and the National Political League.46 The intention was 
to find out the objects and aims of each group, league or organisation, 
investigate those which seemed best suited to cooperate with the RCI's 
soldier settlement strategy, provide mutual support and coordinate 
activities on a united front.
The committee resolved that Grey, armed with its soldier 
resettlement proposal, should call on Herbert Asquith, the Prime
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Minister, to hear its views. The basis of the discussions was the 
organisation of a permanent Imperial Land Settlement Board.*7 Grey 
informed Asquith of the need for immediate action to deal with the 
thousands of discharged servicemen before the war ended, and affirmed 
that it was impossible for any private organisation to deal with 'so 
complex and urgent' a matter.*8 It needed a comprehensive examination 
by the Imperial government, either by existing machinery, such as the 
DRC, or by the newly established Imperial Land Settlement Board. The 
committee also noted that if the DRC could not consider overseas 
settlement in the absence of Dominion representation that it should 
seriously consider domestic soldier resettlement, even though it was 
outside the Commission's original terms of reference.
Asquith's reaction to Grey's request was to ascertain Colonial 
Office opinion.*9 Harcourt hesitated to give him specific advice on 
account of the fact that domestic soldier resettlement lay outside his 
jurisdiction.50 However, Harcourt instructed Butler to forward the 
detailed Colonial Office minutes discussing Grey's letter to the Prime 
Minister for his consideration. Preoccupied with more important war 
work Asquith asked the Colonial Office to nominate a spokesman to meet 
the RCI deputation.51 This was not what the ELSC had expected and it 
expressed its dismay to Grey at being referred to the newly-appointed 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Arthur 
Steel-Maitland. The committee felt that ’the Prime Minister had not 
quite appreciated the importance of the Deputation' and persuaded Grey 
to write a second personal appeal to Asquith requesting that the new 
Colonial Secretary, Bonar Law, and the President of the Board of 
Agriculture, Lord Selborne, meet with it. Reluctantly, Asquith asked 
Bonar Law to grant them an interview ’to heal L[or]d Grey's wounded 
amour propre'. Law agreed to meet the delegation on 22 July 1915, 
although the permanent officials at the Colonial Office thought it a 
complete waste of time.52
Law appeared sympathetic to the deputation's entreaties. However, 
he made it clear from the outset that he would make no commitment nor 
issue any policy statement. Privately, however, he supported the 
Colonial Office tenet that the RCI's initiatives were hasty, untimely 
and inappropriate. His carefully worded response was a masterful 
display of official intransigence sugared in a coating of public 
courtesy. Moreover, the discussion of overseas settlement was deflected 
by Law's emphasis on the Board of Agriculture's investigation of
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domestic soldier colonisation.53 The RCI went away empty handed.
Undaunted, the RCI persevered and kept post-war emigration and 
land settlement and particularly the needs of the ex-servicemen in the 
forefront of the public's attention. On 10 February 1916 they 
despatched Rider Haggard, imperial adventure novelist, agricultural 
reformer and active RCI member on a fact-finding mission to the 
Dominions to investigate their opinions of plans to assist ex-servicemen 
to settle in the overseas empire after the war. Privately, Bonar Law 
admitted that Haggard's mission might be useful. However, he refused to 
give Haggard official status and emphasised that the government could 
not underwrite the mission in any way for fear the Dominions might 
regard it as interference in their internal affairs.54 In a private 
communication to Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, Governor-General of 
Australia, Bonar Law elaborated upon his reasons for refusing the RCI's 
request for official support. He feared that any official appointment 
would be considered premature by the Dominions who were already 
investigating land settlement and repatriation for themselves. 'I felt 
bound to reply that I could see no halfway house between recognising the 
mission officially and having nothing to do with it',55
Privately, the Colonial Office bureaucrats treated the mission 
with their customary disdain and were much more precise about their 
feelings for Haggard and the RCI. One official, Edward Harding, 
secretary of the DRC and one who had witnessed first hand Haggard at 
work as a DRC commissioner, was not impressed at all. 'I think he is of 
the temperament which has very ordinary Imperial ideas, and thinks they 
are extraordinary. Perhaps that is the result of being a Novelist with 
a really keen imagination'.56 Munro-Ferguson was even less charitable.
He had worked with Haggard on a Royal Commission which had delved into 
land tenure, small holdings and their impact on British agriculture. He 
dismissed Haggard as having 'a purely theoretical knowledge of 
agriculture and seemed to me one of the least useful members of the 
Commission',57 Nevertheless, each Dominion was notified of Haggard's 
arrival, the private capacity of the mission was reiterated by the 
Colonial Office and the Governors-General were instructed to monitor his 
progress.
Why was the Colonial Office so hostile toward the RCI and its 
post-war emigration initiative? The higher echelons of the permanent 
civil service were a closed shop, if not an exclusive club, for the 
intellectually and educationally gifted. The intellectual calibre of
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the Colonial Office staff was exceptionally high, maybe too high, but it 
was a poor substitute for administrative competency and it bred 
arrogance and a sense of effortless superiority which many outsiders 
found repugnant.58 Imprisoned in its own environment by social, 
educational and administrative constraints the donnish behaviour 
displayed by the Colonial Office limited its ability to embark upon new 
and imaginative policy initiatives. Officials were ’habitually loathe 
to make abrupt decisions' and exposed the Colonial Office to charges of 
indifference to humanitarian and philanthropic interests alike.59
The Colonial Office often grew impatient and dismissive of such 
criticism and treated these groups with contempt. It saw itself as the 
final authority on questions of imperial significance, ’to which outside 
bodies with imperfect access to information could add little or 
nothing'.60 The RCI was no exception. At the very least, departmental 
remarks were unflattering, unkind and unappreciative. Colonial Office 
officials placed ’little reliance' on the views and opinions expressed 
by the RCI. It was regarded simply as a gentlemen's club and was *a 
wholly irresponsible body [which] has no connection with the Government 
or with the Dominions governments' ,61 Of all the permanent officials 
Sir John Anderson was the most caustic. He considered the RCI a 
nuisance and referred to it as a ’blatant talking shop' whose members 
did not impress him as those who inspired much confidence or could give 
worthwhile assistance on any imperial Issue. ’Amateur enthusiasts or 
journalists', he snapped, ’are not helpful as a rule'.62
The impact of Haggard's mission and the overwhelming response he 
received in most of the Dominions far exceeded even the most optimistic 
RCI expectations. The Colonial Office was also surprised by its 
success.63 Immediately upon Haggard's return in late July, the RCI 
began marshalling its forces for another assault on the government. 
Another deputation was formed and presented its views to Bonar Law and 
the President of the Board of Agriculture, Lord Crawford, on 10 August 
1916. The deputation, led by the intrepid Grey, repeated its previous 
demand for the establishment of an Imperial Land Settlement Board and 
reiterated the importance of assisting those British ex-servicemen and 
their families who wanted to migrate to imperial destinations after the 
war. According to Grey, land settlement was receiving growing support 
as an instrument of repatriation and post-war reconstruction not only in 
Britain but throughout the empire. Therefore it was time to formulate 
an imperial policy. Once again Bonar Law's reply was warm and polite
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but guarded.6*
Almost simultaneously, the Reconstruction Committee, created in 
March 1916, requested the views of seven government departments 
including the Colonial Office on whether the government should encourage 
any form of emigration after the war.65 The departments concerned 
unanimously accepted that if emigration were to be encouraged it must go 
to the Dominions, but they could agree on neither the principle itself 
nor the degree and type of assistance.66 As for the Colonial Office, 
Terence Macnaghten, chairman of the EIO, acknowledged the importance 
that the Reconstruction Committee and the Board of Trade attached to 
post-war emigration, but he remained sceptical. 'We are still ignorant 
of what the post-war conditions will be', he commented in June 1916,
'and whether it will be right to encourage or discourage emigration, or 
simply to pursue the neutral policy of the period before the war'.67 
By August, however, he was more hesitant. 'I am not at all clear what 
our policy in this Office is towards emigration, and I have no notion 
what the policy of H.M.G. is likely to be' At least he now accepted 
that it was logical and 'safest for the Gov't to take the matter in 
hand, and guide such emigration...into the best channels'.69
Pressure from both inside and outside government to formulate some 
kind of policy became so intense during the summer of 1916 that the 
Colonial Office could no longer maintain its customary disdain for so- 
called amateur and uninformed opinion which had allowed it to evade the 
issue. In September 1916 Bonar Law finally decided that it was time to 
take some practical steps to deal with post-war ex-service migration.
He emphasised the need to find openings at home for the largest number 
of British ex-servicemen. However, he admitted that some would emigrate 
no matter what kind of domestic arrangements were prepared. In order to 
ensure that they did not drift outside the imperial sphere ’from want of 
guidance and knowledge of the opportunities available to them in the 
Dominions' the first priority was the creation of a central authority to 
'formulate plans and coordinate efforts'. What he specifically wanted 
from the Dominions was concrete and immediate information on the nature 
of their own land settlement and employment schemes for ex- 
servicemen.70 The Colonial Office, however, remained circumspect and 
demonstrated its intense hostility to organised emigration by a 
determined rearguard action throughout the rest of 1916. While 
promising to establish a central body they plotted against attempts by 
the RCI to seek representation on it or to influence policy making.71
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Attempts to circumvent the RCI failed, however, when political events 
overtook the Colonial Office's departmental machinations.
In December 1916 Walter Long replaced Bonar Law as Colonial 
Secretary when Lloyd George became Prime Minister. Unlike his 
predecessor, Long was truly interested in the emigration issue and 
proved eager to forge ahead. Reminding the Dominions of the urgency of 
the ex-service migration question, he prodded them (except New Zealand) 
for a response to Bonar Law's September telegram. The Canadian 
government promised an answer after the provincial premiers' conference 
in early January 1917. The Duke of Devonshire, Governor-General of 
Canada, reported that while the conference was interesting, revealing 
and provided a useful exchange of ideas, it had not arrived at any 
definite conclusions.72 Australia, which was discussing the subject at 
an inter-state conference when Long's reminder arrived, also delayed its 
reply until January. It was more positive. British veterans would be 
granted unconditionally the same soldier settlement facilities as 
Australians. On the other hand South Africa had not come to a decision 
and indications were that when it did it would be polite, non-committal 
and strictly limited to helping South African veterans. Although the 
replies were mixed, Long was satisfied that the participation of British 
ex-servicemen in Dominion soldier settlement schemes was being 
discussed. The idea of a central authority to coordinate post-war ex- 
service migration, however, fell on indifferent ears.73
Meanwhile, Long demanded the early formation of a consultative 
committee which would consider ex-servicemen and post-war migration, and 
he insisted that it should contain knowledgeable individuals from 
outside government.74 To prepare for this Long appointed the 
emigration enthusiast Lord Tennyson as chairman of the Empire Settlement 
Committee. The committee that consequently took shape in early 1917 
originally comprised twenty-five members, later expanded to thirty- 
three, representing a cross-section of British, Dominion, state and 
provincial governments. Several outside interests, including the 
Salvation Army were nominated to the committee.75 The RCI was 
successfully denied official representation by the Colonial Office. 
However, indirect representation was achieved by the inclusion of Rider 
Haggard as a committee member.
The committee's brief was to make recommendations as to the steps 
the British government should take in constituting the central body to 
facilitate the supervision and assistance of post-war emigration and to
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collate information that might be useful to intending emigrants and 
report on the necessary measures to be taken for settling ex-servicemen 
in the empire. Long had it in mind that, as he told Tennyson, the 
central body would probably emerge from his committee using the existing 
committee members.76 The Tennyson committee agreed with the 
recommendations of the DRC's final report published in March but went 
one step further. The DRC supported the establishment of special 
machinery to assist ex-servicemen to select, purchase and settle on land 
in the overseas Dominions. It did not, however, mention free passage as 
part of the package.77 The Tennyson committee, however, supported the 
principle of free passage to the Dominions for ex-servicemen and the 
provision of development capital for the various soldier land settlement 
schemes.78
Aware of the Tennyson committee's opinions and with the findings 
of the DRC before it, the Imperial War Cabinet, with little discussion, 
approved the New Zealand resolution that intending British emigrants be 
offered inducements to settle within the empire.79 At last the British 
government officially endorsed the need of limited state intervention in 
imperial migration matters. However, it was a general statement of 
principle and made no specific reference to free passage for British ex- 
servicemen. The British cabinet was content to let the Colonial Office 
get on with drafting a post-war emigration policy based on the 
recommendations of the DRC and Tennyson committee reports. The 
permanent officials were however still convinced that British stock was 
needed at home. They regarded the development of post-war Britain as 
more important than overseas development, and they opposed any 
propaganda enticing ex-servicemen to emigrate to the Dominions.
Instead, Macnaghten argued, priority should be given to ’an attractive 
land settlement and general development programme in the U.K.'80 This 
is precisely what happened. The issue of free passage and overseas 
development assistance for British ex-servicemen after the war became 
submerged after April 1917 in the British government's pursuit of a 
domestic colonisation scheme and the Colonial Office's preoccupation 
with casting an all-encompassing emigration bill in 1918.
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SECTION 2.3: DOMESTIC SOLDIER SETTLEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION
The chimera of a swift and speedy conclusion to the war drowned in 
the mud of Flanders. By the end of 1915 all combatants realised that 
their resources and manpower had to be mobilised for total war. 
Consequently, the state had to intervene in areas of social and economic 
policy hitherto confined to the domain of private initiative and 
enterprise. For many social imperialists the necessity of increased 
state intervention was perceived to be a tremendous political challenge 
which held out the need for action in the areas of social, economic and 
political reform after the war during post-war reconstruction. The 
return to normality therefore did not mean a mere restoration of British 
society to the days prior to 1914. Instead, the war provided an 
opportunity for the construction of a new social, economic and political 
order.81
The appalling casualty rates and the steady stream of wounded 
returning home were a daily reminder that it was becoming impossible for 
private charities and philanthropic organisations to cope with the 
enormous task of rehabilitation, retraining and re-employment of 
returning veterans. This prompted the British government in February 
1915 to investigate these problems, in particular the employment and 
vocational opportunities available to disabled soldiers and sailors.
The Murray committee, named after its chairman G. H. Murray and 
appointed by Herbert Samuel, President of the Local Government Board, 
recommended in May 1915 that it was the state's duty to assume absolute 
responsibility for the care of the war disabled. This included the 
restoration of their health, the provision of training facilities if 
they wished to pursue a new trade and assistance in securing employment. 
One solution which was brought to the committee's attention, and 
received its support, was the settlement of soldiers and sailors on the 
land.82
Indeed, home colonisation proved popular with British agricultural 
reformers and politicians alike. Naturally, patriotism permeated the 
demands for a domestic soldier settlement scheme. Many believed that 
small-scale farming operations offered returning veterans the best 
opportunity of leading a healthy, fulfilling and productive life. For 
the disabled soldier, even those stricken blind or infected with 
tuberculosis, it was believed that working outdoors aided the 
recuperative processes and restored one's pride and self-esteem.8^
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Patriotism aside, there were also important strategic, social and 
economic arguments for resettling British ex-servicemen on small 
holdings, such as increased agricultural self-sufficiency, enhanced 
revival of British agriculture, fortification of the social fabric 
against revolution and reinforced political stability. Landholding ex- 
servicemen, trained with the necessary agricultural skills, would prove 
a welcome addition to the long and noble traditions of the British 
yeoman, representative and defender of a stable rural society.8*
Throughout 1915 and 1916 the Board of Agriculture received a 
growing number of enquiries from both within and outside Whitehall about 
the possibility of employing disabled veterans in agriculture and the 
establishment of small soldier settlement colonies. Lord Lucas, 
Selborne's predecessor at the Board of Agriculture, welcomed these 
enquiries because he firmly believed that disabled veterans could be 
used as a partial solution in relieving the chronic shortage of 
agricultural labour.85 Another member of the Murray committee and a 
leading agricultural reformer, Leslie Scott, agreed. 'My own belief is 
that the open air life of soldiering will create quite a new impetus 
towards agricultural life.... Should the demand be larger it will 
obviously have to be considered in close connection with the purely 
agricultural question of increasing our output from the land*
This was precisely what concerned many leading politicians and 
agricultural reformers. From a strategic standpoint, it was vital that 
Britain reduce its dependence on imported foodstuffs by increasing 
domestic food production. The threat of an unlimited submarine 
campaign, unleashed in 1917, clearly demonstrated Britain's vulnerable 
supply lines and emphasised the need for greater agricultural self- 
sufficiency. This was certainly apparent to Sir Maurice Hankey, 
Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, who stated that from a 
defence viewpoint Britain's ’Achilles heel' was her dependence on 
imported foodstuffs and raw materials. However, this important national 
objective could only be achieved by safeguarding the supply of 
agricultural labour. The plan to resettle British ex-servicemen on 
small holdings was therefore developed within this context. Soldiers, 
both disabled and able-bodied, were seen by some permanent officials, 
politicians and agricultural reformers as the vanguard of a new 
development designed to increase Britain's rural population and 
revitalise a flagging agricultural sector.87
It was Selborne's foresight and energy which brought the idea of
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settling the disabled and discharged soldier on British farm land to the 
cabinet's attention.88 He was committed to reconstruction and became 
one of the leading advocates for greater state control of the war 
effort. It was his insistence that the government promptly intervene to 
secure adequate wheat supplies at a fair price to the farmer which 
created a great deal of debate within Asquith's coalition government 
during the summer of 1915. Britain's dependence on imported food during 
the war was viewed by Selborne as 'a source of grave national 
weakness'.89 But Selborne refused to be blinkered by wartime 
circumstances. He saw reconstruction as a positive force in shaping a 
new and vigorous post-war society. Twelve months at the Board of 
Agriculture (May 1915 to May 1916) had convinced him that the most 
contentious economic issue of British politics - tariff reform versus 
free trade - had to give way to the maintenance of the nation's 'welfare 
and safety'. This could only be achieved by 'something approaching a 
revolution in agricultural policy' which would ensure greater 
agricultural self-sufficiency.90
Selborne shared Scott's concern for the plight of the ex- 
servicemen and the possibility of employing them on the land. He 
appointed a departmental committee in July 1915, chaired by Harry Verney 
MP, a former Parliamentary Secretary at the Board of Agriculture (1914- 
15). Its objective was to consider and report on the necessary steps td 
promote the settlement and employment on the land in England and Wales 
of disabled and discharged ex-servicemen.91 Selborne agreed with his 
Parliamentary Secretary, F. D. Acland, that the entire matter was 
'clearly one of extreme interest and difficulty'.92 Sydney Olivier, 
Permanent Secretary at the Board of Agriculture, emphasised the 
importance of having experienced men on the committee. The committee's 
’real work should not be theoretical...but practical and exploratory of 
the concrete material to be dealt with'.93 The information, argued 
Olivier, should be gathered by those most directly concerned with the 
small holdings movement in Britain. In particular, men who had been 
closely associated with previous attempts at domestic colonisation and 
land settlement; experts who knew 'what kind of men, with what kind of 
assistance, and at what expense, can be settled upon such lands with any 
prospect of their becoming self-supporting',94 As far as Olivier was 
concerned one thing was certain: the government would be confronted
with demands for some sort of home colonisation programme. It was never 
too early to prepare for such an eventuality. Selborne concurred and
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stated that the Verney committee's recommendations should be completed 
for cabinet perusal as soon as possible.95
Early in March 1916 Asquith appointed a cabinet committee to 
consider whether land settlement should be included as part of the 
government's demobilisation policy. Meanwhile on 11 March Selborne 
presented a summary of the yet unpublished Verney committee 
recommendations to the cabinet.96 He readily admitted that a state- 
sponsored land settlement scheme for returning soldiers would be 
expensive. But he warned his cabinet colleagues that the Dominions 
would no doubt launch an aggressive campaign to attract these men to 
settle overseas. '[SJurely it would be deplorable if such men had no 
opportunity of settlement in their native country'. British public 
opinion would condemn the government if no concessions were made for 
settlement at home.97 Selborne proposed following the Verney 
committee's recommendations of establishing a cooperative colony system 
comprised of small allotments between three to five acres. He urged 
that because ownership or tenancy of small holdings was politically such 
a divisive issue the land would remain under the complete control of the 
state. The Marquis of Crewe in his weekly cabinet summary to King 
George V reported that the veterans' resettlement colonies were 'in 
reality part of the great problem of reorganisation and of restoration 
after the war, bound up with all the social and commercial activities of 
the country'.98
Selborne was authorised to submit estimates to the Treasury for 
the establishment of three experimental colonies. These colonies were 
to be placed in different parts of the country in order to test the 
settlers' ability to adapt to a variety of soil, farming and climatic 
conditions. The Treasury would provide a 'modest outlay' of capital and 
Lord Lansdowne, a prominent landlord and chairman of the cabinet 
committee appointed to study Selborne's proposals, emphasised the 
importance of 'maintaining the purely experimental character of the 
schemes, and of not holding out hopes of a general allotment of land' to 
disabled and discharged ex-servicemen.99
Selborne succeeded in establishing his pioneering colonies which 
were provided for in the Small Holdings and Allotments Act of 1916.100 
Practical agriculturists attacked the act as a trifling piece of 
legislation and a 'miserable little bill'.101 R. E. Prothero MP, a 
leading agricultural reformer and a future president of the Board of 
Agriculture, believed that the initial capacity of 300 men was 'wholly
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inadequate'. His lack of confidence was justified in the face of press 
reports which estimated that 750,000 men would return to the land after 
the war.102 Nevertheless, these same critics agreed that if the 
legislation marked the beginning of a new development in British 
agricultural policy it was a scheme worth fostering.103
Prothero, later Lord Ernie, realised that domestic colonisation 
would only relieve some of the pressure for soldiers wanting to farm.
*[M]en who wish to settle on the land and to follow agriculture as an 
industry ought not to be driven, for lack of opportunity, out of this 
country. [However] if men are such adventurous spirits... they should 
have every facility given them within the Empire, and in that way the 
Mother Country and her children will build up between them a stronger 
Empire'.104 In October 1917 he presented a detailed memorandum to the 
War Cabinet on the entire question of providing land for soldiers upon 
demobilisation. Demand for land would far outstrip supply and it was 
evident that if these demands were not met immediately, or that no 
suitable settlement schemes had been installed before hostilities ended, 
it would arouse dangerous rumblings of discontent amongst returning 
veterans desirous of farming in Britain. It was essential to decide 
upon a policy immediately or else government inaction would contribute 
to the exodus of ex-servicemen eager to seek land overseas.105
The major obstacles to any large-scale government assisted, 
domestic land settlement scheme were the cost and availability of 
suitable agricultural land. Any large-scale resettlement scheme would 
require the purchase of land at prices inflated by the war. County 
councils, who were encouraged to participate in small holdings schemes, 
could not outbid the larger, wealthier farmers because of the Treasury's 
freeze on local spending. Speculation compounded the problem and was 
seriously endangering attempts by local authorities to settle returning 
veterans. A large injection of money was needed if the domestic 
resettlement work was to succeed. Ernie fully understood the problems 
the county councils were facing. The war had placed enormous
constraints on the money supply and until the Treasury lifted the
embargo on borrowing the county councils would continue to face an 
almost impossible task.106
The cost of land was one inhibiting factor but the greater 
obstacle which had to be overcome was the fact that there was not much
Crown land the government could spare for soldier settlement. Of the
200,000 acres Ernie thought could be brought into profitable production
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the state would have to make available the badly needed money for 
extensive and expensive reclamation work.107 One option Ernie 
tinkered with was compulsory acquisition and a system of land 
nationalisation. Staunch conservatives, like the Colonial Secretary and 
Tory die-hard Walter Long, balked at the idea. 'Any system of land 
nationalisation would throw the country into the hands of the trade 
unions', proclaimed the reactionary Long, who, as Minister of Health and 
President of the Local Government Board in 1916, had advised extreme 
caution when the cabinet had examined Selborne's land settlement 
proposals.108 He seriously questioned the role of the state in the 
proposed enterprise and the scale of public assistance. Did these 
proposals not go against the spirit of private land ownership, a most 
preeminent institution, and all the social conventions it implied?
Throughout 1918 Ernie and Dr. Christopher Addison, Minister of 
Reconstruction, attempted to persuade the cabinet to remove the 
administrative encumbrances and the Treasury embargo on county council 
spending which was not only preventing the expansion of the small 
holding scheme, but which was seriously hampering the efforts of local 
authorities to satisfy increasing demand from men already 
discharged.109 In May, Ernie demanded that in view of the urgency of 
the situation the government had to make a policy declaration to satisfy 
public demand. It was imperative, warned Ernie and Addison in a joint 
memorandum to the War Cabinet, that the nation's obligation to its ex- 
servicemen be met without delay so as not to imperil the good faith of 
the government.110 On 15 May 1918 the War Cabinet considered the 
proposals and agreed to refer them to a ministerial committee headed by 
the Home Secretary, Sir George Cave. The committee was to provide a 
blueprint for the rural regeneration of Britain based on land 
settlement, the development of rural industries, the promotion and 
extension of afforestation, reclamation of waste land and the provision 
of rural housing.
The Cave committee, which included Ernie and Addison, released its 
interim report at the end of October. Confining its attention to the 
needs of ex-servicemen it recommended the provision of small holdings of 
between one and fifty acres not exceeding an annual rent of £50. Each 
small holding would average ten acres in size with the provision for 
cottage sites and gardens. It estimated that one million acres would be 
required for the entire project and might be obtained through a system 
of voluntary acquisition from large estates held by the Crown,
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Ecclesiastical Commissioners, the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, 
hospitals, charities, private individuals and parish glebe lands.111 
The committee recognised compulsory state purchase on such a scale was a 
novel idea but rejected it outright in favour of the more traditional 
means of land acquisition. Similarly, it proposed that county councils, 
rather than the central government, carry out the administrative details 
including land acquisition because of their previous experience with 
small holdings. Furthermore, the committee recommended the 
establishment of credit facilities for those candidates wanting to stock 
their farms and suggested the sum of £2.5 million be voted to enable the 
local authorities to equip the land provided under the scheme. The 
Board of Agriculture was asked to prepare detailed projects for the 
selection, reclamation and improvement of waste land which could be 
reserved for ex-servicemen's holdings.112
Meanwhile, Addison, who had been instructed to examine rural 
housing, especially the need for cottages with land attached, presented 
his proposals to the government in mid-October. The demobilisation 
committee of the War Cabinet decided to refer the memorandum to the Home 
Affairs Committee.113 It was not until 21 November that Cave's 
interim report was taken up by the War Cabinet. However, during the 
interval the Armistice was announced, dramatically altering the course 
of events and catching the government without a home or overseas soldier 
settlement policy. Led by Ernie, the War Cabinet rejected the Cave 
committee's proposals as inadequate to deal with the critical situation 
which had arisen. Ernie believed that the recommendations did not allow 
for the swift acquisition of sufficient quantities of land to meet the 
requirements of an earlier demobilisation. He requested that the 
government should provide an emergency loan of between £20 and £30 
million to the county councils in the first year for the acquisition of 
land and equipment. The Cave committee was invited by the War Cabinet 
to consider Ernie's new proposals.114 Four days later it presented 
its final report endorsing in full Ernie's recommendations. The central 
government was asked to provide the county councils with £20 million for 
land purchasing and pay 75X of any deficit incurred between income and 
expenditure in respect to the working of the scheme. Provisions for 
training ex-servicemen to settle or obtain employment on the land were 
also outlined.115
On 2 December Ernie submitted his proposal for the emergency 
grant. Addison was shocked and felt betrayed that Ernie, whom he had
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worked so closely with over the last year in drafting the new small 
holdings policy, had apparently succumbed to the magic of Lloyd George. 
That the Prime Minister was attracted to this ’dramatic gesture' came as 
no surprise to the Minister of Reconstruction. Addison was displeased 
with the sudden change in policy because it destroyed the careful 
planning and the emphasis on proper training and selection. Moreover, 
it contradicted his efforts to avoid excessive capital expenditure and 
would probably signal the start of an avalanche of applicants that would 
soon exhaust the money allocated. And then what was to be done?116 
Despite his disappointment there was little he could do and on 18 
December the Home Affairs Committee endorsed the grant in the face of 
Treasury opposition.
Meanwhile, on 5 December an itemised statement was released to the 
press listing policy priorities which had been ’couponed' or targeted as 
important reconstruction objectives for Lloyd George's coalition ticket. 
The provision for ex-servicemen ranked in the top three.117 As an 
electoral tactic, Lloyd George's appeal to the British public as a 
friend of the returned soldier was a shrewd piece of politicking. 
Nevertheless, the government was unprepared, despite continual warnings 
from the reconstructionists led by Ernie and Addison, to deal 
effectively with the demands of its ex-servicemen. There was another 
problem closely associated with the government's unpreparedness.
Although Ernie had led the attack on the Cave committee's 
recommendations he had done so because he thought that they were 
inadequate to meet the immediate post-war situation. Therefore his 
request for an emergency grant must be seen as an attempt to gain some 
breathing space in order to implement the long-term strategy he and 
Addison had outlined during the summer of 1918. But the emergency grant 
raised political problems of its own. Ernie became deeply concerned 
that a number of candidates attempted to make political capital out of 
an issue which they knew little or nothing about. Worse still, he 
feared that strong pressure from an ill-informed public would force 
Lloyd George to endorse a misconceived policy on grounds of political 
expediency. He confided to Walter Long that he thought he had persuaded 
the Prime Minister that it was dangerous to make indiscriminate promises 
about land settlement which he knew could not be honoured. Up until the 
beginning of December Ernie thought he had succeeded.118 He was badly 
mistaken.
Lloyd George stressed to his cabinet colleagues that an
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unrestricted land reform programme was more than a policy aimed at the 
rejuvenation of British agriculture. It possessed important social 
implications not least of which was halting the advance of Bolshevism.
It was this argument which enabled the Prime Minister to overcome the 
reservations of some of his more stubborn Conservative cabinet members 
who were worried about cost. ’Just how the increased rural population, 
employed on the land with a living wage and with the amenities of proper 
accommodation and recreation facilities could be combined with adequate 
profits for existing farmers and with food prices acceptable to the 
urban buyer, he did not explain'. But this was precisely the problem 
Ernie and Addison most feared: agricultural efficiency was being
sacrificed for a social ideal.119
In January 1919, during the height of the demobilisation crisis, 
Ernie presented an urgent and detailed memorandum to the cabinet 
outlining proposed legislation for a land settlement bill. He repeated 
his earlier warnings that the government had to be prepared to bear a 
considerable part of the initial cost of the new policy. He also 
castigated the cabinet for not allowing the county councils the 
opportunity of taking positive action during the war to acquire land for 
the inevitable post-war onslaught by returning veterans. His 
protestations fell on deaf ears. Meanwhile, speculation and inflation 
had sent land prices soaring and since the Board of Agriculture had no 
direct powers to buy land for cash it was in a very weak position to 
negotiate on favourable terms with large landowners. Fears were 
expressed that excessive prices would lead to exorbitant and prohibitive 
rents which in turn would discourage ex-servicemen and others from 
participating in the scheme.120 The government's failure to make the 
urgent decisions and prepare a policy before the conclusion of the war 
had caused frustration and resentment in some quarters long before the 
Armistice. Annoyed, Ernie had grown impatient with government lethargy, 
ineptitude and its lack of urgency in the matter despite his valiant 
attempts to correct the situation. He was ’filling the role of a 
scapegoat' and he was not enjoying the ignominious position.121 
Although persuaded to give the Board of Agriculture's blessing to the 
government's plan for land reform in March 1919,122 Ernie remained 
unconvinced of the political motives behind the policy. Disenchanted 
and worn out, he finally resigned in August 1919.
The new land settlement programme was launched by Ernie's 
successor Lord Lee of Fareham, the first Minister of Agriculture. Lord
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Lee was a fervent social reformer who had the backing of Milner and the 
social imperialist wing of the Unionist Party. Wholeheartedly committed 
to the government's land settlement policy, he was determined to honour 
the 1918 election pledges. The injection of £20 million over the next 
two years for the facilitation of land settlement primarily for ex- 
servicemen was adopted * in order to discharge a duty which the 
Government and the nation conceived that they owed to the men who had 
fought to save the country'.123 At Caxton Hall in October 1919 Lloyd 
George reaffirmed the government's commitment to a group of 
agriculturists. It was clear that for both the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Agriculture the land policy was not an economic policy in 
the narrow business sense, although they both believed it would 
contribute to the general health of the nation. Rather, it was a 
political commitment to a social policy which emphasised economic 
efficiency, social harmony, and the corporate values of rural life.12*
At first, the scheme seemed a resounding success as the response 
by ex-servicemen was overwhelming. By May 1920, only nine months after 
the Land Settlement (Facilities) Act had been passed, three quarters of 
the allocation had been expended. Four months later it was entirely 
exhausted. Would additional money be forthcoming to meet the 1,500 new 
applicants the government was receiving each month? The answer was no. 
Equally embarrassing for the Ministry of Agriculture was that it was 
forced to admit that the £20 million had been insufficient to meet the 
demand by ex-service applicants.125 Because of the enormous 
expenditure necessary to meet future demand, Lee recommended to the 
cabinet that further funds not be allocated to the project. He realised 
that both the county Councils and the veterans associations would 
condemn the instructions as a breach of the government's promise to 
provide small holdings for its ex-servicemen. It was regrettable, 
lamented Lee, but circumstances dictated no other course: 'it is a
mistaken kindness to allow men to apply if there is no prospect of 
satisfying their demand'.126
Why the sudden about-turn? Why were more funds not forthcoming? 
Had Ernie's reservations about short-term political gains versus long­
term practical policies come home to roost? It was painfully obvious 
that inflationary land prices were one of the critical reasons for the 
failure to continue with the domestic land settlement policy. A total 
of 253,000 acres had been acquired by September 1920 in England and 
Wales which was enough to settle 17,770 men. However, only 8,178 had
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been settled on allotments complete with houses and equipment. 
Approximately 24,000 candidates, including a small number of civilians, 
had been provisionally approved as suitable candidates but as of 1 
December 1920, 14,858 were still without holdings.127 Between the 
autumn of 1920 and the end of 1921 the situation for the veteran small 
holder steadily worsened. The Ministry of Agriculture enthusiastically 
reported in June 1923 that just under 19,000 men had settled of which
11,000 had taken possession since the 1920 harvest. But it was under no 
illusion as to the future difficulties these men would face. Moreover, 
only 8,000 had derived any benefit from the high produce prices obtained 
in 1919 and 1920.128
The future looked bleak indeed. If 1923 proved as unremunerative 
as the previous two years the number of failures was bound to increase 
dramatically. The Ministry of Agriculture tried to keep a brave face 
and stated that since 1920 a failure rate of 6.52 could scarcely be 
regarded as unsatisfactory. At the same time, they estimated that the 
small holder had already suffered a 402 depreciation in land value which 
aggravated an already weak position.129 The prospect of increased 
losses, despite the subsequent fall in the price of land, brought the 
land purchasing policy to a grinding halt. A new policy was formulated 
whereby the county councils would take over full financial 
responsibility of their estates with the assistance of an annual grant 
from the central government. Estates would undergo a valuation which 
would determine the amount of the fixed grant paid to the local 
authority. Ex-servicemen would not be given preferential treatment as 
they had in the past. As vacancies arose they would be filled by the 
county councils from the pool of applicants which were on hand, civilian 
or otherwise.130
The charge of political expediency must be examined in the larger 
context of the events and atmosphere surrounding the 1918 election and 
its aftermath. The British government in the latter part of 1918 and 
the first six months of 1919 was confronted with widespread discontent 
in the armed forces. In part, military discontent was fuelled by the 
chaotic demobilisation procedure. Confronted with growing unrest and 
impatience within the armed forces over the slowness of the 
demobilisation procedure, senior army officers in both France and 
Britain were faced with increasingly violent outbreaks of indiscipline. 
Similarly, it was reported that the Navy was in danger of open 
mutiny.131 Initially preoccupied with the general election most
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politicians ignored these problems. However, as the disturbances 
escalated and intensified a growing number of politicians and ministers 
grew sensitive to veterans' issues, in particular domestic, and then 
overseas, soldier settlement. It was these domestic constraints which 
revitalised the apparently moribund plans to assist ex-servicemen to 
emigrate.
According to some government ministers, indiscipline and mutiny 
were symptoms of a larger, more menacing and socially destructive 
disease —  Bolshevism. ’There is undoubtedly, in this country', 
reported Sir Alfred Mond, the First Commissioner of Works in November 
1918, ’a certain fever of revolutionary Bolshevist ideas'.132 The 
Russian revolution had stimulated the growth of radical and 
revolutionary movements in Britain. Trade unionism, influenced by and 
supportive of the Russian revolution, had grown during the war as well. 
So too had the British government's domestic intelligence surveillance 
unit which monitored a variety of ’red', ’socialist' and ’anti­
government' individuals and associations, including a number of ex- 
servicemen's organisations.133 For the most part, veterans' leaders 
were levelheaded and pragmatic individuals who sought legitimate redress 
of grievances using constitutional methods through established 
institutions and forms of protest. However, according to the Special 
Branch, the National Union of Ex-Service Men (NUX) and the International 
Union of Ex-Service Men (IUX) were the exception. It reported that 
James Cox, the national secretary of the IUX, rejected constitutional 
action and the IUX was ’an out and out revolutionary socialist 
organisation seeking to establish an industrial republic'. The 
authorities, however, had little to fear from these ’socialist' ex- 
servicemen's organisations. It was unemployment, lack of proper housing 
and grievances over pension gratuities which fuelled the fires of most 
veteran discontent.134 After a new and more acceptable demobilisation 
scheme was introduced in late January 1919 and soldiers were absorbed 
into the labour market, the unrest soon subsided. In hindsight, this 
challenge to authority may not have been critical, ’but it was 
unnerving' .135
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SECTION 2.4: AN ADMINISTRATIVE LANDMARK IN CONSTRUCTIVE IMPERIALISM
The period between 1919 and 1922 proved to be a crucial one for 
constructive imperialists throughout the empire. Their hopes were 
initially raised by the appointment in January of Lord Milner, the 
embodiment of the social imperial creed, as Colonial Secretary, and his 
disciple and close confidant, Leo Amery, as Under-Secretary. Stressing 
the need for 'a complete change' in the Colonial Office, determined to 
impose their will over the permanent officials and assert their 
authority, the new leadership eagerly launched itself into its 
responsibilities convinced 'that we must in time give it a new 
"orientation'*' .136 The distinguishing feature of the Milner-Amery 
partnership was that they possessed a clear set of imperial 
objectives.137 Leading the list of priorities was an aggressive 
empire migration policy.
The task of assisting ex-servicemen was a completely separate 
matter, according to Amery when he first took office in January: *1 had
already at the [Oversea Settlement] committee hammered at any rate one 
point, namely that the treatment of ex-Service men is one of an award 
they are entitled to and has nothing to do with general emigration 
policy'.138 Amery envisaged the free passage scheme as a limited 
venture restricted to a maximum of three years. However, there was an 
important qualification. * In order...to avoid a mere stimulation of 
emigration in an undesirable form, this privilege should be strictly 
confined to bona fide settlers on the land, or those who can prove that 
they have a definite offer of other suitable employment'. As far as 
Amery was concerned the 'problem of the emigration of ex-service men is 
very largely an agricultural one'.139 Indeed, permanent officials at 
the Colonial Office were unenthusiastic and seemed to regard the free 
passage scheme as the responsibility of another department such as the 
Ministry of Labour or the War Office.140 Similarly, they acknowledged 
that some ex-servicemen would leave Britain no matter what the 
government's attitude or policy, but so far as they were concerned the 
free passage scheme was not an emigration scheme proper and therefore 
outside its jurisdiction or interest. Nor did they regard it as having 
any economic significance. It was simply a humanitarian gesture 
designed to lessen the financial burden of those wanting to make a new
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life for themselves and their families in the overseas empire.141
Amery's more immediate aim was to frame a new emigration bill 
which would enhance imperial unity, contribute to the economic well 
being of the empire and offset the fiasco of Long's ill-conceived 1918 
Emigration Bill. Despite his optimism, he encountered only delay, 
disappointment and frustration from a confused and divided cabinet 
between January and March 1919. He complained to Milner, who was in
Paris at the peace talks, that he badly needed his support in the
cabinet. Until Milner returned, the emigration bill would be ’left in 
the air'.142
The majority of the cabinet, led by a group of businessmen, were 
convinced that the nation would shortly experience an intense period of
prosperity and a tremendous shortage of labour.143 To promote
emigration would therefore exacerbate the shortage, delay prosperity and 
hamper reconstruction. The Ministry of Labour strongly concurred.144 
Milner and Amery were however equally convinced that if a new emigration 
bill was not forthcoming immediately the country would face serious 
economic and social distress, and Sir Auckland Geddes, Minister of 
National Service, agreed.145 The cabinet ignored the argument. Amery 
struggled constantly to get his emigration bill discussed in cabinet.
On 7 February he saw Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal, and ascertained that 
empire migration was to be included in the King's Speech. Four days 
later Amery went down to Parliament to hear the speech. To his 
disappointment, Lloyd George had omitted the subject at the last moment. 
At a stormy cabinet meeting two weeks later the Prime Minister continued 
to vacillate, being sceptical about the entire issue. Meanwhile, Amery 
was being asked questions on emigration in Parliament of which he had to 
give ’evasive answers'. Growing impatient, he pressed Bonar Law in 
early March to put empire migration again on the cabinet agenda and sent 
an additional note to the Prime Minister to prod him into action.
Milner, who had returned from the peace talks, saw Amery several days 
later and reported that Lloyd George was ’still very sticky about the 
Overseas Settlement business'. After this further display of the Prime 
Minister's irresolution they chose to concentrate on getting the 
finances for the more immediate task of assisting the emigration of ex- 
servicemen. The broader overseas settlement legislation would have to 
wait.146
At the end of March, the war cabinet suddenly decided to take up 
the question of assisting ex-servicemen to emigrate overseas, catching
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Amery off balance. Although he had prepared the necessary drafts 
complete with arguments, he had not supplied Milner with them. 
Nonetheless, the cabinet was eager to push ahead and on 31 March it 
accepted, subject to Lloyd George's approval, the recommendations on 
free passages outlined by Amery in February.147 Why the sudden rush 
to implement a policy which most of the cabinet were content to ignore? 
Unemployment had become the government's main problem: in March 1919
over 300,000 veterans were receiving unemployment benefits.148 
Furthermore, the cabinet feared the revolutionary spirit which was 
sweeping the country, and in particular ex-servicemen. Assisted 
emigration could dg^fuse the situation.
Amery wanted the government's offer of free passage to be open for 
three years beginning 1 January 1920. This allowed ex-servicemen ample 
time to choose between employment opportunities in Britain or the 
overseas empire. It was also designed to give the Dominions time to 
establish the necessary administrative machinery, prevent a rush of 
applications swamping the Overseas Settlement Office and 'to meet the 
possible charge that we wish to hustle people out of the country'.149 
It was estimated that a three year programme would assist no less than
405,000 ex-servicemen and their families at a cost of just over £6 
million.150 But three years was too long to promise argued the 
Treasury. Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, thought it 
better to limit free passage to one year and reconsider its extension in 
light of the experience gained. On 8 April, Amery stood before 
Parliament during question time and announced the government's one year 
free passage grant for ex-servicemen and women which would begin on 1 
January 1920. Pleased with the accomplishment, he realised that 
enormous difficulties yet lay ahead.151 Its implementation would 
require the creation of an effective administrative structure and the 
willing cooperation of Dominion authorities.
What were the mechanics of the free passage scheme? Ex-servicemen 
and women who had enlisted for active duty and whose service began 
before 1 January 1920 were eligible under the scheme but not those who 
had served solely with Dominion, colonial or Indian army units. Women 
were required to have served for not less than six months in a corps 
administered by a British government department. This not only included 
the women's branches of the armed forces but a variety of nursing 
services, the Women's Land Army, the Forage Corps and the Forestry 
Corps. All concerned could obtain free third class passages for
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themselves and their dependents to the nearest convenient port of the 
Dominion or colony of their choice. The same privilege was extended to 
the widows and dependents of fallen ex-servicemen provided they 
fulfilled the criteria above and were drawing a pension from the 
Imperial government.152 The British government through the local 
officials of the fledgling Ministries of Labour and Pensions established 
the eligibility of applicants. The onus was placed squarely on the 
Dominions to evaluate each case individually and to judge whether the 
candidate was medically fit and properly suited for employment 
opportunities overseas. Only when the OSC had received Dominion 
approval would a third class passage warrant be issued.153
Sustained unemployment among British ex-servicemen provided the 
impetus for the extension of the ex-servicemen's free passage scheme.
As unemployment intensified in the latter part of 1920 Milner and Amery 
were determined to get it extended for another year. In October Amery 
appeared before the newly formed cabinet committee on unemployment, 
chaired by Sir L. Worthington-Evans, to argue for the scheme's extension 
as ’a means of relieving abnormal unemployment during the coming 
winter'. Milner reiterated the point to the cabinet two weeks later. 
Money spent on assisted passages, he argued, also saved the Exchequer 
from the sustained burden of crippling unemployment benefits.15* The 
Treasury nevertheless remained hostile to any suggestion of increased 
expenditure, particularly for the extension of the ex-servicemen's free 
passage scheme.
As winter tightened its grip and unemployment rose, however, even 
a reluctant Treasury had to admit the need for limited action. In 
November the cabinet agreed with Milner's October memorandum and the 
Treasury sanctioned a one year extension of the free passage scheme. 'I
am clear', wrote Chamberlain, 'that if the original policy was right 
this extension is still more right'.155 The Minister of Labour, Dr.
T. J. Macnamara, previously sceptical of Amery's overseas settlement 
strategy, became a convert as well. In 1922 he explained to his cabinet 
colleague, Winston Churchill, that his concern stemmed from the tens of 
thousands of young, able-bodied but unemployed ex-servicemen who had 
been out of work for more than two years. 'I have been thinking that we 
ought to look to over-sea settlement as one of the methods of relieving 
the unemployment situation here. I know that we have hitherto hesitated 
to relate over-sea settlement and unemployment and it is only the 
present exceptional position and emergency that would warrant any other
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course' .156
The financial provisions of the free passage scheme were not 
extended past December 1921 because of plans to introduce the broader 
Empire Settlement Act in early 1922.157 However, successful 
applicants were given until 31 December 1922 to make their sailing. The 
deadline was further extended until March 1923 for those few who had 
delayed their departure because of illness or bureaucracy.
However, the final total of 86,027 fell far short of the 405,000 
estimated by Amery in early 1919.158 Similarly, it was evident that 
these numbers were not going to make an appreciable impact on relieving 
Britain of its unemployment ’emergency' or promote imperial cooperation, 
unity and self-sufficiency. To better understand the shortcomings of 
the ex-servicemen's free passage scheme and the incorporation of British 
veterans in a host of overseas soldier settlement projects, it is 
necessary to examine Dominion policies and attitudes in greater detail.
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CHAPTER THREE
CANADA, BRITISH IMMIGRATION AND SOLDIER SETTLEMENT 1867-1917
A major source of Canadian immigration throughout the nineteenth 
century was the United Kingdom.1 It remained an important source 
between 1900 and 1914 but was overshadowed by the waves of American and 
Central European immigrants which flooded western Canada during the boom 
years of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal government (1896-1911). The flow 
of immigration from the United Kingdom was temporarily disrupted by the 
cataclysm of World War I, but its promotion was renewed with determined 
enthusiasm after the cessation of hostilities in 1918. Generally 
speaking, there were three distinct periods or phases of British 
emigration to Canada: the immediate post-confederation years (1867-
1896); the boom and bust years of the early twentieth century (1897- 
1914); and the inter-war years (1919-1939). Each period is significant 
for different reasons and gives an important insight into Canadian 
immigration and development policy. Although the focus of this thesis 
is the first decade of the inter-war period it is essential to examine 
briefly Canadian attitudes and policies toward British immigrants 
between 1867 and 1914.
SECTION 3: MEAGRE BEGINNINGS 1867-1896
The promotion of immigration was a vital ingredient of Canada's 
economic development. After 1867, successive federal governments aimed 
to attract immigrants who would settle on vacant lands in the western 
prairies. They hoped that with the completion of the trans-continental 
railway in 1885 this would facilitate a steady flow of agricultural 
settlers keen on developing the vast tracts of rich, virgin soil. 
Similarly, continuous economic growth based on agricultural development 
and assisted by increased railway construction would create the 
necessary demands for manufactured goods produced in central Canada.
The exchange of primary resources with manufactured goods and capital on 
an east-west axis, linked by a national railway system, provided the
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basic economic strategy of what became called the National Policy. It 
was therefore essential to the continued growth of Canadian wealth and 
prosperity that these lonely wind-swept regions be settled as quickly as 
possible with the right type of settler. As a result, the federal 
Department of Agriculture was given exclusive jurisdiction over the 
formulation and implementation of immigration policy. Furthermore, 
after the Dominion-Provincial conference of 1874, colonisation on the 
prairies remained a federal responsibility.2
The maintenance of immigration by the federal government and its 
monopolistic control over land settlement and development in the prairie 
region were key factors to the success of the National Policy.
Immigrants were regarded by Ottawa as an 'economic resource' to be 
especially exploited for the purpose of national development.3 
However, not every immigrant was wanted or welcomed. 'The condition of 
success in Canada is honest work', declared a federal Department of 
Agriculture settler guide, 'and none should come seeking to make a 
living who have not made up their minds to work. Canada is no place for 
the idle or the dissipated, and none of this class should think of 
coming'.*
The emphasis on the immigration of farmers and farm labourers 
dominated official thinking from 1867 to 1914. The Dominion Lands Act 
of 1872 established a lavish free grant policy on the prairies aimed at 
meeting the needs of the individual settler. Upon the payment of a $10 
entry fee and the completion of certain settlement duties, which 
included a limited amount of cultivation and residence, each adult of 
twenty-one years would receive 160 acres. Before the land patent was 
issued, normally at the end of three years, the homesteader had to be a 
British subject. These conditions had to be met before any homestead 
transfer was allowed.5 The entire antiquated process of issuing 
patents for homesteads from Ottawa was streamlined by employing the 
local land agent and the Land Commissioner at Winnipeg. Later the age 
of eligibility was lowered to eighteen while guarantees were introduced 
to protect the homesteader from creditors during the early stages of 
settlement. In the case of financial insolvency, the homesteader was 
exempted from seizure of certain numbers and varieties of livestock, 
agricultural tools, out-buildings and the homestead.6
However, the period between 1867 and 1896 witnessed very little 
expansion in the numbers of agricultural immigrants entering Canada.
The free grant system proved extremely wasteful with the ultimate
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benefactor being the hungry land speculator. Conversely, the settlement 
duties, which appeared easy to fulfil on paper, proved very difficult to 
fulfil for those homesteaders without capital. Many were forced to 
supplement their farm income by additional seasonal employment off the 
farm. What became immediately apparent was that the vast majority of 
immigrants had no previous experience of pioneer life and lacked the 
necessary reserve of investment capital to succeed in agriculture. The 
federal government was painfully slow to react to the harsh reality that 
free land by no means guaranteed successful settlement and development.
There were other problems. Despite the fact that the primary 
task of Canada's immigration policy was to attract people to settle her 
vacant lands, many immigrants found it easier to find employment in the 
mining, timber, construction and railway industries. They were 
encouraged into occupations which demanded heavy manual labour, jobs a 
growing number of Canadians refused to accept.7 The long hours of 
tedious, backbreaking farm labour, particularly when clearing the land 
of scrub and bush, deterred many immigrants from sticking it out. Those 
who persevered had earned their homestead many times over before 
actually owning the land.8
SECTION 3.1: THE DAWNING OF A NEW AGE 1896-1914
The appointment of the young and dynamic Clifford Sifton, the 
former Attorney-General of Manitoba, as Minister of the Interior in 
Laurier's Liberal government of 1896 was significant for several 
reasons. He symbolised a new, aggressive and nationalistic Canada; a 
Canada that was eager to forge ahead and claim the twentieth century as 
its own. He firmly believed that the state's role in society was to 
participate actively in shaping it and to help society come to terms 
with the needs and demands of a modern industrial nation. Similarly, 
parochialism or regionalism was anathema to Sifton's idea of 
confederation. For example, the west was not a separate economic unit 
but rather a constituent part within the national framework which 
required disciplined and effective management. He never doubted the 
west's enormous resource potential and possessed boundless enthusiasm 
and faith in its continued economic growth and development.9
The Department of the Interior, previously 'a department of delay, 
a department of circumlocution', became a vigorous and vibrant ministry
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under Sifton's leadership.10 He was pragmatic, commonsensical and had 
been chosen for his business experience and administrative skills. He 
displayed greater flexibility and determination in policy formulation 
and implementation than any of his predecessors. At the same time, he 
firmly believed that successful implementation could only be achieved 
through administrative centralisation and legislation which gave the 
federal bureaucracy the authority it needed.11
Sifton was determined to overhaul and remodel Canadian immigration 
and settlement policy. However, he did not revolutionise it in the 
sense of embarking on novel approaches or adopting new techniques. 
Rather, his success was determined by his resolute re-examination of 
existing policies, his rationalisation of department business, his 
ability to surround himself with a cadre of capable people and his 
dynamic personality.12 However, it would be grossly misleading to 
state that Sifton's achievements were attributable solely to his 
administrative prowess and leadership abilities. A larger budget 
allowed Canadian immigration authorities to conduct a concerted 
propaganda campaign which allowed them to compete successfully for 
immigrants in the United States and overseas. Equally important, there 
were a number of economic factors which made Canada a more viable 
destination for immigrants.
The resurgence of world wheat prices caused by increased demand 
from industrialised nations at the end of a prolonged world depression 
in the late 1890s, coupled by falling transhipment costs for wheat made 
possible by improvements in the speed and efficiency of rail and ocean 
transport, made the settlement and economic development of the Canadian 
prairies more attractive. Technological improvements in farm machinery 
and scientific advances in cereal hybridisation also played a vital role 
in increasing the economic viability of the Canadian west. Similarly, 
by the turn of the century, the scattered remnants of American prairie 
had been opened up and settled. Consequently, land prices rose 
significantly prompting many American farmers to migrate north to the 
vacant and cheaper lands of the ’last, best West'. Interrelated were a 
number of socio-economic factors which surfaced simultaneously in 
Europe. They included rural depopulation, severe bouts of unemployment, 
social unrest and racial discrimination.13
The major objective of Sifton's immigration policy was a speedy 
and systematic settlement of the west. A fervent believer that the only 
good immigrant was an agricultural immigrant, Sifton embarked on a
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selective immigration policy which emphasised the need for experienced 
agricultural settlers whatever their nationality. The establishment of 
a resourceful and independent yeoman class, which was prepared and 
equipped to put up with the toil and sacrifice of a pioneer way of life 
the prairies demanded, was the foundation upon which Sifton built his 
immigration and development polices.
The Alberta demagogue, Frank Oliver, replaced Sifton as Minister 
of the Interior in Laurier's third administration in 1905. Oliver, one 
of his predecessor's strongest political rivals, never favoured Sifton's 
'open door' policy and was perhaps its most vocal critic. Immediately 
upon becoming minister he drafted a new, more restrictive Immigration 
Act which expanded the minister's powers to reject and deport
'undesirables'. A progression of amendments followed the 1906 Act which
effectively prohibited the entry of criminals, social misfits and the 
medically unfit. Blacks, Asians and Orientals were virtually denied 
entry into Canada. The emphasis remained on agricultural immigrants but 
promotional efforts were shifted from central and eastern Europe to 
increased recruitment in Great Britain. Oliver was an intense
Anglophile and his appointment coincided with growing nativist fears
that Canada's 'new citizens' would destroy her Anglo-Saxon character.
'It is necessary', he declared, ’that settlement should be as much as 
possible of people not only much like ourselves but altogether like 
ourselves... in other words that we should draw upon the British islands 
as much as possible... and that every effort should be made to attract 
immigration from the British Isles'.14 In order to protect Canada's 
'national fabric' Oliver did not hesitate to curtail the flow of 
continental European immigration while at the same time being less 
selective about the type of British immigrant he allowed into Canada.
By 1911 Oliver could boast that his policy was 'restrictive, exclusive 
and selective' in comparison with Sifton's.15 But at a price.
Between 1902 and 1914 there occurred the largest trans-Atlantic 
migration of British emigrants to Canada. One of its more undesirable 
consequences was that thousands of British paupers flooded Canadian 
shores assisted by a host of charitable organisations. The vast 
majority were from urban and industrial backgrounds. Suspicion grew 
among Canadians that Britain was using Canada as a dumping ground for 
its unemployed and socially undesirable; that it was a deliberate 
attempt mounted by a few British municipalities to reduce the financial 
burden the unemployed exacted on the poor rates.16 These attitudes
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intensified as the world's economy experienced a short, sharp recession 
in 1907-08. As a result, the work of these charitable organisations 
became the objective of much popular criticism.
The Canadian government, with the minor exception of a handful of 
British ex-soldiers, had consistently refused to employ a system of 
assisted passages because it was contrary to the basic tenet of Canadian 
immigration policy. It argued that immigrants who required assistance 
lacked self-reliance, initiative and resourcefulness and therefore 
increased the chances of them becoming destitute and charges of the 
state. The Canadian public agreed wholeheartedly, yet British 
immigrants continued to arrive in Canada subsidised by various 
charitable associations. How could the Canadian government reconcile 
the apparent incongruity?17
The battle to restrict the flow of urban, British immigrants 
sponsored by charitable societies was a long and complicated affair 
which tarnished Canada's image as a favoured immigration destination.
In the midst of the recession of 1907-08, the Immigration Branch of the 
Department of the Interior issued the first of a series of regulations 
designed to stem the flow of unwanted urban immigrants. Notice was 
given that the only classes of immigrant wanted during the present 
economic downturn were female domestics, experienced farm labourers and 
farmers with capital. Not everyone applauded the new restrictions. The 
Canadian Governor-General, Earl Grey, informed Lord Elgin, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, that he thought the Canadian government was 
making a mistake by inhibiting British immigration.18 In 1909, F. G.
A. Butler, chairman of the EIO, visited Canada and reported a resolute 
enmity towards assisted immigrants from Britain and indeed towards 
British immigrants in general. The Canadian state of mind 'seemed to be 
a blend of disappointment and resentment that the English immigrant 
[was] not more to their liking'.19 The apparent 'unpopularity' and 
’unadaptability' of the British immigrant was striking when contrasted 
to the more favourable opinions many Canadians harboured towards 
immigrants from northern Europe and the United States. Butler tried to 
explain away Canadian antipathy by admitting that Canada had been 
overburdened by a poorer class of city-bred British immigrant between 
1905-08. But he countered with the conviction that the ordinary British 
immigrant was still to be highly prized and remained invaluable to 
Canadian development. He informed his Colonial Office superiors that 
Canada had 'all the self-confidence of a young and successful nation and
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all the impatience of a busy man eager to prosper quickly. [She] is 
disturbed by any impediment, and is not disposed to make allowances for 
and to try to remedy what does not come up to [her] expectations'. He 
regretted that British immigrants would start their new lives in Canada 
under 'an appreciable handicap in the estimation of [their] new 
countrymen' but he hoped that in the future Canadians would develop a 
more sympathetic view to their imperial brethren.20
This wish was still being echoed in 1913 after a visit to Canada 
by W. B. Paton, another EIO official. There was no doubt in Paton's 
mind that there was some degree of disharmony between the British 
immigrant and native-born Canadians. ’The Canadian has a short sharp 
way of speaking which the Englishman resents, each thinks that he knows 
everything, and that his own methods are the best, each in his own way 
looks upon the other as inferior...'21 Paton warned that new arrivals 
would have to conform to local customs and habits quickly. It was 
essential for the British immigrant to 'avoid undue self-assertion at 
the outset' for fear of bringing derision and suspicion upon himself 
from the locals. Friction no doubt existed. For example, an English 
barrister who had lived in Canada for thirty years stated that Canadians 
regarded Englishmen as 'fools to be milked'. A policeman in western 
Canada told Paton that his lack of advancement in the force could be 
attributed to the fact that he was English. A Canadian immigration 
agent whom Paton interviewed denounced British immigrants as drunkards 
and condemned them for their inefficiency. However, Paton concluded 
that the ’necessities of life in a new country must override personal 
jealousies' and each must learn to live together.22
A small but increasing number of Canadians tended to question the 
sincerity and ability of most British immigrants, urban or rural, to 
adapt themselves to Canadian life. More alarming was the marked decline 
in the number of British agricultural immigrants who pursued farming as 
a full-time occupation. As one Canadian historian points out:
The strong objections raised to immigrants from [Britain] 
clearly demonstrates that the ability to speak English or 
even membership in the Anglo-Saxon race were not sufficient 
qualifications for acceptance. 'English-speaking' and 
'Anglo-Saxon' were terms used to indicate other qualities - 
qualities of self-reliance, initiative, thrift, intelligence 
- and when these qualities seemed to be lacking, the 
immigrants were not considered as truly belonging to the 
preferred category.23
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Infrequently, large employers such as Lord Shaughnessy, President of the 
Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), reflected these growing doubts. He 
believed that Canadian immigration policy would be increasingly 
jeopardised if the government continued to recruit unskilled labour in 
Great Britain. It had been his experience to have nothing to do with 
British workers who expected nothing less than ’high wages, a feather 
bed and a bath tub' while working in the primitive and isolated 
environment of a bush camp.24 Complaints from beleaguered municipal 
officials inundated Ottawa demanding the deportation of British 
immigrants who had refused farm work and were proving a drain on local 
relief funds.25
Canada's preference for agriculturalists remained the primary, 
motivating factor behind its immigration policy. But many people failed 
to grasp the reality that British immigration after 1902 was 
predominantly urban, unskilled and non-agricultural. Britain's 
agricultural population was relatively small compared to its industrial 
population and with the acceleration of rural depopulation in Britain 
after the Boer War it became increasingly more difficult for Canada to 
obtain experienced British agriculturalists.26 Besides, conditions in 
Britain did not favour the emigration of farmers and farm labourers 
because wages and working conditions were better at home than in Canada. 
Thanks in part to a resurgence in domestic agriculture those left on the 
land found their services at a premium. According to one Canadian 
immigration commissioner, in some rural areas of the United Kingdom 
there was a scarcity of experienced farm labour.27 Hence, the federal 
government's constant pursuit of experienced farmers in central Europe 
and the United States.
Officially, agriculturalists remained the top priority of Canada's 
increasingly selective immigration policy. But the pressure exerted, 
particularly by the railway companies, for the recruitment of the 
’industrial' foreign navvy definitely frightened observers such as 
Sifton.28 For others, the ever-increasing influx of the industrial 
immigrant signalled the deterioration of a national economic strategy 
originally designed to promote the agricultural development of the 
country. The exodus of immigrants from farming, in particular those of 
British stock, caused other problems. Agriculture was still a very 
labour intensive endeavour and established farmers sorely complained 
about the lack of help, especially during seeding and harvesting.29 
Compounding the problem was the tendency of British immigrants to
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possess urban and industrial backgrounds. Naturally, the vast majority 
of them congregated in Canada's expanding towns and cities, and in many 
cases were the only immigrants who possessed the necessary industrial 
skills essential to a diversifying Canadian economy. Those who migrated 
west, more often than not, contributed to the growing urbanisation of 
the prairies which seemed to go unnoticed by Canadian politicians intent 
on promoting settlement and rural development.30
l
SECTION 3.2: POLICY REVIEW AND DEBATE 1914-1918
The outbreak of war effectively ended imperial migration for five 
years. ’Of course everything here is all war and excitement, and 
consequently the matter of emigration has fallen very far into the 
background' , reported W. W. Cory, the Deputy Minister of the Interior in 
August 1914. W. D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration in Ottawa 
agreed. Policy discussions had been ’totally eclipsed by the war'. 
Conditions were so ’abnormal', he explained, that ’I scarcely know what 
to recommend'. The Colonial Office used stronger imagery. Emigration 
was ’at present virtually dead and shows no signs of early revival'.31 
Senior Canadian immigration officials on both sides of the Atlantic 
thought it useless and ’somewhat unpatriotic' to continue advertising 
for immigrants in British newspapers which could be misinterpreted as 
enticing potential British soldiers and munitions workers to the 
Canadian prairies. The suspension of emigration propaganda in Britain 
by all the Dominions shortly after the commencement of hostilities was 
more than just a patriotic gesture designed to display imperial 
solidarity. It was an economic necessity. Subsequently, the Canadian 
government adhered to the policy of disallowing the entry of British 
immigrants eligible for war work or military service. It was decided by 
Ottawa that it was even in the best interests of those British 
immigrants who were too old to fight but not too old to farm not to be 
encouraged to emigrate.32
Although immigration was not considered a wartime problem its 
close association with post-war reconstruction made it an important 
issue.33 And, as the RCI conducted its post-war emigration campaign 
against a stubborn and intransigent Colonial Office in 1915, some 
Canadian immigration officials and enthusiasts used the time to examine 
steps the Canadian government could take to meet an anticipated flood of
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British immigrants after the war. J. Obed Smith, Assistant 
Superintendent of Emigration in London, submitted several lengthy 
reports to his superiors at the Immigration and Colonisation Branch of 
the Department of the Interior in March and June of 1915. The focus of 
these recommendations was the need to formulate an aggressive propaganda 
campaign aimed primarily at the British agricultural sector. Smith 
stressed the importance of being prepared: 'we ought to be supplied
with lists of the opportunities for employment in definite cases, 
definite numbers and with definite wages',34
Smith warned that there was a distinct shortage of agricultural 
labourers in Britain which made it imperative to cast a wider net to 
secure anyone with a 'farming instinct'.35 This included rural folk 
who had been driven to the towns and cities looking for employment. It 
also included soldiers.
It is undeniable that a percentage... of the men who have 
taken up arms in this great War will find their ambitions 
and lines of work in life rudely interrupted, so that many 
of them will never agree to take an indoor occupation again, 
but their training in the field would fit them for manual 
work on the land..,36
He suggested that his office be allowed to conduct a lecture series in 
the various barracks, training camps and depots to inform recruits of 
the opportunities which awaited them in Canada after the war. They were 
not emigration lectures as such but they would provide valuable 
information to the men who were turning their thoughts to new post-war 
occupations and careers. By March 1915, Smith reported he was already 
receiving inquiries from interested British servicemen and he stressed 
that Canada needed to strike while the iron was hot. It was essential, 
he argued, that Canadian emigration operations be extended and more 
skillfully managed in order to make a 'rapid impression' upon the large 
number of British troops when they returned from the front. Similarly, 
if emigration operations were extended advertising would cost more than 
ever before; but these were unusual times and required a broadening and 
recasting of post-war arrangements to cope with the new circumstances. 
'We shall [therefore] not be under the disadvantage', he explained, 'of 
finding our competitors already in the same field, ploughing and sowing 
therein, while we have remained inactive and practically dormant'.37
If Canada was to be a serious contender and effectively compete 
against the other Dominions after the war, her entire policy needed the
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injection of solid financial incentives. The solution was not to merely 
supply huge tracts of free land to British settlers who for the most 
part possessed insufficient capital to purchase seed, livestock and 
implements. Financial assistance was imperative as an inducement for 
the British agricultural immigrant to make a success. ’The average 
British emigrant is not going to be content', warned Smith, 'with a 
piece of bald prairie, and nothing on it but the sky'.38 There was no 
question, in his mind, that the best and cheapest emigration agent was a 
satisfied settler.39 But this would occur only if Canada had made the 
necessary financial and administrative preparations beforehand.
Charles Magrath, chairman of the Canadian section of the 
International Joint Commission, agreed. He firmly believed that the 
cataclysm in Europe offered a tremendous opportunity for Canada's 
continued economic growth. The war would undoubtedly provide the 
impetus for many Europeans to make a fresh start and a new life 
overseas. Conversely, the war offered Canada an excellent chance to 
update her immigration policy and procedures to ensure a more systematic 
approach to land settlement; and hence the national wealth and 
prosperity which accompanied a successful settlement policy. The future 
demanded, according to Magrath:
a new immigration policy based upon more courageous lines 
than in the past; it means a system in which the efforts of 
Governments - Dominion and Provincial - and corporations, 
working with full knowledge of each others plans and in
harmony with each other in the common work; it means the
expenditure of large sums of money in some system of control 
of agriculturists.... In short it is the very largest and by 
far the most important question facing the people of Canada, 
as it is only through a reasonably successful solution of 
this question that it will be possible for Canada to march 
out into the open again and forge ahead in the immediate 
future.40
The task would be enormous, he warned, because of the size, 
character and diversification of Canada's agricultural settlement areas. 
One problem was to attract the right class of settler who would stay on
the land. Another would be to facilitate the settlers' efforts into
bringing the land under production. Organisation and cooperation at all 
levels of government and business was essential. He suggested the 
formation of a national committee representative of each province and 
those corporations who possessed land for settlement. A three-man 
executive comprised of ’men of affairs' would oversee the framing of a
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new immigration policy. Magrath insisted that the executive should not 
be occupied by departmental personnel. ’They are largely controlled by 
rules and regulations, and no great work can be followed and developed 
under fixed departmental rules. An executive of three men from the 
outside would do much to vitalise the service and would give the 
departmental officers that support so necessary in vigorously pushing 
forward an entirely new venture'.41
In October 1915 Borden appointed the Natural Resources Commission 
to examine questions of agricultural production, immigration, 
colonisation, transportation and domestic trade. It was composed, not 
of civil servants, but of farmers, labour leaders and prominent 
businessmen.*2 In March 1916 a special Senate committee was appointed 
to help the Commission with its enormous task. Its specific focus was 
to make an appeal for cooperation and information to all organised 
bodies in Canada in helping the Commission fulfil its mandate. The 
organised bodies targeted comprised of municipalities, school boards, 
chambers of commerce, boards of trade, universities, church groups, 
farm, labour, professional, press and manufacturing associations, and 
various branches of the provincial and federal governments.43
The Commission's report was published in the summer of 1916 and it 
appeared to support Magrath's ideas about immigration presented 
privately the previous spring. The report advocated the formation of an 
Immigration and Colonisation Board independent of the Department of the 
Interior but responsible to the minister. The arrangement would 
safeguard the new board from bureaucratic restrictions which destroyed 
’initiative [and] constructive and aggressive work'.44 W. J. Roche, 
Minister of the Interior, was infuriated by the report. First, he found 
it extremely difficult reconciling the board's independence with its 
alleged responsibility to the minister. As far as he was concerned, the 
Commission had put the cart before the horse because of its emphasis on 
the machinery rather than the policy. As well, no new policy had been 
suggested nor had the Commission recommended the continuance of the old 
policy with the necessary modifications to meet post-war circumstances. 
Roche then went on the offensive.
[W]hile the report contains what in my opinion is an 
unjustifiable condemnation of our past policy, there is 
nothing suggested as to the particular features that are at 
fault, or what different policy should be adopted to take 
its place. It is true it generalises on the lack of 
initiative, constructive ability and aggressive methods,
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etc. of the Department, but with the exception of 
recommending additional officials by the creation of a Board 
of Immigration and Colonisation it is itself lacking in 
initiative and constructive ability and fails to indicate 
what aggressive methods should be resorted to.45
Despite Roche's dismissal of the Commission's recommendations 
pressure mounted within the Immigration Branch for a more aggressive 
policy. Throughout 1917, Smith and J. Bruce Walker, Commissioner of 
Immigration at Winnipeg, pleaded with Ottawa to end ’the policy of 
restriction of effort and retrenchment in expenditure' on emigration 
propaganda. Both men called for a vigorous resumption of an immediate 
and wide-spread propaganda campaign. While recognising that the policy 
pursued since August 1914 had been proper, prudent and totally justified 
in light of the impositions the war was placing on labour and the 
economy, they pointed out that settlement was a ’theme of universal 
conversation' in the countless number of military hospitals and 
convalescent homes in Britain. These facilities provided an excellent 
starting point to disseminate literature, advice and information and no 
better occasion existed to ’renew, reinvigorate, revive and extend' 
Canadian operations to safeguard against competition from other 
Dominions.*6 Walker warned that Canada would suffer a tremendous loss 
of prestige, influence and manpower if she allowed herself to be 
outstripped and pushed aside by less experienced but more aggressive 
competitors.
Walker insisted there was an important domestic reason for 
pursuing an energetic immigration policy in Britain. Nativist fear and 
distrust of foreigners were growing, intensified by the war. Fuelled by 
wartime propaganda, many Canadians questioned the wisdom of an 
unselective immigration policy. Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians and 
other aliens, though good settlers, were not held to be good citizens 
because of their separate existence on the prairies and their resistance 
to the Canadian way of life. The Anglo-Saxon character of Canada had to 
be firmly re-established with good British stock because it was just the 
’material for welding together all these composite foreign elements into 
a strong and great nation'.*7
W. D. Scott completely disagreed with his field agents' 
assessments. He was Ounno^edwith the overabundance of articles 
discussing Canada's immigration policy after the war and speeches 
exalting the assured doubling of its population. Canadian authorities 
would be kept busy absorbing returning veterans and readjusting to a
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peacetime economy. Besides, normal Atlantic passenger services were not 
likely to recommence for twelve to eighteen months after hostilities 
ceased. Demands for repatriating Dominion forces eliminated the need, 
at present, 'to engage in or prepare for an active immigration 
policy*.** Scott tried to reassure Smith that Canada need not fear 
serious competition from other Dominions because numerous opportunities 
existed for the 'suitable immigrant to improve his circumstances*.*9 
By virtue of Canada's geographical position she held the advantage in 
immigration matters over South Africa and the Antipodes. Therefore, as 
late as August 1917, Scott did not think his department should embark 
upon an advertising campaign in Britain. The presence of 300,000 
Canadian troops in Europe was not ’likely to be completely overshadowed 
and forgotten by the frantic efforts of Australia to impress upon 
Imperial or overseas soldiers the merits of her offer to [soldier] 
settlers* .50 A large Canadian presence was the best and cheapest form 
of advertisement.
SECTION 3.3: MAINTAINING A TRADITION
Despite the fact that soldiers in the past had proven inadequate 
and ineffective settlers the Canadian government launched a determined 
soldier settlement policy in late 1915. As two Canadian historians 
remark, a post-war soldier settlement scheme was inescapable. 'It was 
unprecedented and therefore unthinkable that a war could end without 
some effort being made to settle soldiers on the land. Tradition, 
mythology, and concern about rural depopulation overruled memories of 
the waste and failure of "military bounty"*.51 Canadians simply 
assumed that returning veterans would be offered farms as they had 
previously; and soldiers themselves had no reason to think any 
differently than their civilian counterparts. Sir Robert Borden, 
Canada's wartime Prime Minister, reassured servicemen that it was the 
solemn intention of both the nation and his government to 'prove to the 
returned man [their] just and due appreciation of the inestimable value 
of the services rendered to the country and empire*.5*
Canadians did not deny that defending democracy and empire was 
expensive. Nor did the daily sacrifices and hardships encountered by 
their troops go unnoticed or unappreciated. The enormous display of 
patriotic fervour, in particular from English-speaking Canada, was proof
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enough, and it quickly reinforced Canadian society's already strong 
sense of obligation and indebtedness to her fighting men.53 In this 
extremely emotional and highly charged atmosphere soldier settlement was 
one constructive method of demonstrating Canada's recognition of these 
sacrifices. However, land as a reward for services rendered was not 
soldier settlement's only appealing attribute. Far from it. Underlying 
the patriotic rhetoric were practical political, social and economic 
considerations which dictated the pursuit of a comprehensive soldier 
settlement policy.
Soldier settlement remained an important supplement to the federal 
government's predominant and traditional role in settling and developing 
the agricultural resources of western Canada. This was reiterated in a 
memorandum submitted to the Minister of the Interior, W. J. Roche, by W. 
D. Scott, during the initial policy stages of soldier settlement in 
early February 1916. Scott argued that Canada was still fundamentally 
an agricultural country and therefore it was in the national interest to 
ensure that the largest possible proportion of those soldiers 'fitted 
for or willing to undertake agricultural work [be] induced or assisted 
to do so' .5* Inevitably, it became one of the most expensive planks in 
Borden's reconstruction programme.
Walter Scott, Saskatchewan's first premier, heartily endorsed his 
unrelated federal colleague's assessment.55 The settlement of returned 
men on the land fulfilled the object of populating and developing the 
remainder of Canada's vast and empty fertile regions. He firmly 
believed that Canada's most urgent problem, next to the successful 
prosecution of the war, was the question of how to increase the 
country's agricultural population and production. ’That will be the 
chief problem after the war, as it was before the war, and as it is 
during the war', he prophesied.56 Soldier settlement provided a 
partial solution.
More significantly, soldier settlement 'represented the first 
indication that the Canadian government viewed the land as its principal 
solution to unemployment' ,57 As in Britain, many Canadians feared that 
when the war ended there would be many unemployed and dissatisfied 
veterans which, if left unsatisfied, could pose a threat to the 
political and social stability of the country. The threat of social 
unrest, which gripped every Allied government after 1918, therefore 
provided additional motivation for the Canadian government to act 
decisively to this potentially dangerous problem. A complementary but
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quite distinctive view was the idea that agricultural communities were 
healthier and more stable, politically and socially, than urban ones.
The rural myth was not unique to Canada for each Allied combatant 
possessed its own version. In Canada, the rural myth was expressed in 
the popular social philosophy of the back-to-the-land movement; an 
agrarian backlash aimed at halting rural depopulation brought about by 
increased industrialisation and urbanisation and the subsequent 
destruction of society's moral fibre that it implied.
Senator Sir James Lougheed was appointed by Borden, in July and 
October 1915, as chairman of two commissions which not only initiated 
the development of a national soldier settlement plan, but spearheaded 
the government's entire demobilisation policy and its investigation into 
the larger issue of Canada's post-war reconstruction problems.
Lougheed, a lawyer by profession, had been government leader in the 
Senate and Minister without Portfolio since Borden's election victory of 
1911. Ontario born, Lougheed had migrated west to Calgary and 
established one of the most successful law firms in western Canada. 
Extremely wealthy, Lougheed had married wisely, virtually inheriting his 
father-in-law's Senate seat in 1889. In July 1915, he was appointed 
chairman of the Military Hospitals Commission (MHC), the agency which 
provided retraining and rehabilitation for Canada's war disabled. Its 
major tasks included the reception and placement of wounded soldiers, 
the purchase, maintenance and management of convalescent hospitals and 
sanitaria, vocational training and the provision of artificial limbs.58
The provinces established their own Returned Soldiers' Aid 
Commissions to work in conjunction with the federal authority but their 
duties were narrowly defined as assisting able-bodied soldiers with 
employment problems. Full financial responsibility for retraining and 
re-educating the disabled for future employment fell squarely on the 
shoulders of the federal government. 'The war is a national 
undertaking', stated Premier William Hearst of Ontario, 'and there is no 
desire that we should shoulder responsibility that should properly rest 
elsewhere'.59 Hearst was correct in stressing national responsibility 
for the incapacitated soldier and it became painfully obvious that the 
provinces did not want to be saddled with the enormous monetary and 
administrative headaches rehabilitation implied. It seemed ironic that 
the provinces should so easily delineate federal-provincial jurisdiction 
on this issue when, in education for example, both levels of government 
had fought each other so bitterly for control.
100
The provincial premiers were also worried that returned soldiers 
would add to the steady stream of people already leaving the rural areas 
for the cities. At the inter-provincial conference held in Ottawa in 
October 1915 the premiers voted unanimously in favour of supporting a 
soldier settlement scheme. However, they argued that the complexities 
of the issue were 'national' and beyond the scope of provincial 
jurisdiction. They advised that the federal government institute a 
special inquiry to investigate the matter.60 Once again, Ottawa was 
forced to pick up the slack and frame a returned soldiers' agricultural 
resettlement scheme.
It seemed a natural progression to Borden also to give Lougheed 
the chairmanship of the Natural Resources Commission in October. The 
new commission was in part created to placate a mayoral delegation which 
had descended upon Ottawa in the spring of 1915. The delegation had 
complained bitterly about the chronic unemployment in the cities during 
the previous winter. They demanded money to boost municipal relief 
programmes and requested that the urban poor should somehow be relocated 
and re-established on the land.61 Borden, while promising to 
investigate the matter, quickly realised that the combination of the two 
commissions under one person would go far to meet the parallel demands 
of the premiers and mayors to deal with rural depopulation. He struck 
upon the idea to expand upon the mayors' protestations and use the 
Natural Resources Commission as a springboard to launch the government's 
examination of the larger issue of Canada's post-war problems. In light 
of the recommendations of the inter-provincial conference the Commission 
seemed a perfect instrument through which a national soldier settlement 
plan could be formulated. With Lougheed as chairman it became a 
foregone conclusion.
W. J. Black, the former principal of the Manitoba Agricultural 
College, was chosen as secretary of the Natural Resources Commission.62 
An experienced administrator, Black was a wise choice as he was familiar 
with the problems of western development and land settlement.
Lougheed's foresight shone through once again with the appointment of 
Ernest Henry Scammell as secretary to the MHC. Born in England,
Scammell was the son of E. T. Scammell, founder and secretary of the 
NMEL. The younger Scammell was 'one of those officials a wise 
organisation cherishes', as he possessed enormous amounts of energy and 
administrative expertise.63 It was Henry Scammell, more than any other 
individual, who shaped and moulded Canada's demobilisation and
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rehabilitation policies.
The urgency with which Canadian politicians and civil servants 
viewed the problem of continued rural depopulation, and the seriousness 
with which they viewed soldier settlement as a partial solution, was 
echoed by Henry Scammell. ’One difficulty to be faced', he reported, 
'will be that men from the country districts will be inclined to 
congregate in the larger centres'. Conversely, ’large numbers of men 
who previously followed an indoor occupation, both those who are able- 
bodied and those who are partially disabled, will after their long open 
air life in the trenches, decide to find employment on the land'.64 
The young Scammell had reached the same conclusion as Sir Arthur 
Pearson, the blind publisher and founder of St. Dunstan's Hostel for 
blind ex-servicemen in London's Regent's Park. Agriculture was a vital 
step in the retraining and rehabilitation of the disabled veteran, 
according to Pearson. He was able to persuade many blind veterans that 
poultry farming provided a practicable occupational alternative.65
W. D. Scott felt duty bound to offer practical solutions in the 
face of such ’lunacy' propounded by ’theorists' such as Pearson. He 
completely disagreed with the idea that soldiers who had lost an arm or 
leg would not be hampered to any great extent in their efforts to farm. 
He confined his attention ’solely to those who upon return are 
physically fit, express a desire for a rural life and have the physical 
strength necessary for the hard work' farming demanded.66 He divided 
the group into two categories, experienced and inexperienced. 
Inexperienced candidates would be administered through the Department of 
the Interior and its various agencies such as the Immigration and 
Dominion Lands Branch. They would be placed with reliable farmers at 
current wages for one year in order to gain the instruction, advice and 
experience necessary to manage their own farm.
Scott proposed that two sections in each township, as yet 
ungranted, be reserved exclusively for returned soldiers for a period of 
four years. He singled out the Peace River District of northern Alberta 
as a specific target for future development and suggested that all the 
odd numbered sections be similarly reserved. Instead of the customary 
homestead grant of 160 acres, qualified soldiers should be allowed 320 
acres. He recommended that full cooperation by the provinces should be 
solicited and that they be encouraged to offer similar inducements on 
land administered by them or assist by purchasing improved land for 
resale to the soldier settler. Scott also advocated the immediate
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incorporation of a '"Returned Soldier Colonising Society" directed by 
leading capitalists of [a] philanthropic and patriotic turn of mind',67 
Funding for the scheme would be provided by the society through a 
floatation of bonds guaranteed by the federal government. Advances up 
to $1,000 would be available to each homesteading soldier and used as a 
downpayment or an advance on a lien. Interest would be charged and no 
patent would be issued until the loan was repaid in full. Eligibility 
was limited to honourably discharged soldiers who had either enlisted in 
Canadian regiments or been domiciled in Canada prior to their enlistment 
with Allied units. Finally, candidates had to satisfy government 
selection officers that they possessed sufficient expertise and 
practical farming knowledge to make a go of their new vocation. In 
order to ensure success and foster greater responsibility and 
independence among the soldier settlers, Scott proposed that each 
settler be required to invest $200 of his own capital.
Scott pondered that should the floatation of a loan by the 
proposed soldiers' colonising society prove unfeasible the merits of the 
project might warrant direct government participation as the central 
loan agency. 'To loan $1,000 each to 20,000 soldier farmers', commented 
Scott, 'would take $20,000,000'.
Consider the consequent benefit to the nation as a whole 
entirely outside of the patriotic aspect of providing for 
our soldiers. Fro[m] 1896 to 1911 the Dominion Government 
paid in bounties on pig iron, steel, lead and petroleum 
$20,000,000 from which the country receives no return except 
the stimulus to trade. If the spending of this money is 
justifiable, surely the loaning of a like amount for at 
least as important a purpose needs no justification.68
Scott's suggestion that the Canadian government underwrite the financial 
burden of soldier settlement and undertake the leading role in policy 
formulation was reinforced when the British government made preliminary 
enquiries concerning Canadian soldier settlement policy in October 1915.
The Colonial Office had received a proposal for a privately 
sponsored colonisation scheme in Canada from a consortium in the fruit­
growing Okanagan Valley of British Columbia. They immediately forwarded 
the proposal to Ottawa and were promptly told by the Canadian Governor- 
General, the Duke of Connaught, that the Minister of the Interior 
refused to encourage any colonisation schemes proposed by private 
individuals. The majority of the private colonisation ventures in the 
past had been motivated by self-interest and had failed miserably
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creating much hardship in the process.69 The Canadian government made 
it absolutely clear that it was definitely unwilling to prejudice its 
national interests by endorsing privately sponsored schemes.
Lord Milner, however, approached the issue from a different tack. 
He had learned that Lionel Hichens, a former member of his 
'kindergarten' and now the managing director of the shipbuilding giant 
Cammell Laird, was embarking for Canada. He had been closely involved 
with land settlement in South Africa during the reconstruction period 
after the Boer War and was acquainted with its problems. Now he had 
been recruited by the Ministry of Munitions to investigate and expand 
Canada's munitions industry. Milner suggested that as he was going over 
on behalf of the Ministry of Munitions he could also investigate post­
war land settlement in Canada in a private capacity.70 Milner realised 
the British government did not want to give the impression that it 
supported the emigration of its soldiers after the war. But he warned 
Bonar Law that as many soldiers would leave Britain after the war no 
matter what the government did to encourage them to stay, it was much 
better to see them settle in the Dominions than 'drift off' to the 
United States or the Argentine. He warned that there would be nothing 
but 'appalling muddle and waste...in the hurry and scramble' upon the 
cessation of hostilities, unless the main principles of a land 
settlement policy had been carefully 'thought out and laid down 
beforehand' .71
Milner was convinced that it was essential for the Dominions to 
make advance preparations if they wanted to obtain the quality and 
quantity of British emigrants they had so eagerly sought prior to the 
war. He was anxious that such a golden opportunity supplied by 
Hichens's visit to Canada should not be squandered by either the 
Imperial or Dominion government. Hichens had cultivated a good 
relationship with Borden and his cabinet colleagues and this provided 
additional leverage. 'It is not a question of this Gov[ernmen]t doing 
anything or of dictating to Canada', explained Milner, 'but only of a 
shove-off, which may lead to their doing the right thing on their own 
account'. Bonar Law acquiesced and drafted a letter to Borden along the 
lines suggested by Milner.72
Borden's reply to the Colonial Secretary and the record of the 
meeting between Borden and Hichens has not survived. Nevertheless, the 
report by the Ontario Commission on Unemployment, released in early 
1916, provided Milner, Bonar Law and the Colonial Office with an
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opportunity to analyse Canada's response to the question of British 
post-war migration and the employment of ex-servicemen after the war.73 
The Commission was originally appointed to examine the recurrent causes 
of permanent unemployment in Ontario. It was not empowered to 
investigate unemployment arising out of the war. However, from a 
British perspective, the report offered a few interesting ideas and 
impressed the vice-chairman of the EIO, T. C. Macnaghten.7*
One important result derived from the Commission's investigations 
was its recommendation for the establishment in London of an Imperial 
Migration Board. The Board would represent the British and those 
Dominion, provincial and state governments interested in promoting and 
improving migration within the empire. Jointly funded by the 
participating levels of government, the central agency would be 
responsible for the collection and dissemination of accurate, impartial 
and up-to-date information concerning imperial labour markets, 
occupations, industries, travel costs and accommodation.75 The 
advocacy of an aggressive inter-Imperial migration and land settlement 
policy was aimed at checking the population drain to foreign countries 
so as ’to conserve British manhood for the development of British 
territory and the support and defence of British institutions against 
future contingencies' ,76 It also recognised the need for an extensive 
review of the system of subsidising shipping and booking agencies. To 
increase efficiency, the report recommended more adequate inspection of 
immigrants; and to ensure greater success amongst newcomers, it stated 
that each immigrant should possess a minimal amount of cash upon 
landing. Above all, it alerted the Ontario government of its pressing 
moral obligation to discharged British and Canadian soldiers. It warned 
that a serious economic and social crisis would result after the war if 
steps were not taken during hostilities to formulate a comprehensive 
employment policy for these men before their return.77
Macnaghten was encouraged by the Commission's findings. That it 
supported an introrImperial migration policy was ’a considerable advance 
on anything connected with post-war emigration which has yet reached us 
from the Dominions'.78 Although he could not find anything in the 
report to indicate that the Commission supported the granting of free 
land to ex-soldiers, or that its views had the endorsement of the 
Ontario government, it was clear that it had some influence. He 
remained cautious on the question whether it was desirable to encourage 
emigration from Britain after the war and whether the Dominions really
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wanted British ex-soldiers. But, he admitted, the soldiers themselves 
would certainly demand the opportunity to emigrate and would doubtless 
receive the wholehearted support of the 'well intentioned' emigration 
enthusiasts. Macnaghten concluded that it would be 'difficult to check 
the emigration movement [and] keep it in the right channels in the 
absence of fuller information' hitherto received from the Dominions.79
SECTION 3.4: THE RIDER HAGGARD MISSION 1916
Macnaghten may have been encouraged by the unofficial statements 
uttered by one provincial agency, but he, like the rest of the Colonial 
Office, hardly expected the resounding support Rider Haggard received in 
the Dominions during his tour. The tour captured the public's 
imagination and turned what was simply a fact-finding mission into a 
tremendous public relations victory for the RCI over an intransigent 
British government.
Initially, the Council of the RCI confined the tour to Australia 
and New Zealand. George McLaren Brown, European General Manager of the 
CPR and an active member of the ELSC, was responsible for expanding the 
original itinerary. He argued that if Haggard confined his mission 
strictly to the Antipodes the imperial character of the mission would 
entirely disappear.80 Furthermore, he strongly recommended that 
Haggard proceed to the Antipodes via South Africa and return to England 
via Canada. The ELSC forwarded the resolution to the Council which 
wholeheartedly endorsed McLaren Brown's suggestion at its first meeting 
of 1916. On 3 January, Haggard received his instructions to proceed to 
the four 'white' Dominions.81
In mid-January, Smith enquired about the mandate Haggard had been 
given on behalf of the RCI. He also queried whether the British 
government had delegated its authority to the RCI to enter into 
discussions with the Canadian government or had the authority been 
invested to Haggard?82 Sir Harry Wilson, honorary secretary of the 
RCI, replied that the British government had raised no objections to 
Haggard's mission in a private capacity as the RCI's honorary 
representative. He emphasised, however, that Haggard had 'full 
discretion' to discuss land settlement questions with the Dominion and 
provincial governments.83 The Assistant Superintendent of Emigration
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became increasingly hostile.
I...quite fail to understand why there should be any attempt 
to educate the Canadian Government and our Department on 
business which has been their public duty for so many 
years...I do not quite see what advantage there would be in 
you discussing the matter with me, so long as neither the 
Home Government have invited the assistance of any outsiders 
in connection with business which is obviously the first 
duty of this Department.84
Canada had been settling thousands of people satisfactorily for years 
with no outside assistance. Did the RCI actually think it had anything 
different to offer? 'I have received no hint that our Department is at 
all unable to carry on its business here and in Canada', Smith commented 
acidly, 'without calling for the assistance of others'.85 Wilson 
attempted to reason with Smith and offered him an opportunity to discuss 
the matter in a friendly, rational manner. He reiterated that the RCI 
had absolutely no intention of interfering with the practices and 
policies of the Canadian government.88 Unfortunately, he failed to 
de-fuse Smith's anger.
Smith's wrath was endless and he levelled another broadside at the 
RCI. He strongly objected to its soliciting of certain Canadian 
companies for monetary contributions for a mission conducted in an 
honorary capacity. 'I must confess that the last mentioned arrangement 
surpasses anything I have supposed could happen in connection with such 
a matter, and I would strongly recommend the Council to reconsider their 
whole attitude in this proceeding, if they wish to retain the record of 
the Royal Colonial Institute',87 He concluded that the Canadian 
government had appointed the Natural Resources Commission whose mandate 
included the investigation of the emigration of ex-servicemen to Canada 
after the war. Was it now not obvious to the RCI the superfluity of the 
Haggard mission? Wilson terminated the correspondence but Smith's 
intense hostility cast a dark shadow over the Canadian visit.
Smith had other reasons for not supporting or encouraging 
Haggard's visit to Canada. In a personal letter to Cory and written in 
language reminiscent of similar Colonial Office vitriol, he confided 
that Haggard was the last person in the world to be sent on such a 
task.88 The condemnation was based on a similar mission Haggard 
undertook in 1905 when he had investigated the Salvation Army colonies 
in the United States at the bequest of the then Colonial Secretary, 
Alfred Lyttelton. His findings were deemed impractical and dismissed in
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an official report of a departmental committee assigned to review 
Haggard's recommendations. Furthermore, he warned Ottawa that the RCI 
had a reputation for ’rushing in where angels fear to tread....It seems 
to forget so frequently that Governments, like ours, have their own 
views and their own machinery for carrying out Canada's policy'. The 
RCI had to learn that Canada was quite capable of conducting its own 
business without outside interference and that land settlement and post­
war migration were * too serious and of too great import to be peddled 
around [by] well-intentioned gentlemen [who] often create an atmosphere 
which does not facilitate the real work of negotiations between 
Governments'.89
Smith's scathing remarks generated deep concern at the RCI as it 
was feared his reaction and subsequent encounter with Wilson would be 
conveyed to his superiors in Ottawa. As a countermeasure the RCI 
attempted to clarify their position to the Canadian High Commissioner, 
Sir George Perley. Wilson wrote Perley that Sir Charles Lucas, a former 
EIO chairman and currently chairman of the Council of the RCI, was ’very 
anxious that there should be no misapprehension about [Haggard's] visit, 
which is purely private and unofficial' ,90 As a further reinforcement 
to the RCI's bridge building exercise, Haggard called on Perley to 
inform him of the exact object of his visit and to inform him that the 
last thing he wished to do was to compete, ’or in any possible way 
interfere with any existing Commission, Committee, or Society concerned 
with immigration' to Canada.91 Wilson's last-minute instructions to 
Haggard continued to reflect the RCI's deep-seated concern over Canadian 
attitudes. Opposition in Canada was expected and if Smith's hostility 
was an indication of what Haggard could expect in Canada the situation 
was depressingly grim. Therefore, upon arrival in Vancouver, if any 
resistance was encountered from the federal government, Haggard was to 
halt the inquiry immediately and limit his enquiries to those requested 
by the reactivated DRC before returning directly to England.92
When Haggard arrived in Canada in late June he found no sign of 
opposition. Instead, his reception in Victoria, British Columbia ’was 
striking and indeed enthusiastic' and included front page coverage in 
the local newspaper.93 He was met by the all too familiar host of 
local businessmen and civic dignitaries and by E. H. Scammell, who had 
been despatched by Lougheed to escort Haggard across Canada. The 
schedule was hectic and he was kept extremely busy in Victoria with 
numerous public speaking engagements. It was at the Veterans Club, of
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which Rider's brother Andrew was president, where Rider pointed out that 
during his tour he had encountered some 'very liberal ideas' as to the 
issue of soldier settlement but apparently 'hardly any plans of a 
concrete nature for translating these ideas into action'.9* He 
implored his audiences of the necessity for the empire to marshall its 
resources, coordinate its policies and concentrate its energies in an 
attempt to avoid overlapping and duplication of settlement and migration 
work conducted by private agencies and governments. Haggard emphasised 
the necessity for drawing up a 'working plan' which could be ready for 
operation once the war was over.95
The initial Canadian response was pleasantly surprising. Local, 
provincial and federal authorities were willing to listen, cooperate and 
exchange ideas and information with the RCI representative. His 
reception was warm, the outlook encouraging and opposition non-existent, 
but he was very careful to explain that he had no 'special scheme' and 
that he was on a 'mission of enquiry' ,96 The Vancouver World reported 
that Haggard had the 'welfare of the empire at heart' and that his 
opinions, ideas and advice on land settlement questions were 'based on 
study and experience, of a very wide and varied character [which] must 
command respect',97 However, Haggard remained cautiously optimistic 
and followed Wilson's instructions to the letter.
The apparent change of heart by Canadian authorities was being 
monitored by Wilson in London. Just prior to Haggard's arrival in 
Canada, Wilson informed Haggard that the Canadians were aware of his 
progress in Australia and New Zealand. He also reported that he had 
received very favourable responses from Borden and Lougheed which took 
’the sting out of our friend Obed Smith's dog-in-the-manger 
communications',98 McLaren Brown had worked diligently to counteract 
any damage Smith had inflicted and it was largely through his influence 
that the ’mischief' undertaken by the Assistant Superintendent was 
rectified.99 As well, Henry Scammell had proven to be a loyal ally by 
dispelling any misapprehensions that arose in Ottawa. Wilson was 
satisfied that Smith's ’interference' had been effectively removed and 
that the RCI could ’confidently expect no further trouble in 
Canada' .100
Haggard's message was simple and straightforward. He was deeply 
concerned about the mass exodus of British subjects who settled in 
countries outside the empire. The loss of such large numbers of good 
British stock was tragic, unnecessary and had to be curtailed if the
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British empire was to remain a vibrant international power. Personally, 
Haggard did not favour the emigration of British citizens to any 
overseas destinations. ’But if they insist on leaving', he explained, 
’we want to try and take care that they leave for some place where the 
British flag flies'.101 Similarly, in a hot and sultry Regina, he 
hoped to see ’this empire of ours one house with many rooms, in each of 
which its citizens may wander, knowing that there he is at home'.102
Soldier settlement, he told his listeners, was an attempt to solve 
the problem of emigration erosion. He made it quite clear to provincial 
and federal leaders that British veterans returning home after the war 
would find little or no support, financial or otherwise, from the 
British government or private institutions and charities. He hoped, 
that if promises of free grants of land and financial assistance were 
forthcoming from the Dominions, extra pressure would be exerted on 
British authorities to support the imperial project. At the same time 
Haggard made it perfectly clear that the RCI's ELSC was not In existence 
to advocate and promote emigration. Nonetheless, it was fundamentally 
more important to prepare for the eventuality of post-war migration and 
set the wheel in motion than patiently wait for the British government 
to initiate a plan once hostilities ended.
The enthusiastic Canadian response was inspired by the same 
patriotic fervour which had inspired the mission. The press surrendered 
their front pages and gave detailed reports as he travelled across the 
prairies. The Edmonton Journal proclaimed that the success of the 
mission was ’vital' to Canada's future while other editorials demanded 
every effort be made to encourage and formulate Haggard's efforts into a 
constructive framework.103 Congratulations and warm wishes flooded in 
and as the mission progressed eastwards across western Canada the offers 
of land and concessions increased. A. R. U. Corbett, Haggard's private 
secretary during the mission, was not surprised. When the Australian 
leg was near completion he informed Wilson that the Canadian reaction to 
Australia's exuberant response would prove very interesting indeed. 
Corbett had predicted that the Canadian authorities ’will of course want 
to go one better and it will be rather amusing'.10* And so it was.
Some reservations were expressed, however. Walter Scott, the 
premier of Saskatchewan, agreed that any soldier settlement scheme 
required careful settler selection. ’Not all ex-Service men will be 
found adapted for or willing to become farm settlers and it will not 
help the situation to send out men who should be foredoomed to
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failure'.105 He urged success would be determined by how much of a 
fair start the soldier settler could be guaranteed. The implementation 
of a comprehensive advance loan policy embodied in the settlement scheme 
was imperative.
The Canadian Pacific Railway took the opportunity of Haggard's 
visit and disclosed its plans to provide farms on its extensive holdings 
in western Canada for returning veterans from Canada and Britain. The 
plans were provisional and consisted of two settlement methods. A 
system of assisted colonisation would provide the returned soldier with 
the opportunity of selecting his own farm on unsold CPR land in 
predetermined districts. Building material, equipment and livestock 
would be provided by the company on a long term repayment scheme. The 
second approach was the 'Ready Made Farm' system. Farms would be built 
and fully stocked prior to the soldier settler's arrival. Groups of 
fifty or more farms would be constructed to form a colony in which a 
demonstration farm and a central stores depot would be located 
administered by a CPR colony superintendent. Strict selection practices 
were advocated necessitated by previous experience.106 The proposals 
had been under discussion since the beginning of 1916 but the chairman 
of the CPR's advisory committee, J. S. Dennis, notified his associates 
that Haggard should only receive a general outline and that none of the 
information should be published because of its highly tentative 
nature.107
Lougheed also supported the ready-made farm principle advocated by 
the CPR and J. H. Sherrard, President of the Canadian Manufacturers 
Association.108 He too took the opportunity, supplied by Haggard's 
visit, to release the report of the Natural Resources Commission. The 
report assumed that returning veterans who made their homes on the land 
stood a better chance of leading a healthier, more prosperous life 
compared to soldiers employed in urban areas. Farming experience was 
not essential because the proposed soldiers' colonies would be designed 
to provide the occupational and managerial expertise required. The 
colonies would provide schools, churches, stores and a central training 
farm for prospective settlers. Each colonist was entitled to 160 acres 
and loans to a maximum of $1,500.109
The premiers of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba cordially 
invited Haggard to discuss the mission and gave their support reminding 
him, however, that the three prairie provinces had no control over Crown 
land. Nevertheless, as he swept across western Canada, the momentum he
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generated strengthened his position once he arrived in Ottawa for 
discussions with Borden and his cabinet. Haggard met with a cabinet 
sub-committee on 18 July 1916 comprised of Sir Thomas White, Minister of 
Finance, Martin Burrell, Minister of Agriculture, T. W. Crothers, 
Minister of Labour and Lougheed. His proposals received a sympathetic 
ear and when he met with Borden the following day the Canadian Prime 
Minister stated that he had a 'very agreeable interview with him'.110
The Prime Minister also assured Haggard that a soldier settlement 
policy would be introduced to Parliament in the near future and he 
similarly reassured him that everything would be done to promote the 
immigration and settlement of British soldiers. Haggard was pleased and 
the interview with Borden embodied all he sought.111 He had much to 
be satisfied about but Haggard was not naive. He advised the RCI to 
remain cautious.
Now, at any rate, they have given their public promise from 
which they cannot and will not wish to recede. In any event 
it seems to me wise to let the glory rest with them and not 
to claim too much for our efforts. Perhaps the chief value 
of these lay, not so much in my arguments, as in the fact 
that I was able to show them that they had the Provincial 
Governments and the population of Canada behind them in 
anything that they might choose to do. Of this there could 
be no doubt after the very remarkable success of the 
meetings which I addressed in the various Provinces - for 
remarkable it was.112
Unfortunately, certain influential people in the federal 
government were not as enthusiastic about Haggard's mission. The 
Solicitor-General and future Minister of the Interior, Arthur Meighen, 
was not overly impressed: '[Haggard] laid before us nothing whatever
except a very general desire that we do something substantial in the way 
of facilitating land settlement by British soldiers; which indeed anyone 
might have taken for granted'.113 Meighen contrasted the lack of 
substance in Haggard's interview with the 'well digested...concrete and 
definite' settlement scheme recommended by the Natural Resources 
Commission.11* However, the federal government were unenthusiastic 
about Lougheed's report as well. Cabinet ministers lacked the 
confidence in group settlements exuded by the CPR and Lougheed because 
years of experience had taught successive federal governments that group 
settlements spelled failure and hardship. Both Haggard and Lougheed 
were told by the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior that no 
vacant townships existed close enough to railways to make such a colony
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scheme viable.11* It was evident that the Canadian government had its 
own ideas and would implement these ideas at its own pace. Although the 
Canadian government was not forthcoming, and possessed some serious 
reservations about the Haggard mission, it was a congenial host.116
SECTION 3.5: SOLDIER SETTLEMENT IN 1917
It was the provinces, not the federal government, who initiated 
the first soldier settler schemes. The polite dismissal of Haggard's 
mission by senior officials in Ottawa was not accepted by Howard 
Ferguson, Ontario's energetic and enthusiastic Minister of Lands,
Forests and Mines. Ontario was the first province to respond with a 
land settlement scheme for returned soldiers in February 1917. The 
province arranged to transport interned enemy aliens to the clay belt of 
northern Ontario near Kapuskasing to clear the dense forest for soldier 
settlement. Enemy internees were busily employed doing the back­
breaking work of land clearance and road building, providing the basis 
of a reward and a fresh start for returned servicemen who had been 
fighting against the internees' own countrymen.117 The Kapuskasing 
scheme proved extremely popular and was touted as Ontario's response to 
the back-to-the-land movement which was sweeping across Canada. In 
Ontario boosters painted an attractive picture of the resource potential 
of the north and the enormous economic benefits that could be derived 
from it. The development of ’New Ontario' or the ’true North' was being 
vigorously promoted and it had universal appeal. The pioneer settlement 
at Kapuskasing would be the important first step in the expansion and 
long-term exploitation of northern Ontario's natural riches.118
Once enough land had been cleared Ferguson proceeded with the 
colony. Five townships were set aside located between sixty and seventy 
miles west of Cochrane on the National Transcontinental Railway. Each 
settler was promised 100 acres (of which ten acres was pre-cleared) and 
a maximum of $500 in provincial loans repayable within twenty years at 
6X interest for the purchase of livestock and machinery.119 A small 
sawmill was erected to complement the initial farming operations and 
provide additional revenue from the lumber produced during the land 
clearing. Horses, farm implements, wagons, sleighs and other heavy 
machinery were set aside in a community pool to assist the settler 
during the early stages of settlement. A training school was
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established on the provincial government's demonstration farm at 
Monteith, thirty miles south of Cochrane. Instruction in agriculture, 
land clearing, stumping and logging was offered.120
The Kapuskasing colony was founded on a co-operative community 
basis. Provisions were made for the erection of a village complete with 
a school, administrative building, general store and laundry facilities. 
Ferguson placed great emphasis on the endless supply of good pulp wood 
in the region which he saw as a valuable winter income supplement for 
the settlers. There was also an enormous amount of road and bridge 
construction planned for the area which ensured the economic viability 
of the new settlement. Patents would be granted as long as the settler 
cleared two acres each year to the equivalent of 10Z of the total 
acreage, resided continuously for three years and built a habitable 
home. Such economic diversity was sure to guarantee the project's 
success and the Department of Lands, Forests and Mines was confident 
that their greatest enemy to northern development - loneliness - would 
be defeated because of the communal and co-operative framework it had 
established in Kapuskasing. Every social amenity had been provided for 
including a gramophone, piano and billiard table.121
Isolation was categorised as the settler's gravest enemy by land 
settlement experts and colonisation enthusiasts alike. According to 
their argument, drought and pestilence were deemed inconsequential 
compared with the federal government's current system of settlement 
which encouraged solitude and retarded rural progress. The Ontario 
scheme and the CPR's soldier colonies and "Ready Made Farms" project 
illustrated that many people believed that successful agricultural 
development required co-operative methods and that the provision of 
social amenities to enhance social inter-action was considered 
essential.122 Lougheed's report, released during Haggard's mission in 
1916, testified that even some senior politicians had succumbed to the 
notion of soldier settlement colonies. The effect this idea would have 
on policy makers in Ottawa and the practicality of the soldier colony 
idea was another matter.
Ontario was particularly anxious to extend this settlement 
opportunity to all soldiers who had served in the British forces during 
the war.123 In a despatch to the Colonial Office, tK e  D«*»ke. o-f Devyo's 
Governor-General of Canada, gave his endorsement of the settlement 
scheme and %was particularly impressed with the enthusiasm' of the men 
who were on the land already cleared.124 Ottawa also
114
noticed Ontario's initiative. Scammell recorded that Ontario was 
the only province to follow through and implement its land settlement 
legislation. He bitterly complained that the other provinces were quite 
content to sit back and wait for the federal government to provide 
funding.125
The initiative displayed by Ontario was not lost on either the 
British or Canadian governments. Borden responded by sending requests 
for information to each of the provincial premiers and his cabinet 
colleagues.126 The replies were enthusiastic but raised a number of 
problems. The Saskatchewan government had not adopted or put into 
operation any policy to secure or assist British soldiers planning to 
settle in Canada. Cooperation was forthcoming and interest was keen but 
owing to the fact that Crown land was under federal jurisdiction in 
Saskatchewan it was not the province's responsibility to finance or 
adopt such a land settlement policy. Given more time and once the 
Dominion government had outlined its own policy Saskatchewan would be 
more definite in its plans of assistance.127 Premier George Clark of 
New Brunswick informed Borden of his province's recently passed post-war 
settlement legislation and its ongoing attempts to establish prosperous, 
self-contained community settlements. The New Brunswick legislation was 
based on exactly the same foundation as Ontario's Kapuskasing project. 
The community settlement idea was aimed at those soldier settlers who 
required financial assistance, training and mutual support. Clark was 
confident of the scheme's success and reminded Borden that Imperial 
soldiers who desired to settle in New Brunswick after the war, and who 
possessed sufficient capital to make their enrollment in the community 
settlement project unnecessary, could purchase a previously cultivated 
farm in a productive locality through the Farm Settlement Board.128
Premier Brewster of British Columbia, though very supportive, 
believed that his province would be burdened with the greatest share of 
responsibility in a national soldier settlement scheme.129 The 
prairie provinces and the maritimes had little or no public land to 
offer. It remained for Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia to take 
charge. Legislation had been passed during the last session, based on a 
report submitted in March 1916 by the provincial Returned Soldiers' Aid 
Commission, which made provision for land on co-operative farm 
settlements for local soldiers.130 However, no final settlement 
details had been worked out. Brewster entertained other reservations.
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It seems to me that before any comprehensive plan can be 
adopted for the Dominion as a whole there should be a 
convention called at Ottawa...to discuss not only the duties 
of the provinces in respect of returned soldiers and of 
citizens generally, but the relation which the Dominion 
should bear to collective responsibilities. There should be 
some clear line of demarcation of duty and responsibility as 
among the several bodies in whatever compact is proposed to 
be framed, and I do not think any government should commit 
itself to a programme until it is definitely known what all 
the other governments will do.131
Borden agreed, announcing to his provincial counterparts that the 
federal government had drafted some preliminary legislative proposals 
but that it was eager for provincial input. There was also the issue of 
the Colonial Office's December reminder concerning Dominion plans for 
British ex-servicemen. The Prime Minister announced that an inter­
provincial land settlement conference would be held in Ottawa on 10-12 
January 1917 to discuss these issues.132
The conference had two main objectives. 'A full, free and frank' 
discussion and exchange of ideas and information between the Dominion 
and provincial governments on how best to settle ex-servicemen after the 
war. More importantly, the question of inter-government cooperation and 
the 'satisfactory division of responsibility' with regard to increased 
loan facilities and the settlement of unused land under private 
ownership were key points under discussion.133 The question of 
technical education was examined as well as the preferential employment 
of ex-soldiers in the civil service and on public works projects. 
However, it was universally recognised that the underlying objective 
behind the conference and the proposed legislation was the vital 
national necessity of increased agricultural production.134 The Duke 
of Devonshire cabled Walter Long, Bonar Law's successor at the Colonial 
Office, that the conference had been interesting and revealing. 
'[WJithout arriving at any very definite conclusions there was a useful 
interchange of ideas and good results may be expected to follow'. Long 
was pleased because the Canadian conference coincided with his attempts 
to examine the issue of post-war migration embodied in the Tennyson 
committee.135
Shortly after the conclusion of the conference a high powered 
cabinet committee composed of Roche, White, Burrell and Meighen were 
given the task of framing the appropriate legislation. Lougheed's 
absence was manifest. In May 1917 the Canadian government presented its 
legislation for the repatriation and re-establishment of its soldiers on
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the land to the Canadian Parliament. The Soldier Settlement Act of 1917 
was enacted to provide returning veterans with the opportunity of 
establishing themselves on a homestead.136 This particular approach 
to land settlement emphasised the Canadian government's commitment to 
open up huge new areas of land for agricultural purposes. Roche 
stressed that the aim of the legislation was now two-fold: 'to assist
the returned soldier and increase agricultural production'.137 
Admittedly, if the legislation proved attractive to the returned 
soldier, Roche believed it might provide an important measure to 
counteract the exodus of Canada's rural population to the cities. In 
some government circles officials believed that soldiers, as a class, 
would prove no exception to the above rule. The tendency to migrate to 
the metropolis still alarmed a growing number of Canadians concerned 
about the future of the country's social fabric.138 One thing was 
certain. While recognising the sacrifices Canadian troops had made 
during the war the basic conception of the soldier settlement 
legislation was that it was not a military bounty. Rather, it was a 
plan for making brave men into competent farmers. As it was repeatedly 
emphasised in Parliament, in order to ensure maximum success the entire 
scheme had to be placed on sound business-like principles.139
The Act provided for the establishment of a three-man Soldier 
Settlement Board (SSB) which was empowered to grant loans to a maximum 
of $2,500 at 5X interest for twenty years for the acquisition of land, 
livestock, and farm machinery. Loans could be applied to property 
already owned or leased by the returned soldier, or to lands he wished 
to purchase, or to the settlement of free Dominion lands in the prairie 
provinces. In the case of Dominion lands the Act authorised the 
reservation for soldier settlement of all undisposed-of land within 
fifteen miles of a railway. A free grant of 160 acres was allowed to 
each soldier applicant wanting to homestead in these reserves. In 
addition, the soldier could easily expand his operation and claim the 
standard homestead right of 160 acres providing he had not exhausted the 
privilege already. The beneficiaries of the Act were Canadians who had 
served overseas with the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) or as 
members of the Imperial forces and soldiers who had served with the 
Imperial forces and any self-governing Dominion or colony. Provision 
was also made for agricultural instruction of the inexperienced soldier 
settler, but no specifics were outlined.140
Roche proudly informed Parliament that Canada was doing its utmost
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for the returned soldier and that its soldier settlement legislation was 
'the most generous and practicable offer made by any British 
dominion'.141 Liberal backbenchers, although not challenging the 
government's generosity, were sceptical of the legislation, in 
particular the type and location of the land being offered. Roche 
countered with the announcement that there were six-and-one half million 
acres of available Dominion land within ten miles of railways in western 
Canada. But he was forced to admit that not all of it was open prairie. 
A good portion was swampy marshland, thick scrub or dense forest which 
needed a large amount of money, time and backbreaking work to bring 
under cultivation.142 This prompted one Liberal backbencher, W. H. 
Pugsley, to proclaim that the legislation did not go far enough for 
these very reasons. The available land was concentrated in the remote 
north central regions of the prairies, two thirds of which was in 
Alberta. He charged that the soldier settler should not be sent to 
these remote and isolated areas where he would very likely become 
discouraged and quickly abandon the homestead. He complained that it 
was highly doubtful that many soldiers wanted to lead the lonely life of 
a pioneer. 'Not one man in a thousand would be attracted by an 
invitation to settle on land in the Peace River country, six hundred 
miles north of the American boundary, where there are no settlers, no 
schools, churches or doctors'.143 Pugsley suggested that the 
government exercise its right of expropriation and obtain land in 
established settlement districts for those who were not desirous of 
pioneer settlement. His advice was unfortunately ignored.
In the mean time, all concerned agreed that returned soldiers 
should not receive preferential treatment regarding land settlement.
They should be treated as 'ordinary individuals, not as extraordinary 
persons'.144 Similarly, this did not warrant throwing all caution to 
the wind. The primary fear echoed by one prairie politician and a Lands 
Branch official was the inadvisability of the federal government of 
embarking upon a settlement policy in which the majority of the 
participants were inexperienced. 'Unless a man evinces a desire to his 
own volition to go in for farming, and has had previous experience 
therein...legislation framed with this object in view is doomed to 
failure'.145 Promises of agricultural training were extracted from 
Roche but it was evident from his cursory treatment of the subject that 
nothing concrete had been mapped out. For its part, the federal 
government ignored the opposition's calls for caution and greater
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forethought.
From its inception it was evident that the Soldier Settlement Act 
of 1917 was aimed at achieving imperial self-sufficiency and cultural 
uniformity. Roche declared:
Fortunately for us....in this period of national crisis, we 
have had the preponderance of our population Canadian and 
British-born. It is therefore, in my opinion, of the 
greatest importance, not only from a sentimental but also 
from a national and economic standpoint, that we should 
maintain, to as great an extent as possible, the British 
element in our population...1*6
The response to this Act was disappointing for its architects as
slightly more than 2,000 men took advantage of the scheme between 1917
and 1919.147 The biggest problem was the type and location of the 
Dominion lands. The majority of the good and easily accessible land had 
been culled by homesteaders long before the war. Although thousands of 
productive, easily accessible acres remained unsettled they were in the 
hands of individual and corporate speculators. Dominion lands, located 
in the heavily forested and marshy inter-lake region of Manitoba, on the 
northern fringes of the park belt, in the Peace River country of north­
western Alberta, or the semi-arid Pall»5&r Triangle were extensive but 
isolated and marginally productive.148 Farming operations in these 
areas demanded a large and immediate infusion of investment capital. 
Clearing land was a costly and slow business which consumed any initial 
returns gained in the early years. Ottawa's failure to incorporate the 
powers of expropriation into the SSB's mandate proved to be a glaring
mistake. In 1918 it was announced that 85X of the 22 million acres of
vacant Dominion land in the west had been deemed unacceptable because it 
was either agriculturally unsuitable or too far from the railway.149 
This effectively halved Roche's initial estimate. Equally significant, 
it was an admission of policy failure by the government. A new policy 
was needed and quickly.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CANADA: SOLDIER SETTLEMENT - A FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY
The sudden ending of hostilities in November 1918 and the urgency 
of repatriating Canadian veterans quickly made it imperative that Ottawa 
formulate a broader soldier settlement strategy which eliminated the 
oversights inherent in the 1917 legislation. Determined to maintain 
strong and effective central leadership in reconstruction planning, 
federal policy makers were mindful that the new soldier settlement 
legislation could provide an important supplement to Canada's 
reactivated immigration and development strategy. However, the war had 
transformed Canadian society and Ottawa soon realised that it would have 
to take into account some of these new developments when redrafting pre­
war policies or embarking upon new initiatives. This was particularly 
evident in the area of post-war immigration policy.
Prior to 1914 Canada's national immigration policy was based on an 
economic strategy designed to develop its primary resources. The 
emphasis on agriculture and the federal government's firm control over 
all aspects of immigration and colonisation ensured the pursuit of a 
consistent and vigorous economic development policy. However, the war 
had changed people's attitudes and perceptions towards a variety of 
ethnic groups. Patriotism and conformity to Anglo-Canadian orthodoxies 
had become fundamental conditions of acceptance within Canadian society. 
No longer were immigrants considered suitable simply because they were 
obedient, hard working and possessed the proper agricultural 
credentials. Participation in the war effort was the yardstick used by 
many Canadians to assess an immigrant's loyalty as was his willingness 
to adopt the Canadian way of life. Anything less branded him unfaithful 
and an enemy. Subsequently, previously welcomed ethnic groups, such as 
Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Finns and Ukrainians were either denied 
access to Canada or had severe landing regulations exacted upon them.
The agriculturally industrious religious sects, notably Doukhobors, 
Hutterites and Mennonites, previously invited to settle on the prairies, 
were now judged incapable of *Canadianisation' and excluded. Although 
social compatibility and the willingness to adopt the Canadian way of
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life increased in importance they did not supplant the need to attract a 
skilled work force as the main criteria behind immigration policy in the 
immediate post-war years. As Canada's immigration policy became more 
restrictive, its architects nevertheless maintained that with a return 
to normality Canada would secure sufficient numbers of agricultural and 
industrial workers either domestically or from the preferred nations of 
the United States and Britain.1
The optimistic assumption that British immigration would return to 
the pre-war levels was quickly dispelled. And with it went the 
expectations of achieving a culturally homogeneous society rooted in the 
institutions of an Anglo-Saxon heritage. The campaign to reinforce 
Canada's Anglo-Saxon character through a selective immigration policy 
was a potent, ideological weapon in certain sectors of Canadian society. 
Nativist sentiment, fuelled by racial prejudice ran high, particularly 
in western Canada where many Anglo-Canadian trade unionists and farmers 
had developed a hostile attitude towards ’alien' immigrants.2 
Anxieties and emotions intensified upon news of the Russian revolution 
in 1917 and during the increasingly turbulent, sometimes violent, labour 
unrest between 1917 and 1919. Veterans joined forces with trade 
unionists, farmers and various nativist associations to combat the 
largely imaginary threat from within. In many cases veterans 
spearheaded anti-alien agitation, and by 1918 one association, the Great 
War Veterans' Association (GWVA) had eagerly accepted national 
leadership on the alien question.3
SECTION 4: VETERAN MILITANCY AND THE ’ALIEN' QUESTION
’Among the most important [national issues] are the settlement of 
our agricultural lands and the pressing problem of the alien population 
of Canada', proclaimed Dr. A. M. Forbes, vice-president of the GWVA.4 
Forbes argued that a policy of agricultural reconstruction based upon 
the resettlement of returning veterans would do more to stabilise 
Canadian society than any other reconstruction policy. Agriculture, he 
stated, was more important to the future well-being of the nation than 
manufacturing. The only way to stop social erosion was to make the 
countryside, rather than the city, a more attractive place to live for 
native-born Canadians. ’No nation can be regarded as unhealthy when a 
virile peasantry, contented with rural employments... exists on its
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soil',5
Underlying Forbes's argument was the stark realisation that 
Canada's urban population was expanding. The 1921 census revealed that 
fractionally more Canadians lived in the cities than in rural areas. 
While agricultural employment had increased in the four western 
provinces between 1911 and 1921, and was the largest employer in every 
province except British Columbia, the industry suffered a small overall 
decline in the number of men it employed nationally because of falling 
statistics in eastern provinces.6 Urbanisation inexorably increased 
and during the 1920s most rural Canadians grudgingly accepted the fact.
Nevertheless, the farmer as the ideal Canadian citizen remained a 
powerful myth in post-war Canadian society. Land was the element which 
best exemplified social stability, and the'sturdy yeoman farmer 
symbolised progress, development and a robust society. The appeal of, 
even reverence for, the past and its ancient traditions, was another 
important element in this conservative ideology. The basic components 
of class harmony, social stability and tradition were common to both 
Canadian and British agrarian myths. But unlike British conservatism's 
romanticisation of country life, Canadians did not necessarily equate 
the agrarian myth with the ’nonindustrial, noninnovative and nonmaterial 
qualities' inherent in the British ’countryside of the mind'.7 As in 
the United States, the Canadian yeoman's purpose was ’to strengthen the 
fibre of [the] country by building into the basic industrial 
structure... the best blood and bones of [the] nation'.8 But the basic 
issue remained social stability rather than modernisation.
Arthur Meighen illustrated the point when he introduced the 
Soldier Settlement Act of 1919. The primary purpose of the legislation 
was to secure settlers for the development of vacant prairie farm land,
and to make settlers of those who have proven themselves the 
backbone of the nation in its trouble. We believe that we 
cannot better fortify this country against the waves of 
unrest and discontent that now assail us...than by making 
the greatest possible proportion of the soldiers of our 
country settlers upon our land.9
The veterans proved to be willing defenders of the existing order 
for several reasons. As more soldiers returned from the trenches in 
1918 the membership and organisation of the veterans' associations grew 
stronger and became more aggressive in their demands.10 Many became 
disgruntled soon after their homecoming by the lack of speed and
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adequate resources for their return to civilian life. Disappointment 
turned to anger as some veterans discovered that jobs they had vacated 
had been filled by people they considered to be aliens. Hardened by 
their war experience and conditioned by a 'friend or foe' attitude, 
veterans usually identified the alien immigrant with the enemy they had 
recently fought against in Europe. With the advent of Bolshevism it was 
easy to transfer their animosity for the enemy alien to Russian and East 
European immigrants.11 Subsequently, one of the GWVA's primary 
objectives was ’to inculcate loyalty to Canada and the Empire'.12 The 
preservation of freedom, democracy and Christianity had been the 
principal ideological basis for going to war and for the veterans these 
values were the very essence of the British empire. But the ideology 
contained a darker, more sinister element. As one historian points out, 
the expression of these British principles revealed an intolerant, 
sometimes jingoistic and ’militant Anglo-Saxon superiority', symbolised 
by the Union Jack, the English language and the Royal Navy.13
As veteran militancy grew in 1918 the Canadian cabinet was 
bombarded with a steady barrage of anti-alien resolutions from the 
GWVA.1* In March, the GWVA presented a petition to Prime Minister 
Borden urging that enemy aliens should bear their share of the war 
effort and requesting that they be employed in essential war work under 
appropriate surveillance. Earnings above the amount equal to the pay of 
a Canadian soldier would be expropriated by the government for the war 
effort. No aliens would be allowed to hold public office or possess 
firearms. All enemy alien newspapers should be suppressed and the use 
of alien languages in the schools and pulpit strictly forbidden.15 The 
launching of Germany's spring offensive later that month placed greater, 
more militant demands by veterans on the authorities to curb the alien 
threat and for stricter immigration machinery after the war. Quality 
not quantity was what Canada needed according to the GWVA. The only 
immigrants suitable, aside from the white races within the British 
empire, were from the United States and northern and western Europe 
exclusive of enemy belligerents. In December, the Edmonton branch 
called on the federal government ’to prohibit the enemy alien from 
entering the Dominion of Canada [and] to confiscate all land properties 
[sic], invested capital and monies of such unnaturalised, and 
naturalised enemy aliens, excepting those who joined the C.E.F.' and 
their immediate families.16 Despite the fractional nature of intra­
veteran association politics, the GWVA received unanimous support from
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rival veterans' organisations on the immigration issue and the alien 
question.17
Land settlement had been a major plank in the GWVA's platform 
since its foundation in 1917 and became a serious bone of contention 
between the association and the federal government. Between 1917 and 
1919 the GWVA had attempted to cajole the federal government into 
allowing it an equal share in the supervision of its soldier settlement 
policy. Pleased with the introduction of soldier settlement legislation 
in 1917 it believed that its participation in the parliamentary 
investigation initiated that year had been important in spurring on the 
federal government. But its enthusiasm soured when the government 
quietly shelved soldier settlement to face the nationally divisive 
issues of conscription and railway subsidisation in 1917-18. It was not 
until January 1918, after Borden's electoral victory, that the
government picked up the thread of soldier settlement once again. But
it was almost too late to implement a serious settlement scheme for the 
upcoming year. This prompted the GWVA at its second annual convention 
in Toronto in August 1918, to urge the federal government to expand its
settlement scheme and to appoint a cabinet minister whose sole
responsibility would be the formulation and supervision of the scheme, 
and to convene a special conference between the federal and provincial 
governments and the GWVA in order to draft a more suitable policy.18
The government flatly refused such a partnership. The 
announcement of the three-man Soldier Settlement Board, which would 
administer Canada's soldier settlement scheme, was finally made in 
January 1918. It did little to restore the GWVA's confidence in the 
federal government since two of the three seemed unqualified or 
unsuitable. F. W. Law, the GWVA's branch secretary in Winnipeg, 
vigorously protested against Charles Roland's appointment. Roland was a 
native of Winnipeg, a former commissioner of the Winnipeg Industrial 
Bureau, former secretary of the unpopular Winnipeg Patriotic Fund, 
manager of the Winnipeg Telegram and, claimed the Veteran, a notorious 
civic booster. A highly dubious choice, according to the magazine's 
editors, and one that reeked of political patronage. The real 
hostility, however, occurred over Major E. J. AsKton's appointment. 
Although a CEF veteran, Ashton's real expertise, according to the 
Veteran, was not in veterans' administration but as a furniture dealer 
and undertaker in Regina. The GWVA was greatly angered because the 
government had not approached the association and sought its advice on
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possible candidates. It therefore vented its displeasure: ’Perhaps the
Government is a government of farseeing prevision and fears that the 
scheme of settlement on outlying homesteads...may bring veterans to 
untimely graves and is providing for their skilful internment'.19 Its 
own exclusion apart, it could find little fault with the acting chairman 
and former Superintendent of Lands for British Columbia, Samuel Maber.
Ever since 1917 the GWVA had attempted to get one of its members 
appointed as a member of the three-man board. It had nominated Captain 
Ivan Finn of Prince Albert, Saskatchewan as its representative in 
response to a suggestion by Roche, the Minister of the Interior, in 
which he promised to make a recommendation to the cabinet that the GWVA 
be allowed to nominate a representative to the SSB.20 Finn was a 
member of the GWVA's land committee and had actively campaigned against 
the ’foreign farmer' in western Canada at the GWVA's inaugural 
conference in April 1917.21 But when he was not selected the 
association cried betrayal and stated that ’strangers are given 
jurisdiction in those departments of the Government where our affairs of 
greatest importance are administered, and we are not even consulted',22 
Roche's support for the idea made no headway with his cabinet 
colleagues. Besides, when the issue was raised in October 1917, Borden 
was preoccupied with assembling his Unionist government to fight the 
forthcoming general election. Soldier settlement and GWVA 
representation on the SSB were minor problems for the federal government 
compared to the conscription crisis which threatened to split the 
country. Roche, for his part, now retired to the tranquil pastures of 
the Civil Service Commission.
SECTION 4.1: THE SOLDIER SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1919
The formation of the Union government in October 1917 heralded the 
entry of the austere Arthur Meighen into the Department of the Interior. 
First elected to Parliament in 1908 as MP for the Manitoba constituency 
of Portage la Prairie, Meighen, a lawyer by profession, established a 
reputation as an astute and masterful debater. In 1913 he became 
Solicitor-General, at that time not a cabinet position. Borden had 
always been impressed with Meighen's intellectual and managerial 
abilities and after the outbreak of war Meighen found himself 
undertaking greater administrative and party responsibilities outside
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the scope of his office. The Prime Minister increasingly relied on him 
to pilot controversial legislation through the House. Though not one to 
complain about the hard work, he did want a cabinet position which 
acknowledged his achievements and status in the government. As a 
precondition to agreeing to a wartime coalition government, Meighen 
insisted that he be given the Interior portfolio, which signified 
western party leadership.23
Meighen concurred with his predecessor on the urgency of 
immediately selecting SSB personnel. The delay had been due to the 
tremendous difficulty of finding capable men ’for this most perplexing 
and indeed stupendous work'. At the same time, he could not ignore the 
pressure from the western premiers who were demanding immediate action 
in time for spring seeding.24
Maber realised immediately that Roche's legislation was wholly 
inadequate and he urged Meighen to reserve all Dominion lands within 
fifteen miles of the railway. He also knew that there was a scarcity of 
good arable land close to existing rail networks on the prairies. The 
probability of a large number of soldiers applying to the SSB therefore 
necessitated the reservation of a better class of land.25 But it was 
not enough. Maber pointed out that the bulk of the available homestead 
land along existing railways was in northern Saskatchewan and north­
western Alberta. Many surveyed townships in the Peace River district of 
north-western Alberta still remained isolated and without rail 
communications. The only lands suitable for soldier settlers elsewhere 
on the prairies were claims cancelled through default, abandoned 
homesteads or expropriated reserve land. These lands were scattered 
throughout the region, but Maber was confident that it contained a 
number of good homesteads.26 In April 1918, Meighen reacted to Maber's 
entreaties and reserved all remaining vacant Dominion land within 
fifteen miles of the railway.
Slowly, portions of school lands, Indian reserve lands, grazing 
leases, Hudson's Bay Company and forest reserves were set aside 
exclusively for returned soldiers.27 The GWVA exerted constant 
pressure on the government to expand its soldier settlement programme.
In May the British Columbia chapter hastened the utilisation of Indian 
reserves for returned soldiers in exchange for grazing leases. 
Saskatchewan veterans complained that progress was unsatisfactory.28 
Once again, veteran nativism reared its ugly head when demands were made 
to expropriate the homesteads of ’enemy aliens' such as Mennonites and
136
Doukhobors. Similarly, land locked up by the speculators and 
corporations did not escape the veterans' demand for expropriation 
either.29 Condemning the soldier settler legislation of 1917 as 
inadequate, they charged the federal government with 'merely tinkering 
with a vast question'.30
A flurry of activity engulfed the Department of the Interior and 
the SSB in 1918. Between April and July a new set of land regulations 
was formulated and Dominion land agents were notified of the new 
procedures and priorities.31 Throughout July a series of orders-in­
council was implemented reserving a variety of Dominion lands. This 
included the forty mile wide railway belt in British Columbia, remaining 
Doukhobor reserves and unsurveyed lands in the Peace River and 
Vermillion districts of Alberta. Maber was particularly anxious to 
secure the reservation of these unsurveyed lands as it had been reported 
that squatters were moving into the districts. He recommended that 
squatting by civilians before a survey was carried out should be 
prohibited.32
Indian reserves were singled out by the GWVA as a promising 
solution to the land shortage. Numerous branches across the prairies
agreed that the Indians were not making full use of these lands and that
they should be purchased from the Indian bands at a fair and equitable 
price.33 At first, the federal government balked at the idea. But 
when it became clear that there was a chronic land shortage the proposal 
attracted serious attention. Meighen was particularly anxious to secure 
these lands and he implored D. C. Scott, Deputy Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs, that it was of the utmost importance for the success of soldier 
settlement to do so.3* Scott was sympathetic and wanted to cooperate, 
but he stressed that his Department's first duty was to the welfare of 
the Indian. He reminded Meighen that land could not be legally taken 
without the Indians agreeing to a surrender. Once a fair valuation was
agreed upon the surrendered land would be administered by the SSB. As
custodian of the Indian lands he wanted to ensure that the department 
'are getting fair prices for the Indians'. He also worried about the 
danger that the SSB might obtain the most desirable land, leaving the 
Indians with poorer sections. He therefore strongly advised that the 
government be prepared to take the land en bloc.35
It was clear that a revitalised soldier settlement policy would 
need provincial participation. John Oliver, the Premier of British 
Columbia, had recognised the need for such input as it emerged that the
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number of applicants would far outstrip the insufficient amount of 
suitable Dominion land available. Oliver implored Borden to call a 
national conference to discuss amendments to the 1917 Act. The Prime 
Minister complied and on 19 November 1918 a post-war conference convened 
in Ottawa to discuss land settlement, immigration and agriculture. High 
on the agenda were land reclamation, land expropriation and a 
comprehensive agricultural training and education programme for soldier 
settlers.36
J. A. Calder, one of the three Liberals in the coalition cabinet, 
warmly endorsed Oliver's initiative. Since his appointment as minister 
of the new Department of Immigration and Colonisation, post-war 
immigration and land settlement had received his undivided attention. 
Calder was a shrewd Saskatchewan Liberal who was just beginning to make 
his name in federal politics. The Conservative party hierarchy 
distrusted him and thought him a ’slick and unscrupulous partisan'.37 
But according to the Canadian Annual Review he was the chief 
representative of western thought in Ottawa.38 In September 1918 he 
toured the prairies where he announced to a reporter of the Winnipeg 
Free Press, western Canada's leading newspaper, that the federal 
government had drafted a broad policy regarding immigration and land 
settlement in which it recognised the need for ’full and direct co­
operation with the Provinces. It involves the settlement of privately- 
owned lands, abandoned farms, and leased farms, and the employment of 
Provincial and Federal credit',39 He elaborated upon this 
pronouncement during the federal-provincial conference in Ottawa, 
standing in for Meighen. He agreed with Oliver that the re­
establishment of war veterans provided an excellent opportunity to 
develop the nation's resources. ’The economic situation demands that 
all our resources must now be utilised', and this unquestionably meant 
bringing vacant and under-developed prairie land into immediate use. 
’This matter affects all Governments, Federal, Provincial and Municipal 
and the Returned Soldier problem must be hooked up to the general 
question of speeding up production...particularly food production'
Calder was under no illusion that to bring millions of acres of 
wilderness under cultivation would require heavy investment. The 
creation of a large number of small holders who might one day purchase 
their own farm was believed to be money well spent, but nothing would be 
achieved using parsimonious half measures. It also meant that the 
feuding between the provinces and Ottawa would have to cease. The
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premiers agreed, promised their support and acknowledged that settling 
returned soldiers was a federal responsibility.*1 Calder's 
announcement of the government's broad intentions had paved the way for 
Meighen to formulate new legislation.
The 1917 Act had restricted the soldiers' choice to Dominion land 
in western Canada. Provinces, such as Nova Scotia were outside the 
original scope of the 1917 Act and had to provide their own schemes. 
However, very little Crown land remained in Nova Scotia and what was 
left was isolated, costly and heavily forested making it extremely 
expensive to clear. Now that soldiers could purchase farms and pre-empt 
vacant and abandoned homesteads outside the prairie provinces, Canada's 
soldier settlement policy became truly national. Although most of the 
enquiries came from veterans from the three prairie provinces, and the 
majority of the vacant land was in this region, the maritime provinces 
and Quebec were eager to help their returning heroes within the limited 
resources available.*2
Meighen sketched out his plans to Borden on 11 December 1918.
With a few minor adjustments over the winter it became the framework of 
the government's policy. In May 1919 Meighen introduced the new 
legislation which contained a number of changes to make the scheme more 
attractive and induce more men to settle.*3 All vacant Dominion lands 
within a fifteen mile radius of a railway in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, 
Alberta and the railway belt of British Columbia were reserved for 
soldier settlement. The SSB was instructed to focus its attention on 
lands held vacant by land speculators and was authorised to designate 
these lands as settlement areas. The Soldier Settlement Act of 1919 
empowered the Board to purchase these lands at a price set by the 
Exchequer Court should the speculator refuse the Board's offer. The new 
Act extended the Board's power to expropriate land from forest reserves 
and acquire uncultivated Indian reserves and school lands.** More 
importantly, it allowed veterans the freedom to choose and purchase 
privately owned land with government assistance which by its location 
and fertility was preferable to Crown land in the area.
The chief provision of the new Act, however, was a larger, more 
generous credit programme. The classes of assistance provided under the 
Act were as follows:
1. To aid in settlement on lands purchased through the
Board.
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(a) Up to $4500 for the purchase of land,
(b) Up to $2000 for the purchase of livestock, implements, 
and other equipment,
(c) Up to $1000 for the erection of buildings and other 
improvements.
2. To aid in becoming re-established on land already owned 
by them.
(a) Up to $3500 for the removal of encumbrances, the 
payment so advanced not to exceed fifty per cent of the 
appraised value of the land,
(b) Up to $2000 for the purchase of livestock, implements, 
and other equipment,
(c) Up to $1000 for the erection of buildings or other 
permanent improvements.
3. To aid in becoming established on Dominion Lands in the 
prairie provinces.
(a) Up to $3000 for the purchase of livestock and 
equipment, and the erection of permanent improvements.45
Interest was set at 5%  per annum, but loan charges for stock and 
equipment did not begin until the third year and were payable in four 
annual instalments, while loans for land and buildings were repayable in 
twenty-five annual instalments. As with land selection soldier settlers 
under the new scheme were given the option of making their own offer 
when purchasing implements and livestock. Before any purchase was made, 
however, the SSB required an appraisal from its own officials to ensure 
the proper expenditure of public money. According to the federal 
government, by the end of 1920 the new purchasing procedure had saved 
the Canadian public over $3.6 million.46 Eligibility was limited to 
those Canadian veterans who had served overseas with the CEF and those 
domiciled in Canada before the war who had seen action with Imperial or 
Allied forces. Full benefit was extended to ex-servicemen from the 
British Isles and the self-governing or 'white' Dominions.
The SSB took additional measures to protect its investment by 
providing preliminary agricultural training facilities and expert 
supervision. The emphasis on proper selection, training and supervision 
reflected Ottawa's determination to remain in complete control of its 
soldier settlement policy. Its efforts to establish training facilities 
before demobilisation, both in England and Canada, reflected the urgency 
with which Meighen regarded soldier settlement as a vital component of 
Canadian post-war reconstruction. Meighen informed Sir Edward Kemp, 
Minister of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada (OMFC), that
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negotiations were under way in Canada for the use of agricultural 
facilities and institutions. It was to be a coordinated effort between 
the SSB and the federal and provincial Departments of Agriculture. 
Inexperienced applicants would receive training at the various 
provincial agricultural colleges and schools of agriculture. Successful 
private farmers would also be canvassed and selected to participate in 
an apprenticeship programme.47 However, very special opportunities 
existed in Britain during demobilisation. It was estimated that 
demobilisation would take from nine to eighteen months. Therefore, 
while waiting for passage home training facilities could be established 
for practical instruction in Canadian farming techniques and land 
settlement under the auspices of the Khaki University in Britain.45
Meighen urged that the military authorities should cooperate by 
providing training farms, horses, equipment and qualified instructors. 
SSB officials stressed the need for brief, three-month courses which 
concentrated on the practical rather than the academic or scientific. 
Candidates were to familiarise themselves with the daily routine of farm 
life before being sent to farmers who would provide additional practical 
ground work and experience.49 Preliminary meetings had already taken 
place between the SSB and the Ministry of Militia's Demobilisation 
Committee for the prompt implementation of the arrangements for 
agricultural instruction. In December 1918, Commissioner Ashton and C. 
F. Bailey, Ontario's Assistant Deputy Minister of the Department of 
Agriculture, were despatched to London to survey Canadian troops on the 
question of land settlement and the need for training facilities in 
agriculture.50 A census undertaken in early 1918 confirmed that
105,000 Canadian soldiers out of a total of 400,000 men overseas had 
expressed a wish to settle on the land after the war. These figures 
were later revised by Meighen who reported that on the basis of 273,444 
replies from members of the CEF, 87,771 had expressed an interest in 
farming and stock raising.51
Experience, training and temperament were not the only criteria 
for a successful soldier settler. Capital was essential and the SSB was 
favourably inclined to put a minimum capital requirement of $500 on any 
candidate accepted for land settlement. When the 1919 legislation was 
announced Canadian veterans were entitled to make a down payment of 10Z 
on the purchase price of land, stock and seed. Imperial ex-servicemen 
were required to pay 20Z of the amount paid for their land, stock and 
seed and were to spend sufficient time on Canadian farms to acquaint
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themselves with Canadian farming methods.52 For those ex-Imperials who 
had farming experience, one year with a Canadian farmer was deemed 
sufficient while for inexperienced ex-Imperials the minimum was two 
years.
Meighen defended the new measures in the House of Commons by 
stating that they were not a gratuity or reward for the soldier. The 
legislation provided the foundation for a systematic approach to the 
colonisation of new territory. 'The primary and great principle of this 
Bill is to secure settlers on the lands of this country', he announced,
[The] class of citizen that counts the most in the 
determination of the stability of a country...is undoubtedly 
the basic class— the agricultural class...Its purpose is to 
strengthen the fibre of this country by building into the 
basic industrial structure of the best blood and bones of 
our nation.53
Meighen never tired of stressing the national scope of the land 
settlement issue. It was an enormous task requiring cooperation between 
all levels of government. Participation of private individuals such as 
well-trained agricultural experts, experienced and capable farmers and 
financial officers from banks and mortgage companies was also essential. 
Regional qualification and advisory boards sprouted up all over the 
country staffed largely by local farmers, instructors from provincial 
agricultural colleges and public servants from provincial Departments of 
Agriculture who were familiar with local land prices, soils and farming 
practices. The SSB bureaucracy mushroomed to meet the increasing 
pressure from applicants who needed land appraisals, loan estimates, 
supervision, advice and information. The watershed of the SSB was 
reached in June 1920 when staff numbers rose from a few hundred to a 
peak of 1,579. In 1923 Ashton reported that the supervisory staff alone 
consisted of 150 trained agriculturists, all practical men, many of whom 
possessed degrees from agricultural colleges. By the end of November 
1924 reorganisation had reduced the staff to 600 and by 1930 some 500 
remained employed.54
The new legislation had an immediate impact on the number of 
applications handled by the SSB. In March 1919 only 400 were received. 
Between May and July the average was 400 per week and by August it was 
600.55 In its first annual report published in March 1921, the SSB 
proudly announced that during 1919 approximately 75X of the applicants 
were granted qualification certificates while in 1920 just under two-
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thirds were successful. The aggregate number of soldier settlers was 
25,443 of which 19,771 or 11% received loans to purchase farms 
privately. Loans amounted to over $80 million.56 The acreage and 
livestock statistics were even more impressive. The SSB held clear 
title to over 2.1 million acres of land, 360,000 acres on mortgage and 
first charge on over 980,000 acres for a grand total of 3.49 million 
acres. Of this, over 765,000 acres had been acquired from various 
forest reserves, grazing leases, Indian lands, Hudson's Bay reserve 
lands, Doukhobor reserves and school lands on the prairies. The SSB had 
liens on 119,000 horses, cattle, sheep and swine, as well as numerous 
pieces of farm machinery. Statistically, it was an impressive picture. 
Even more encouraging was the fact that 10X of the loans had been 
repaid.57
Despite Meighen's insistence that soldier settlement was not a 
'big loan venture', but a practical scheme based on sound business 
principles, the Canadian Annual Review called Canada's soldier 
settlement programme 'the largest real estate and loan business in 
Canada if not in the British Empire' ,58 Prime farm land In 1919 was 
not cheap. In the prairie provinces it was selling for between $50 and 
$60 an acre. Elsewhere it was considerably cheaper, averaging between 
$16 an acre in New Brunswick, $33 in Ontario and $53 in British 
Columbia. However, for those veterans who did not claim Dominion land 
but purchased privately owned land their price per acre was considerably 
higher. And it was land purchasing which comprised over half the loan 
money spent by soldier settlers.59
For the immediate future soldier settlement proved to be a notable 
success. The SSB was convinced that the 1919 Act had an appreciable 
effect in stemming rural depopulation and making an important 
contribution to the back-to-the-land movement. The achievement of 
settling over 25,000 soldiers with their families had added more than
100,000 people to Canada's permanent agricultural population. This was 
indeed of national significance, reported the SSB, because if the scheme 
had not been launched 'a great proportion of them would be found in the 
crowded centres of population, increasing the difficulty of the problems 
of u n e m p l o y m e n t ' T h e  SSB's production figures for soldier settlers 
were indicative of the importance of the soldier settler to Canadian 
agriculture. Over $10 million of livestock had been purchased by the 
SSB for its clients who in turn had produced, in a very short space of 
time, 2.6 million bushels of wheat and 6.5 million bushels of oats, and
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other grains, feed and fodder valued at $13.9 million.61 Even more 
impressive was the number of virgin acres brought under cultivation. Of 
the 4.8 million acres occupied by soldier settlers, 2.1 million was raw 
Dominion land lying in the prairie provinces. The number of soldier 
grants issued in this settlement area by March 1921 was 8,772 with each 
farm averaging 240 acres. Of this untamed land the SSB estimated that
194.000 acres or 9.2Z had been broken by 1920 and it was believed that 
in 1921 an additional 300,000 acres or 14.2% would be tamed for the 
first time. Indeed, the SSB was encouraged by these figures because
928.000 acres of soldier settlement land had been brought under 
cultivation nationwide by 1921.62
However by 1920 soldier settlers were already confronting serious 
problems. The initial rush of applicants made it impossible to screen 
all undesirable and unsuitable applicants and resulted in the inevitable 
approval of a higher number of these cases than was normal under 
ordinary circumstances. The liberal monetary provisions, which Meighen 
had taken great pains to deny as constituting a military gratuity or 
’big loan venture', were exactly that. 'The very nature of the scheme 
itself', admitted Commissioner Ashton, ’involved the waiving in many 
ways of ordinary business margins of security',63 The most significant 
blow to the entire scheme was the sharp and sudden post-war deflation 
which began in 1920. The lion's share of settlement took place in 1919 
and 1920 when the prices of land, stock and equipment were at a premium. 
However, by the time the majority of soldier settlers had brought enough 
acres under cultivation or had built up their herds, prices for 
agricultural products had plummeted. The SSB was the first to admit the 
surprising results of 1920. ’Considering the collapse of markets in the 
middle of threshing, it is felt that the showing is a remarkably good 
one'.64 The cost-price squeeze ushered in a period of failure, 
foreclosure, abandonment and indebtedness which haunted soldier settlers 
and politicians alike throughout the inter-war period.65
SECTION 4.2: PROVINCIAL SETBACKS
The Kapuskasing soldier colony was the first provincial scheme to 
be abandoned in 1920. E. C. Drury, former secretary of the Canadian 
Council of Agriculture and the first President of the United Farmers of 
Ontario, replaced Premier Hearst and his provincial Conservative
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government in 1919 at the head of a farmer-labour coalition. The needs 
of northern Ontario had figured prominently in the election and Drury 
promised to formulate a more prudent economic development policy based 
on sound management rather than sheer exploitation. His primary 
objective was Kapuskasing which had been an extremely precarious 
operation right from the start.66 It had been founded as Ontario's 
answer to the national back-to-the-land movement, and although a most 
commendable social experiment, it quickly foundered on inept planning, 
misguided assumptions and an inadequate settler selection procedure. In 
short, it was a tragedy which Drury and a provincial commission of 
enquiry sought to remedy quickly.67
Kapuskasing had not proved popular with the veterans. A total of 
131 soldier colonists had tried their luck in the colony of which only 
twenty remained in September 1920.68 When a British delegation from 
the Overseas Settlement Committee (OSC), the Imperial government's 
migration authority established in January 1919, travelled to the area 
six years later the Earl of Clarendon, chairman of the OSC and 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, recorded that 
people, principally French Canadians, lived in the ’most primitive 
pioneering conditions'. Their chief source of income was made not from 
agriculture but from the sale of timber which was cleared off the farm 
land. Clarendon astutely observed that only ’experienced bushmen with 
farming experience' could make a living from such a densely wooded 
region.69 Very few of the soldier settlers had any pioneer 
qualifications at all therefore abandonment and disappointment was high.
The same depressing results plagued British Columbia's soldier 
settlement plans. Speculators had secured most of the suitable 
agricultural land. However, the expected rush of British Columbia 
soldier settlers never materialised. By 1921 a mere 319 native-born 
British Columbians had participated in the provincial scheme and by 1922 
interest was declining. A paltry fifty-three provincial soldier 
settlers had taken advantage of the $500 rebate on the purchase price of 
land selected by them out of the available 19,156 acres.70 The 
provincial government tried to hide its disappointment by stating that 
the soldier settlers in these scattered and remote areas ’were showing a 
determination to make good, and that...progress towards permanent 
settlement had been made'.71 But British Columia too had failed to 
attract substantial numbers of soldier settlers to areas which were 
isolated, marginally productive, expensive to clear and lacked large
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established markets which would facilitate product diversification.72
SECTION 4.3: PROBLEMS ON THE PRAIRIES
The federal government was keen to avoid the glaring mistakes 
witnessed in Ontario and British Columbia. Reclamation of swamp and 
timber land, a task which British Columbian authorities wanted the 
federal government to assume, was considered outside its jurisdiction by 
Ottawa. The chief element of successful settlement was to settle people 
on land which was ready to farm close to transportation facilities and 
markets. Lands which offered the greatest chance of overall success 
were those suited for mixed farming. 'Skillful farmers who believed 
that they allowed for every contingency have often failed in their 
enterprise by over specialisation', exclaimed the SSB.73 The direction 
towards mixed farming was not impulsive, it argued, but was calculated 
on sound economic principles.
Cory, in 1914, had considered it imperative for the government to 
make changes to its land policy because of falling homestead entries.
The traditional areas of settlement along the older railway lines were 
filling up and the largest tracts of available arable land were 
concentrated on the northern fringe or park belt of the prairie 
provinces. It was this area, recommended Cory, where the federal 
government should concentrate its settlement efforts. Each prairie 
province had its own specific forest fringe region targeted for mixed 
farming by the SSB. In Alberta the enormous Peace River district 
several hundred miles north-west of Edmonton was reserved for soldier 
settlement. Land expropriated from the Porcupine Forest Reserve in 
north-eastern Saskatchewan was designated as a soldier settler reserve 
and the Carraganna district in north central Saskatchewan near Prince 
Albert was believed to have tremendous potential as well. Manitoba had 
much less park belt to offer and what was available was concentrated in 
the inter-lake region between Lakes Winnipeg and Manitoba or was 
chiselled from the Riding Mountain Forest Reserve and the Turtle 
Mountain Forest Reserve in the western and south-western parts of the 
province.
The basic problem concerning soldier settlement in the park belt 
was that government officials were over-optimistic in their appraisal of 
the region's immediate agricultural potential. The land was generally
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productive but it was heavily forested and demanded clearing, draining 
and breaking. Transportation facilities were either lacking or poorly 
developed.7* The SSB was emphatic that it did 'not contemplate the 
settlement of soldiers as pioneers in remote locations or under isolated 
conditions, removed from markets, in virgin forest lands, or on lands 
not cultivable without reclamation or other development' . In October 
1919, Maber reiterated this point to a special Parliamentary committee 
which was examining veterans' affairs. But it was blatantly clear well 
before the publication of the SSB's first report in March 1921 that the 
federal government had indeed failed to meet its own criteria in certain 
regions. The very nature of its expansion of homestead lands through 
the acquisition of Indian lands, school reserves, grazing leases, 
Hudson's Bay reserve lands and the withdrawal of land from forest 
reserves, the majority of which was concentrated in the park belt, made 
soldier settlement in these isolated and sometimes inaccessible northern 
areas nothing but heartbreaking.75
Speculation and squatting in the Peace River district had made it 
crucial for the federal government to reserve what was left of the 
homesteading land within fifteen miles of the railway in this newly 
surveyed northern region.76 According to E. J. Lyne, a Liberal member 
of the Alberta Legislative Assembly and party secretary for the 
provincial Liberals in Grand Prairie located in the heart of the Peace 
River country, what frustrated soldier settlers most was the lack of 
transportation facilities. He bitterly complained to William Lyon 
Mackenzie King, the newly elected leader of the national Liberals, that 
settlers who were urged by the federal government to settle in this vast 
northern territory had a right to adequate rail facilities. Despite the 
federal government's promises the soldier settlers had been constantly 
denied proper rail and road transportation. In several proposed sites 
for soldier settlers the minimum distance from the railhead was eighty 
miles! Lyne hoped Mackenzie King would 'visit... this Northern Empire 
[which] would bring home to you the vastness of our undeveloped 
resources and enable you [to] better...legislate for their early 
development' J 7
Manitoba possessed some of the most marginal settlement territory 
under SSB supervision.78 The inter-lake district sandwiched between 
Lakes Winnipeg and Manitoba had been singled out by the SSB as a 
promising development area. Land north of Dauphin located in the park 
belt and to the west of Lake Manitoba was another site. Further north
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was another area deemed suitable near the Manitoba-Saskatchewan border 
at Swan River. The SSB had also been looking into the feasibility of 
slicing forest reserve land from the Riding and Turtle Mountain 
reserves, and under pressure from the Manitoba executive of the GWVA, a 
few hundred acres were carved off from each forest reserve.79 
Generally speaking, the majority of this reserved land was heavily 
forested and stony, particularly in the inter-lake region. Although it 
was reported that the soil was productive the enormous amounts of time, 
energy and money required to bring the land under cultivation proved too 
much for some.
Even for those who overcame these obstacles, natural calamities 
such as frequent and early frosts, hail, flooding and drought wiped out 
even the best and most determined soldier settlers.80 One desperate 
Canadian soldier settler in the inter-lake region near Ashern reported 
that his one workable well was frozen and in order to water his animals 
he had to melt snow in the house. He had drilled four wells during the 
summer and had struck solid rock at depths varying from four to twelve 
feet. Worse yet, while drilling he was forced to take his livestock two 
miles every day to water. Four of his soldier settler neighbours had 
suffered a similar fate and were talking of pulling out if the 
government did not send proper drilling equipment. Despite the hardship 
and complications, there were many private individuals keen to sell land 
to returning veterans in fertile southern Manitoba.81
Although Alberta claimed the largest share of Canada's soldier 
settlers, it was in Saskatchewan, the second highest benefactor, that 
soldier settlement was pursued with the greatest determination. Very 
early on the Saskatchewan branch of the Military Hospital Commission had 
advocated the preparation of machinery to give returning veterans an 
opportunity to engage in farming after the war.82 The Saskatchewan 
Returned Soldiers Employment Commission, the provincial agency 
responsible for securing employment and generally assisting returning 
veterans, was one of the more active and conscientious provincial 
soldiers' aid commissions in Canada. It too advocated the need for 
immediate and adequate preparation for returning soldiers before 
demobilisation. And it argued that the re-establishment and 
rehabilitation of Canada's citizen soldiers was a national obligation. 
The Commission insisted that this obligation could only be met by inter­
provincial cooperation coordinated by the federal government.83
Land settlement provided an integral part of the Saskatchewan
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government's commitment to the returned soldier. Agriculture was the 
life blood of the prairie economy and in Saskatchewan farming was more 
important to the provincial economy than in Manitoba and Alberta who 
were able to exploit other natural resources. Because Saskatchewan had 
the most arable land of the three prairie provinces it had more at stake 
in a successful land settlement policy. More settlers ensured a healthy 
and vibrant rural economy but at the same time it exposed the underlying 
weakness within the province's economy. Saskatchewan's economic base 
was too weak to support large-scale diversification - or so its 
politicians argued. Until the province had been effectively settled 
such diversification was impossible which meant that its economy would 
remain heavily dependent upon agriculture. A series of crop failures 
and low yields would dramatically affect the most carefully laid land 
settlement policies. People would get discouraged and abandon farming, 
or poor conditions might deter new settlers from settling which in turn 
would have a direct bearing upon future prosperity and development. 
Therefore, it was essential that Saskatchewan be settled as quickly as 
possible and that as many new acres be brought into production. The 
provincial government was aware of the seriousness of the problem, as 
was the federal government which was the custodian of the region's 
natural resources and responsible for land settlement and development.
At the 1918 annual meeting of the Saskatchewan Returned Soldiers 
Employment Commission it was expressed that there was not a sufficient 
amount of good, easily accessible farm land for soldier settlement. The 
Commission recommended that land for returned soldiers should be in 
districts already settled and adjacent to existing railway lines. If 
not enough land was available in certain districts the Commission urged 
the federal government to acquire land through expropriation. This was 
essential because, according to the Commission's figures, 70% of those 
Saskatchewan veterans who had returned by August 1917 had expressed a 
desire to settle on the land. The Commission also decided that the 
obligations for clearing wooded lands for soldier settlement in 
Saskatchewan clearly rested with the federal government.84 The 
provincial Liberal government, under the leadership of Premier William 
Martin, agreed. Martin's government had committed itself to unlocking 
large areas of homestead land which had been staked out by land 
speculators. It was determined to push ahead and devise a policy which 
contributed to increased settlement in Saskatchewan. Despite the fact 
that the onus was on the federal government Martin was anxious to
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cooperate and take the initiative.
Saskatchewan had the largest variety of settlement areas on offer. 
This included the largest proportion of Hudson's Bay reserve land which 
was located in the province and large tracts of virgin farmland 
surrendered by Indian bands to the SSB. Saskatchewan also disposed of 
the largest amount of school lands. Almost 95,000 acres were appraised 
and transferred to the SSB by September 1921; the valuation totalled 
$1,375 million. Saskatchewan's contribution dwarfed that of its prairie 
neighbours: Alberta and Manitoba scraped up between 10-12,000 acres
each valued at $150,000 and $152,000 respectively.85
Saskatchewan's single largest settlement project was the Porcupine 
Soldier Settlement. Created by an order-in-council in June 1919 it was 
made up of 200,000 virgin acres which had been withdrawn from lands 
previously categorised for homesteading in the Pasquia and Porcupine 
Forest Reserves of north-eastern Saskatchewan. In order to establish a 
uniform settlement pattern planners deemed 240 acres as the optimum 
settlement unit for the type of country involved. Soldiers were 
entitled to the standard homestead grant of 160 acres but were 
encouraged to purchase an additional adjoining 80 acre allotment. The 
sale of these allotments was to offset SSB expenditure on development 
projects such as roads and bridges which would facilitate the opening up 
of the region. 'To settle the timber lands', explained Commissioner 
Ashton, 'we need pioneers who must still bridge the period between 
establishment and production'. The Porcupine settlement provided the 
perfect example.86
The land was certainly raw and untamed. No provision had been 
made beforehand for housing, roads, bridges or preliminary clearing.
The settlement was carried out under the harshest pioneering conditions 
imaginable. The region was heavily forested with thick stands of poplar 
and dense scrub regularly interspersed with sloughs, swamps and marshes. 
According to several soldier settlers they figuratively had to carve 
their homes and farms out of an unyielding environment.87
Despite the extreme hardships the pioneers began to push the 
frontier back in this bleak region. Several communities slowly emerged 
and the transcripts of the few Canadian soldier settlers that have 
survived are a colourful reminder of modem day homesteading. 
Nevertheless, the results were disappointing and the federal 
government's role left a lot to be desired. On 2 July 1919, the first 
day veterans were allowed to ballot for their choice of claim, 131
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veterans took the opportunity to claim a soldier grant. By December 
1923, 175 had been established of which twenty-five properties had been 
abandoned. Of the remaining 150 veterans sixty were married and ninety 
remained bachelors. However, there were a number of absentee operators 
and only 100 of the 150 actually lived on their holding. Two years 
later the total number of soldier grant entries had reached 283 in the 
Porcupine Reserve involving 67,200 acres or 105 square miles of farm 
land. Advances totalled approximately $281,000.88 To further 
facilitate settlement, land was obtained by the SSB in 1919 from the 
Hudson's Bay Company for the planning and development of the new 
townsite of Lens. In 1920 planning permission was given by 
Saskatchewan's Minister of Municipal Affairs and the townsite was 
resurveyed to provide a church, hotel, hospital, library, schools, 
recreational, industrial and residential districts. Lens was to be the 
model for new town planning in Canada.89 The idea, including the name, 
never caught on however. Much of the plans stayed on the drawing board 
and the development which took place at Prairie River did so at a 
snail's pace.
The SSB was pleased to report that the Canadian settlers were of a 
good type. 'They now realise the proposition they are up against, and 
with remarkably few exceptions are applying themselves to the making of 
a real success' .90 But did these settlers realise what they were 
getting themselves into? Complaints began to trickle in soon after the 
initial clearing. The federal government had committed itself to 
completing a road from Prairie River to the settlement area by the 
autumn of 1919. However, it was not until the summer of 1925 that the 
first roads were built for cars. The first car in the Prairie River 
area was purchased and used by the SSB, but even then the community was 
not linked to the provincial network for several more years.91
Between 1919 and 1930 the SSB spent $60,000 draining sloughs, 
clearing bush, building bridges and local grid roads. But it was not 
enough as concern mounted over the years about the lack of settlers in 
the Porcupine Reserve.92 Continued isolation induced by a lack of 
direct road and rail communications was a major factor; the weather was 
another. During 1920 drought and an early frost accounted for crop 
failures ranging from 15% to total failure.93 The price collapse for 
primary products worsened the situation and was exacerbated by a 
succession of indifferent harvests until 1924 when very poor returns 
were again recorded. Although some soldier settlers made an early
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windfall by planting alfalfa for feed, the majority had banked on wheat, 
the big cash crop on the prairies, and were broke by the winter of 1924. 
Once again the SSB encouraged the more destitute to find work in 
threshing gangs, road crews and lumber camps to supplement their family 
income. Local supervisors even went as far as to obtain preference of 
employment for these men in some camps.9*
The lack of quick and efficient transportation facilities was not 
the only major complaint in the Porcupine Reserve. Charges of 
corruption and lack of proper supervision were levied by one disgruntled 
settler against the SSB supervisors, who he claimed, had lined their 
pockets at the expense of their clients. The purchase of the 80 acre 
allotment was another bone of contention. After seeing his neighbour 
carve out 160 acres of bush on a soldier grant the same disenchanted 
settler thought the SSB should have given that neighbour the 80 acres as 
a reward for all his hard work. Instead, the government charged that 
neighbour $3 an acre which wiped out his cash reserve.95 There were 
numerous cases of individual hardship, fortitude and perseverance and 
despite the federal government's optimistic projections it was clear 
that this particular soldier settlement project fell far short of its 
objectives.
What about the British soldier settlers in this region?
Indications are that there were none in the first settlement period 
between 1919 and 1925. However, many Canadian veterans who settled in 
the region had returned with English war brides. Mrs. Mary McLenaghan, 
whose husband Ed was a field supervisor for the SSB in Kitscoty, Alberta 
and Prairie River, Saskatchewan between 1920 and 1925, had nothing but 
the highest praise for these women who endured tremendous personal 
hardship adjusting to Canadian pioneer life.96 It was during the 
civilian phase of settlement that British settlers trickled into the 
area. In the autumn of 1924 Ed McLenaghan was despatched to England to 
select more. Based in Liverpool, McLenaghan spent seven months 
interviewing and screening prospective applicants for the 3,000 British 
families settlement scheme, a joint venture undertaken by the Canadian 
and British governments to promote British agricultural settlement in 
Canada. Between thirty and seventy families settled on abandoned 
soldier settler property in the Prairie River district in 1927. It was 
a mixed success with at least a 50X failure rate. *[L]ike most 
government schemes', complained one Canadian settler, ‘the ones sent 
over to recruit these settlers were as unqualified as [those] they
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selected'.97
As a soldier settlement project the Porcupine Reserve was a 
failure. Of the 500 homesteads reserved for British and Canadian ex- 
servicemen only 150 were occupied by Canadian veterans. The throwing 
open of the region to civilian settlement in 1926 and the attempt to 
settle British families in 1927 were indications of the failure of the 
scheme. By the 1930s only a handful of the original soldier settlers 
barely survived.
SECTION 4.4: OVERSEAS OPERATIONS
The appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel K. C. Bedson as the SSB's 
overseas representative in February 1919 coincided with Milner's 
reconstitution of the OSC.98 The demand for information on Canadian 
soldier settlement schemes, assistance and legislation by Canadian and 
British veterans necessitated its creation. Headquartered in the 
Canadian emigration offices in London, Bedson coordinated his activities 
with J. Obed Smith, to disseminate literature, interview and screen 
prospective applicants and liaise between the SSB and the OSC.
The Colonial Office welcomed the appointment and was anxious to 
find out what further steps the Canadian government was taking to assist 
British veterans. Ashton reported that the 'sentiment in Canada 
is...that we need more Anglo-Saxons' and British ex-servicemen were seen 
as a vital component in solving the problem.99 Personally, he was 
confident that Canada could absorb an almost unlimited number of men 
into her rural population provided they were willing to work. Capital 
was another matter. It was much more difficult to start farming without 
capital than it had been at the turn of the century. Even if a British 
soldier settler possessed capital, Ashton advised that he work one, 
preferably two years, with an experienced farmer in the district in 
which he intended to settle.100
Ashton was encouraged by Bedson's preliminary reports. For 
example, Bedson interviewed a group of British ex-officers and was 
impressed by their analysis of the emigration issue. 'All seem very 
keen and willing to take up land and fully appreciate the amount of work 
that is required if they are to be successful'.101 More importantly, 
they had independent financial means and were prepared to purchase land 
privately. At the same time, they wanted to take advantage of the SSB's
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offer of assistance in purchasing farm machinery and enrolling in 
courses at the various agricultural colleges. These were precisely the 
class of immigrant Ashton was seeking. He explained to the Minister of 
Immigration that this class of immigrant was the 'most desirous and 
should receive prompt attention and hearty support'.102 Bedson 
informed George Fiddes, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial 
Office, that soldier settlement in Canada would be a guaranteed success 
provided the federal government 'supplied funds and gave the men proper 
encouragement'; especially during the winter when grain farming was at a 
standstill and family income was tight.10:5
Determined to do all it could for this class of settler, the 
federal government did not want to attract publicity. The Department of 
Immigration wanted to make ’a definite yet not a public move towards 
encouraging [them] to settle'.10* For one thing they did not want to 
be left open to charges of class distinction or favouritism regarding 
trans-Atlantic accommodation. It was evident that because these 
settlers had private means they could depart for Canada during the 
forthcoming summer and not have to wait for the following spring. It 
was suggested that Smith have a quiet word with the steamship companies 
to allocate some cabin space for these men before the remainder of the 
Canadian forces were despatched home. In light of the Canadian 
demobilisation riots earlier that year, Smith was reminded of the 
political sensitivity of such a move. If it was publicised that these 
men had been allocated cabin space and had landed in Canada before the 
last Canadians had returned home the domestic political uproar it would 
cause would be intense and unforgivable. Nevertheless, the government 
did not want to drag its feet for fear that these men would quickly lose 
interest. Quiet, firm encouragement was advised.105
The case of the ex-officers was the exception rather than the 
rule. The majority of British ex-soldiers eager to migrate had little 
or no capital and relied on the Imperial government's implementation of 
its free passage programme announced in April 1919. Its announcement 
was shortly followed by a meeting at the end of the month between the 
OSC, representatives from the War Office, Admiralty, High Commissioners 
and Agents-General. The application procedure and the administrative 
framework were the major focus behind the first set of meetings. The 
burning question, however, was the method and to what extent the various 
Dominions wanted to carry out the selection process themselves.106
The Canadian response to the free passage scheme was one of
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cautious enthusiasm. The senior Dominion was quite proud of its 
immigration machinery whose success over the years was the envy of her 
sister Dominions. Assisted passage, however, was not a policy favoured 
by Canadian immigration officials or appreciated by the general 
public.107 'Canada will always welcome the man who can pay his way, 
and stand on his own feet, but the man in Canada who requires 'public 
assistance' is regarded as a failure'.108 The special assistance 
given to British settlers, reported Sir William Clark, Britain's first 
High Commissioner to Canada, was resented by many Canadians who had 
carved their homesteads out of the wilderness without any government 
assistance whatsoever. They had worked hard, made good and could not 
understand the reason for all the 'mollycoddling'.109 Canadian 
authorities were confident that their vast immigration network, 
extensive experience and advantageous geographical position would prove 
as effective in attracting British emigrants to Canada after the war as 
it had before the outbreak of hostilities and that emigration would 
therefore resume even without government subsidies.110 Nonetheless, 
the granting of free passage to British ex-servicemen who had 
unselfishly defended the empire in its hour of need was a well deserved 
exception to the general rule.
When the British government first announced its free passage 
grants the Canadian government made it abundantly clear that it would 
retain a firm and independent hand in its selection of overseas 
immigrants. A precise set of guidelines was formulated governing the 
type of immigrant Canada wanted to encourage. As ever, agriculturalists 
remained the top priority. F. C. Blair, Secretary to the Department of 
Immigration and Colonisation, declared that Canada wanted a class of 
settler who immediately upon arrival became a producer and not merely a 
consumer. 'Rapidity of development in Canada at the present time 
depends almost entirely upon our own ability to develop the natural 
resources, establish new enterprises with fresh capital and develop 
further those already in existence'.111 Canada did not want to 
attract or assist people who would compete against local labour, or 
promote the incursion of non-agricultural labour. This was particularly 
important because of the many Canadian ex-servicemen who were still 
looking for work.112
In September an inter-departmental conference was held in Ottawa 
between the SSB, Calder, Cory and Smith. The main focus was how to 
foster greater cooperation between the departments of the Interior and
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Immigration on the issue of the colonisation and settlement of ex- 
Imperials under the Soldier Settlement Act of 1919. It was agreed that 
1920 would be occupied with the settlement of Canadian veterans. For 
the most part, the federal government resolved that British veterans 
would be enrolled at the various agricultural training depots during 
that time. It was therefore decided to limit the number of British 
applicants during 1920 because of the heavy demand imposed by Canadian 
veterans.113 The SSB was nevertheless authorised to initiate a 
moderate overseas publicity campaign to inform British applicants of 
what Canada was prepared to do, the benefits to be obtained and the 
procedure involved.114
For ex-Imperials wanting to farm under the auspices of the SSB, 
Canada was only willing to accept Imperial soldier settlers who were 
physically fit, morally upstanding, possessed an honourable discharge 
and could provide a deposit of £200 as a surety before sailing. They 
also had to have the cash necessary to pay the 20% downpayment required 
under SSB regulations for land, livestock, machinery and building 
materials obtainable through the Board. The selection and medical 
examination of British soldier settlers would take place in Britain. 
Shortly after Bedson's appointment a two-man selection board was 
established and despatched to Britain. The panel travelled throughout 
Britain appraising soldier applicants at the various regional emigration 
offices.115 Only when the selection board was satisfied that an 
applicant was suitable did the OSC grant a free passage. However, non- 
agricultural veterans were eligible under the scheme provided they had 
assured employment in Canada. Free passage grants were also available 
to widows and children of deceased British veterans, women war workers 
and orphaned children of British ex-servicemen and women.116
Despite the establishment of an elaborate administration, 
preliminary reports indicated that the few British ex-servicemen and 
women who had already arrived in Canada during 1919 had no intention of 
pursuing farm work. Some, finding the SSB's monetary requisite too 
high, were scared off. Others, not wanting to farm under the SSB, 
simply lied about their intentions of embarking upon an agricultural 
career in order to claim a free passage. Instead, many possessed solid 
offers of employment through relatives and friends, were screened and 
approved as essential but non-agricultural immigrants. A major source 
of trouble was that many British veterans, provided that they met 
government landing regulations, entered Canada as ordinary immigrants.
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Problems arose almost immediately as the economic climate in Canada 
worsened in 1920. To begin with, many of the ordinary ex-service 
immigrants possessed little or no money on arrival, became impoverished 
and quickly threw themselves upon the mercy of local charities. Those 
who arrived under the free passage scheme also began to find conditions 
difficult. Destitution quickly blurred the distinction between assisted 
and self-financing ex-soldier migrants. In some regions of Canada it 
was mistakenly assumed that all poverty-stricken British veterans had 
travelled to Canada under the auspices of the free passage scheme 
thereby bringing the entire scheme into some disrepute.
Confusion persisted as the SSB and immigration officials tried to 
clarify the situation. In January 1920 the Vancouver World proclaimed 
that 3,000 ex-imperials were left scattered, stranded and impoverished 
throughout British Columbia. 'Arriving here in flocks without any 
properly authorised persons to advise them, these men are unable to take 
up land as they intended, some are stranded, others fit for charity', 
while Canadian authorities steadfastly refused to assume 
responsibility.117 The Vancouver representative of the newly created 
Department of Soldiers' Civilian Re-establishment confirmed that the 
situation was rapidly deteriorating. The majority of the new arrivals 
were army pensioners with wives and families who had travelled to Canada 
independent of the free passage scheme. Many were disabled or mentally 
unfit and had no previous farm experience or no intention of farming.
His view was substantiated by the Commissioner of Immigration in 
Vancouver, A. L. Jolliffe, who reported that of 150 recently disembarked 
British ex-servicemen and their families only two claimed farming 
experience. Approximately a half were pensioners, many were partially 
disabled and suffered from a variety of medical problems including 
shattered limbs, tuberculosis and neurasthenia. Over one-third had 
applied for immediate financial aid. As the situation became more 
critical, local repatriation and immigration officials demanded the 
implementation of preventative steps to halt the entry of disabled 
Imperial veterans, especially pensioners.118
Officials in Toronto faced a similar dilemma. They reported that 
an increasing number of ex-Imperials were eagerly looking for work, and 
clearly feared that these men would seriously interfere, if not compete, 
with the re-establishment of Canadian veterans.119 Ex-Imperials might 
also become a source of serious unemployment in regions where there was 
already a large, unskilled labour force. For example, the DSCR unit
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officer in Port Arthur, Ontario (the important grain handling terminus 
on Lake Superior), stated that the 400 to 600 registered ex-Imperials in
his area had found plenty of work. But it was a region which possessed
plenty of handymen and unless some of the ex-Imperials had special 
mechanical abilities a decline in the local economy would hit these men 
particularly hard.120
As winter approached the Ontario Soldiers' Aid Commission 
complained that it was being overwhelmed by destitute ex-Imperials and 
their families requesting assistance. Unable to find work these men
were increasingly relying upon the Commission to provide money and
shelter until they could obtain satisfactory employment. Its biggest 
complaint was the type of ex-Imperial immigrant arriving in Ontario.
Most of these men leave England with the intention of taking 
up farm work but for some reason or other drift to the 
cities and do not fulfil their original intention. The 
housing problem here In Toronto is as acute as the 
employment situation and we are finding it almost impossible 
to obtain situations, excepting as labourers, and as these 
men do not appear in any way willing to leave the City, it 
would appear... that steps should be taken to stop sending 
these families out.121
The Commission warned that the situation would worsen with the onslaught 
of winter.
The various Canadian veterans organisations found the problem of 
the ex-Imperial equally trying. The GWVA, the Army and Navy Veterans 
(ANV) and the Imperial Veterans in Canada (IVC) came under increasing 
pressure to provide financial assistance to tide over British veterans 
until they secured employment. As the number of penniless British 
veterans grew the financial strains of supporting their fellow British
comrades began to show; particularly with the IVC who bore the brunt of
the appeals from impoverished ex-Imperials. A spokesman for the 
Vancouver branch of the IVC implored the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, to bring home to British 
veterans 'the unpreparedness of this country to absorb them into its 
industrial and agricultural life'.122
The federal government accepted the need for more drastic measures 
to stop the flow of destitute and agriculturally inexperienced ex- 
Imperials into Canada and in September 1920 displayed a tougher posture. 
Repeated warnings were despatched to the OSC that Canadian landing
regulations would be strictly enforced. Safeguards, such as a more
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thorough medical examination at the port of disembarkation, were 
suggested. Disabled pensioners were singled out and Ottawa insisted 
that the physically unfit be stopped at Canadian ports and deported 
before they became a public charge.123 The SSB emphasised continually 
that only those ex-Imperials selected and accepted by its overseas 
office would be eligible for the benefits under the 1919 Act.12* If 
'other Imperial ex-Service men should happen to arrive without a ticket 
or without money for meals, it will be entirely their own fault, because 
they have been warned time and time again not to leave...without being 
thus provided'.125 In many cases, Canadian officials put the reasons 
for failure squarely on the shoulders of the ex-Imperials themselves. 
They professed to believe that many had become destitute during the 
voyage by squandering their savings through gambling. They also assumed 
- without evidence - that the rigours of military life and routine had 
impaired the abilities of many British ex-servicemen to adjust to post­
war civilian conditions. 'It seems to be a hard thing for ex-soldiers 
to get rid of the idea that they are no longer in the army and must 
shift for themselves. Most of them expect that upon arrival at a 
Canadian port they will be met by an official who will provide them with 
billets, rations, transportation, or cater to their needs until such 
time as they can find employment'.126
Amery was dismayed by Canada's increasingly hardnosed attitude 
towards British ex-servicemen. Canada's eagerness to cooperate, as 
expressed by its Prime Minister Arthur Meighen in October 1919, had 
vanished. Rather, it had been replaced by stringent selection 
guidelines rigidly enforced in London and at Canadian disembarkation 
ports.127 In an attempt to clarify federal immigration policy, J. A. 
Calder, Minister of Immigration and Colonisation, met Milner and Amery 
in London in September 1920. When Calder broached the subject of 
extending the free passage scheme for another year Milner made it 
abundantly clear that the extension would be contingent upon a greater 
degree of 'corresponding action' on behalf of the Dominions, in 
particular an equal share of the financial responsibility. Milner 
stressed that because of the already enormous demands placed upon the 
British taxpayer an increase in the expenditure on overseas settlement 
could only be defended if it was shown to be essential in the context of 
the larger imperial policy of empire development. He also raised the 
issue of the self-governing Dominions' attitude towards its new British 
citizens. The Dominions showed a tendency to regard the arrivals from
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the mother country 'too much from the point of view of the immediate 
utility of their labour and too little from the point of view of their 
potential value as citizens in the Dominions'.128 New settlers had to 
be made welcome and not regarded as 'mere working hands [or] 
drudges' .129
Calder and Smith agreed that there was room for improvement in 
Canadian attitudes but the federal government remained resolute in its 
determination not to relax its policy. ’Our difficulty is not to make 
Canada better known in the Mother Country', echoed F. C. Blair, 'but 
rather to make an intelligent selection of those who are anxious to 
migrate'.130 The federal government's main consideration, however, 
was not to flood the domestic labour market with unskilled non- 
agricultural immigrants. Moreover, the Colonial Office was convinced 
that the SSB was unlikely to expand its operations in Britain because 
'men selected on this side are apt to regard themselves as entitled to 
special privileges in many directions, and this makes them somewhat 
difficult to deal with'.131 As a result, the Colonial Office believed 
that the establishment in Britain of a system of testing farms or large 
agricultural training camps would probably be abandoned. Indeed, it did 
occur. In June 1920, the federal government decided in favour of a 
network of training and receiving stations for ex-Imperials in Canada to 
be administered by the SSB.132
The policy of disengagement continued with the withdrawal of 
Colonel Bedson as the SSB's overseas representative and the termination 
of his post on 31 January 1921. No qualification certificates would 
henceforth be issued in Britain. Those wishing to emigrate under the 
privileges of the Soldier Settlement Act were 'invited to proceed...as 
ordinary emigrants in the ordinary way'.133 Upon arrival they were to 
apply to the District Superintendent of the SSB in the area they wished 
to settle and obtain the necessary information and advice on how to 
qualify for .the benefits of the Act. Enquiries from prospective soldier 
settlers would in future be handled by Smith in London. No clear reason 
was given for Bedson's recall but it was implied that the emigration 
officials could easily cope with the additional number of 
applicants.134 In reality, the decision was made to cut costs and 
rationalise overseas operations because the rush of British applicants 
never materialised. The federal government's conscious efforts to keep 
the number of ex-soldier migrants low and the enormous problems certain 
regions of the country were having with the new arrivals also influenced
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their decision. Furthermore, Bedson informed the OSC that the new 
procedure did not eliminate the £200 deposit.135
The OSC regarded the decision to discontinue Bedson's services as 
a serious impediment to the aspirations of many ex-servicemen eager to 
settle in Canada. The Colonial Office firmly believed that because 
selection certificates were no longer obtainable in Britain it would 
discourage many ex-soldiers who might have entertained the thought of 
emigrating and applied for selection in Britain. More importantly, in 
light of the hardship many ex-Imperials had already encountered, they 
feared that a stronger sense of injustice would be created in the minds 
of those British ex-servicemen who proceeded to Canada and were rejected 
after having absorbed the expense of travelling across the 
Atlantic.136 Macnaghten discussed at length with McLaren Brown and J.
S. Dennis of the CPR the possibility of the CPR stepping in and taking 
over the work previously done by Bedson. The CPR were quite prepared to 
do so if officially requested by the federal government. Macnaghten 
agreed to write the Canadian High Commissioner urging him to support the 
CPR plan while Dennis promised to take up the issue with the federal 
government when he returned to Canada at the end of the month.137 
However, nothing came of the idea.
Of the 31.3X or 26,905 British ex-servicemen and their families 
who arrived in Canada under the auspices of the free passage scheme 
approximately two-thirds were women and children. The total number of 
ex-Imperials who migrated is much higher but impossible to ascertain 
because the figures do not exist for those who entered Canada as 
ordinary immigrants. What is clear from the sketchy statistics which 
have survived is that the free passage scheme failed to bring large 
numbers of ex-Imperial agricultural immigrants. For example, of the 
1,382 applicants approved in the period October-December 1921, only 136 
were classed as agricultural. The majority had experience in 
shipbuilding, railways, engineering, construction, metal working, 
electricals and commerce. Similarly, of the sixty-five female ex- 
service applicants in the same period only eight were classified as 
agricultural and were categorised as inexperienced farm hands.13® The 
number of British farm applicants chosen through the SSB in London was 
minimal. In its first annual report, the SSB reported that 'some 
hundreds' of ex-Imperials had been examined and selected but no specific 
figure was cited. Four months after the ex-Imperial guidelines were 
announced Commissioner Ashton reported that 159 ex-soldiers had paid the
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£200 deposit and had been granted selection certificates. Owing to 
shipping shortages in the spring of 1920 only fourteen had managed to 
sail. According to SSB records 340 ex-Imperials were selected in 1920 
as suitable for farming in Canada, but only 266 actually reported to the 
Board upon arrival. Of these, 134 withdrew their deposit before or 
during training and only a paltry sixty-nine were assisted under the OSC 
free passage scheme.139 Nevertheless, some like the Toronto Star must 
have wondered in dismay why only a handful of British ex-soldiers used 
the free passage scheme, and even fewer embarked upon agriculture when 
there were thousands of demobilised soldiers milling around employment 
bureaus in Britain.140
SECTION 4.5: THE WATERSHED
Although the war had effectively halted immigration it provided 
Canadian agriculture with tremendous impetus for expansion which was 
nothing short of phenomenal. Over 92,000 homestead entries were 
recorded during the conflict and between 1916 and 1921 a total of 40,000 
new farms were established on the prairies alone.141 The Dominion 
census of 1921 best illustrates the growth which occurred. Since the 
1911 census the total number of farms increased by 282, total farm 
acreage by 52.52 and total improved farm acreage by an amazing 
95 . 32.142 The major factor behind this expansion was wartime demand 
which stimulated higher prices during and immediately after the war.
For example, in 1917 wheat was fixed at $2.21 a bushel, thrice its 
prewar level, and by 1919 it had reached $2.38.143
Unfortunately, the short-term gains were derived at the expense of 
the industry's long-term stability and future prosperity which held 
disastrous consequences for soldier settlement. The Allies' insatiable 
appetite for Canadian wheat and the sharp rise in world wheat prices 
created a dangerous investment cycle on the prairies. Although Canadian 
farmers responded patriotically to the federal government's plea for
increased food production, the primary demand was for wheat. As demand
and prices rose farmers pressed more and more land into wheat 
production, purchased additional land or rented from those neighbours 
who had enlisted. Official estimates demonstrated that the extension of 
the total area of farm crops in Canada between 1914 and 1918 had
increased from 33.4 million acres to 51.4 million acres, an increase of
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53.8X.144 Indeed, it was a staggering accomplishment but it did 
contain an ominous indicator. Prairie farmers had staked their future 
in the production of a single cash crop which made them extremely 
vulnerable to market fluctuations. This vulnerability was reflected 
another way, in prairie wheat acreage statistics. Between 1914 and 1918 
wheat acreage increased from 9.3 million to 16.1 million, out of a 
national total in 1918 of 17.3 million, the largest on record.145 
This meant that 93% of Canada's wheat production in 1918 was 
concentrated in the three prairie provinces. Wheat was indeed king but 
only if prices remained high.
Farmers continued to stake their immediate prosperity on wheat 
because it was easier and quicker to expand grain acreage compared to a 
similar expansion in livestock production. Not only was grain farming 
the ’path of least resistance' for expanding prairie farmers, but high 
prices were a much better stimulus and could accomplish more for the 
back-to-the-land movement than the best run propaganda campaign ever 
could.146 The dependence on a single staple for export was risky to 
say the least; something the Canadian government had recognised and 
attempted to rectify prior to the war through the promotion of mixed 
farming. If a balance between grain and livestock could be struck 
between a larger number of farmers it would cushion their losses and 
create a degree of income stability when one or the other markets were 
weak. Specific wartime demand and high grain prices impeded such a 
practical approach. Besides, it was easier to obtain farm credit for 
grain farming as capital investment in the livestock industry was more 
expensive because of the necessity to build and maintain the facilities 
to manage an efficient operation.147
Inflation also kept pace with rising wheat prices. Whatever 
profit farmers obtained from increased cultivation and the bullish grain 
market was quickly absorbed by rising production and labour costs, 
additional investment and inflation. As a result, many farmers went 
into debt in anticipation that the boom times would continue after the 
war. However, over-capitalisation and over-expansion were not the only 
consequences faced by prairie farmers who persisted in pursuing the 
cultivation of a single crop during the war.
The high costs incurred did not make prairie farmers more 
efficient. In fact, many farmers, attracted by high grain prices, 
abandoned the tried and proven dryland farming techniques of 
summerfallowing, fall tillage and crop rotation. Inevitably, the desire
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to maximise profits and "cash in" led to increased soil exhaustion.
Plant diseases, such as rust, began to make inroads and reduce crop 
yields in many western areas. The situation was further aggravated 
between 1916 and 1918 by drought and frost which reduced yields even 
more and contributed to soil infertility. After the record bumper crop 
of 1915, in which wheat yields averaged 29.3 bushels per acre, 
successive yields steadily declined until 1919 when the worst yield of 
9.7 bushels per acre was recorded.14® Of course, as long as prices 
remained artificially high and more land was brought under cultivation 
the drop in yields could be offset. Farmers would still be able to pay 
their expenses and maintain a comfortable living standard. However, 
they had sacrificed the long-term productivity of the land for short­
term monetary gains. The farmer had resorted, in the words of the 
Canada Year Book, to 'extensive rather than intensive agriculture'.149
Wheat prices remained buoyant in 1919 at $2.38 per bushel.
Federal officials must have felt optimistic when framing the Soldier 
Settlement Act of 1919 because the generous credit terms, in combination 
with high prices, would ensure a high success rate amongst soldier 
settlers and a quick return on their investment. The enormous demand 
for soldier settlement literature, the keen interest amongst returning 
veterans and the initial rush of applicants during the summer of 1919 
seemed to justify the federal government's confidence. There was no 
better stimulus to settlement than high prices.
Prior to the 1920 harvest, all indications were that the firm lead 
established by the Canadian government had started to pay handsome 
dividends. 'This is more or less the beginning of things', explained 
Major John Barnett in September 1920, chairman of the SSB, ’in as much 
as a survey of next season's breaking indicates that at least 500,000 
acres of new land will [have been] broken' since the SSB's 
establishment.150 Preliminary production and freight receipts for 
1920 demonstrated that the 10,000 producing soldier settlers had already 
generated $3 million in rail and shipping revenue while producing crops 
valued at $10 million. Barnett estimated that with 250,000 acres of new 
soldier settlement land under cultivation in 1921 and twice the number 
of soldier settlers, freight receipts would double.151 In fact, close 
to 190,000 new acres were brought into production, raising the aggregate 
amount of new acres to 600,000. At the end of the 1921 fiscal year 
soldier settlers occupied 5.23 million acres. Even with the collapse of 
the market price for grain during the middle of the 1920 harvest,
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veterans brought in farm receipts totalling $12.7 million.152
Nineteen-twenty was the highwater mark. SSB officials were mildly 
surprised that even with the market collapse and the high labour and 
threshing costs, 9,372 settlers of the 12,174 obligated to meet their 
first loan payment by 1 November 1920 had done so in whole or in part. 
Approximately $2.3 million was due of which 53.9X or $1.24 million was 
collected. In addition, soldier settlers were urged to make payments 
above the minimum required to reduce their debt load as soon as 
possible. Prepayments amounting to a little over $1 million were 
subsequently received.153 Collections had gone exceedingly well under 
the economic circumstances, and it was with a great deal of pride and 
gratification that the results obtained 'placed the stamp of guarantee 
upon soldier settlement work'.15* The self-congratulation proved 
premature.
From the SSB's inception in 1918 to 31 March 1921 a total of 1,470 
cases of abandonment were reported compared with 329 who repaid their 
loans in full. However, the SSB considered 7% as a norm for the amount 
of adjusted or salvaged claims. The adjustment figures were broken down 
into three categories. Fraud, misrepresentation and dishonesty made up 
a small number of cases. Just under one third were attributed to causes 
beyond the control of the settler, such as death, recurring illness or 
disability due to war service and crop failure. The lion's share of the 
blame for failure was unfairly but squarely placed on the shoulders of 
the struggling settler by the SSB. Poor temperament, bad management and 
abandonment for no apparent cause were cited as factors for 
discontinuance.155 Certainly, these factors did play a role, but to 
claim that failure was largely due to personal attributes or flaws was 
preposterous. Economic factors, such as high prices for land, stock and 
equipment at a time when commodity prices were plummeting, were the 
major causes of failure. Most veterans had arrived too late to reap the 
benefits of wartime profits, but still had to pay inflated wartime 
prices and pay off their growing debts from falling incomes.156 By 
March 1923, 3,285 soldier settlers or 14.5X had discontinued farming. A 
year later the total had climbed to 21.5X or 5,203. The SSB 
acknowledged the fact that poor land, crop failure and low farm prices 
contributed to the growing number of abandonments but it still 
maintained as late as 1924 that the personal factor was a major reason 
for failure.157
There was no question that the boom and bust of 1920-21 was a
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major contributory factor behind the failure of many a brave soldier 
settler. The price of wheat was less than half the 1919 price and 
reached only $1.11 per bushel in 1921.158 But it was not the major 
factor because many soldier settlers were already experiencing 
difficulties prior to the depression. The worsening situation was 
further complicated between 1919 and 1924 by persistent drought 
conditions which plagued farmers throughout Canada and lowered their 
crop yields even further.
Not everything was doom and gloom. There were personal as well as 
regional triumphs but they went by unnoticed by the general public. For 
example, N. H. McTaggart, Progressive MP for Maple Creek in the arid 
south-western corner of Saskatchewan had between 450 and 500 soldier 
settlers in his constituency. Barnett informed him that ever since 
1921, despite the economic downturn, the Maple Creek area had led 
Saskatchewan in the number of repayment collections. On a national 
level, there were three SSB districts in McTaggart's constituency which 
compared extremely well with the rest of Canada in regard to loan 
repayment, salvage and general prosperity. Only fourteen or fifteen 
salvage cases had been reported and just as many had repaid their loans 
in full. Barnett wrote McTaggart that 'the very fact that...you have 
not heard from [any] of them indicates that they are happy, contented, 
and prosperous'. Similar stories were reported in western Ontario and 
the maritimes ,159
Farm diversification remained an important priority for the SSB as 
cereal prices remained depressed. Settlers were encouraged to maintain 
a small number of pigs, cows and poultry to offset expenses. In turn, 
any income generated from grain receipts could be used to reduce 
financial obligations. The federal Department of Agriculture supported 
the SSB's attempts to promote thrift, economy and diversification 
amongst its settlers because it was 'essential to the prosperity and 
continued success of the settler'.160 It agreed with the SSB's 
conclusions that for the moment grain farming was a gamble, especially 
in the prairies. Farmers, argued the Saskatoon district supervisor, by
utilising all the sources of revenue that were available through mixed
farming, stabilised family income and reduced the impact induced by a 
serious set-back such as a crop failure.161 There was another 
interesting point concerning successful soldier settlers recalled
Ashton. 'It was very noticeable that among our settlers the men who
were succeeding best were the men who, in addition to being good
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fanners, were good salesman also'.162 Better farming meant the 
application of modern scientific, managerial and commercial techniques 
which ensured security and increased returns. By 1925, however, it was 
too late to start advocating these commonsensical ideas. The collapse 
of grain prices in 1920-21 had already done the damage.
Indebtedness became a serious problem for the surviving soldier
settlers after 1921. Of the 5,203 adjustment cases processed in 1924, 
one half were located in Manitoba and Alberta. Alberta was also in the 
embarrassing position of having the lowest collection record in the 
country which averaged 38Z. Manitoba's 1,600 farm abandonments was 
considered extremely high as only 56X of the 3,707 soldier settlers 
remained on their properties by 1926.163 As the number of salvage 
cases increased throughout the 1920s revaluation became a highly 
contentious issue which highlighted the growing political significance 
of soldier settlement.
The 1921 federal election clearly demonstrated the degree of 
veteran dissatisfaction with the Meighen government's apparent lack of 
compassion and its inability to satisfy a variety of demands. The 
growing importance of the veteran issue in Canadian politics, and in
particular soldier settlement, was reflected by the activities of the
various veterans' organisations prior to the federal election in 
December. But the real problem remained unemployment. Although it 
inflicted hardship on all sections of Canadian society, the plight of 
the returned man received an enormous amount of attention. In 1919 a 
special House of Commons committee was bombarded with letters, telegrams 
and evidence from a variety of individuals, boards of trade, 
municipalities and commercial associations warning the federal 
government of the danger of veteran unemployment. It recommended that 
the eradication of veteran unemployment was a national undertaking and 
therefore a federal responsibility; whereas civilian unemployment was 
strictly a municipal and provincial matter. It advised that steps be 
taken to meet the emergency both administratively and financially.166 
Meighen agreed that the Dominion authorities had to play a key role in 
ameliorating unemployment, but ’the great thing to do...is to enforce 
with the least possible delay such a definite general policy as will get 
business going again and get our people back to work'. Ex-servicemen 
could not be singled out or treated separately, according to Meighen. 
Unemployment affected everyone and demanded national cooperation and 
sweeping solutions. Privately, Meighen had run out of patience with the
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veteran issue. At the beginning of the election campaign in September 
1921 he told Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper, a prominent British Columbia 
conservative, that Canada's experience with the veterans over the last 
year ’amply demonstrates that the Government in its entire policy 
towards ex-service men reached the limit of generosity that the country 
could sustain'.165
However, the Canadian electorate, including a large number of ex­
soldiers, had run out of patience with Meighen's government and he was 
soundly defeated at the polls. He readily admitted to Amery after his 
defeat that unemployment and veteran discontent were contributory 
factors, but the primary reason for the defeat was the depression and 
the Conservative government's unpopular wartime activities.166 
However, the change of government did not bring about an improvement in 
the economic fortunes of many veterans. Unemployment continued to rise 
and the demands by the veterans' associations for resolute action grew 
louder.167 Deflation and the phenomenal drop in prices for primary 
commodities had wiped out the equity of many soldier settler properties. 
According to one confidential report undertaken by the Liberals during 
the 1921 election campaign the situation bordered ’on a financial crisis 
for the loans advanced by the [Conservative] Government are in excess of 
what the farms are worth at 1922-1923 prices and valuations'. Losses 
between the 1919-20 price levels and the actual 1922-23 valuations was 
estimated at $10 million.168
The report severely criticised the previous government's financial 
management of the entire soldier settlement operation. It conceded that 
the economic situation had initially led to exorbitant prices but it 
charged the SSB with carelessness in its selection and loan granting 
procedure. Overstaffing, it claimed, was another problem which 
contributed to high costs. The only solution, according to the report, 
was to increase the interest on the loans by one-half a percent and 
extend the repayment period by five years.169 The Liberal government 
re-opened the investigation into soldier settlement when it appointed a 
parliamentary inquiry in March 1922. A number of relief measures were 
suggested to ease veteran indebtedness. They included the revaluation 
of land, livestock and equipment, exemption of interest for a period of 
years, a reduction in the rate of interest and the extension of the 
redemption period on stock and equipment loans. The inquiry recommended 
that the original repayment period of four to six annual instalments on 
stock, equipment and building loans, as set out in the 1919 Act, be
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extended to twenty-five years. Barnett was forced to admit in front of 
the committee that under the old regime the SSB repayment scheme had 
been too heavy in 1919. Similarly, the committee suggested that a 
sliding scale of interest exemptions be granted to soldier settlers who 
had settled before the end of 1921. Both points were accepted by the 
government and incorporated as amendments to the legislation in 
1922.170
Although the government wrote off over $10 million in interest 
under the 1922 amendments its optimistic forecast that 1923 would be a 
better year was quickly dispelled. The SSB reported at the year's end 
that over $88 million remained outstanding of a total of $107 million in 
loans and interest charges. In August the SSB was transferred to the 
Department of Colonisation and Immigration and became the Land 
Settlement Branch. The move was, in part, designed to rationalise 
settlement administration and operations in light of the latest attempt 
in Anglo-Canadian cooperative colonisation: the 3,000 British Family
Scheme. In 1924 new regulations were introduced limiting the granting 
of new loans to soldiers who applied to purchase farms already owned by 
the SSB, or to those who owned land and could have applied for a loan 
but did not, or those to whom the SSB were committed because they had 
been recommended for training or had a justifiable claim to be dealt 
with. However, it was stated emphatically that no new applicants would 
be accepted for training or qualification.171
Deflation continued to afflict livestock prices: the SSB
estimated in 1924 that livestock values had decreased by over 50%. 
However, it was not until 1925 that remedial legislation was brought in 
to reduce indebtedness caused by the drastic fall in livestock values.
In the end, close to $3 million was struck from soldiers' accounts.172 
The burning issue remained land revaluation. After travelling 
extensively throughout Manitoba a leading provincial Liberal fund raiser 
noted that land revaluation was the most important issue with soldier 
settlers. *[TJhese people will never attain any degree of success until 
the purchase price has been reduced and these people placed in a 
position where the land will earn enough to pay all the carrying charges 
and permit a profit to the individual'. In February 1925 the Manitoba 
provincial command of the GWVA, supported by the United Farmers of 
Manitoba, agreed and insisted that all soldier settlement lands receive 
revaluation.173 The following month, at the annual conference of the 
provincial commands of the GWVA, demands were made that the government
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introduce amendments, including land revaluation, to the soldier 
settlement legislation to relieve the hardship being suffered by the 
majority of settlers.17*
According to E. J. Garland, an Alberta MP and an outspoken 
champion of the veterans' cause, land revaluation was not only urgent 
but imperative. Ever since 1922 Garland had campaigned unsuccessfully 
for the necessary land revaluation legislation and in 1925 he once again 
failed.175 However, time was on his side. Pressure mounted until 
eventually veterans succeeded in winning the necessary concessions from 
a minority Liberal government in 1926. The appropriate legislation was 
introduced but the constitutional crisis which ensued for most of that 
year prevented its passage. In January 1927 the newly elected Liberal 
government was reminded of its obligation to Canada's veterans by the 
newly formed Canadian Legion and the United Farmers of Alberta. Aware 
of their responsibilities, politicians on both sides of the House 
demanded fairness, leniency and compassion for Canada's soldier 
settlers, while the government duly promised to deal effectively with 
land revaluation.176 Between July 1927 and the spring of 1930 the SSB 
laboured under the enormous burden of reappraising 8,103 applicants out 
of the 10,697 eligible to apply. By the end of 1929, 7,043 appraisals
had received their final review. It was estimated that the aggregate
sale price of the 7,043 properties was $26.5 million. The total 
adjustment granted in these cases was $6,379,930, representing an 
average reduction of 242. When revaluation was completed in 1930 a 
total of 8,047 farms had been revalued at $30.39 million with reductions 
estimated at $7.4 million. This was written off and was far below the 
estimated $10 million forecast by Robert Forke, Minister of Immigration 
and Colonisation, in March 1927.177
The agricultural situation stabilised by 1925-26. In 1927 Canada 
produced a record bumper crop, only to be surpassed by an even bigger 
yield in 1928.178 With revaluation and two excellent harvests surely 
soldier settlement was at last on a solid footing? The depression of 
1929 wiped out any optimism that remained and brought greater 
disappointment and despair to those soldier settlers who survived. 
According to the 1931 SSB report, of the original 24,491 soldier
settlers who had received loans from the SSB over half had abandoned
their holdings by 1931. Just 11,612 remained and of these only 5,500 
were judged to be in a secure position with a good chance of success. 
Approximately 4,500 veterans had a reasonable chance and It was this
170
group which the SSB focussed its attention and supervisory resources.
The remaining 1,600 or so fell under the category "likely to fail" but 
the SSB was determined not to abandon these cases and it was evident 
'that dispossession of their farms under existing conditions would not 
be warranted* .179
The onslaught of a new depression forced the SSB to further 
alleviate the plight of the surviving soldier settlers. Yet another 
special committee was appointed in early 1930 by the Liberal government 
to examine pensions and returned soldiers' problems. In May its 
findings were presented to Parliament in which its most important 
recommendation was a 30X reduction of the total outstanding indebtedness 
of all soldier settlers still occupying their farms. All livestock 
liens held by the SSB would be terminated and the stock reverted 
outright to the settler. No debate ensued and after just two days of 
procedural necessities its recommendations became law. With an 
impending federal election that July it was not surprising that the 
committee's recommendations were legislated so quickly. By March 1931 a 
further $11.3 million was written off the soldier settler account.180
SECTION 4.6: THE FINAL CHAPTER
The SSB was officially abolished in 1931.181 However, there 
were a few final financial adjustments for the remaining soldier 
settlers. Clearly, the depression hampered the newly elected 
Conservative Prime Minister's efforts to appease Canada's ailing soldier 
settlers. Wheat prices reached a record low and the burden of 
accumulated arrears forced R. B. Bennett to introduce additional 
remedial legislation in 1933 in the form of interest remission. A new 
feature was the bonus amendment. It was designed to reward the thrifty, 
hard working settler who showed determination to make his repayments. 
Previously, remedial legislation had benefitted the good, bad and 
indifferent settler. After detailed discussions with soldiers' 
organisations and settlers themselves the amendment was designed to 
remedy the disparity of previous legislation. It provided that for 
every dollar the settler contributed towards his arrears or instalments 
the government would equal that payment to relieve some of the burden.
As a precondition settlers had for the first time to pay insurance 
premiums and local taxes on their holdings. Previously soldier
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settlement lands were considered Crown lands and therefore not subject 
to taxation. By 31 March 1935 soldier settlers had earned a bonus 
totalling $1.9 million.182
In the end, the financial cost to the nation was substantial.
From its inception to March 1935 Canada's soldier settlement programme 
had cost $136.3 million. Repayments amounted to $52.2 million and 
approximately $35.2 million was written off through various remedial 
legislation inaugurated since 1922. This left $48.9 million 
outstanding. However, when compared to the cost of veterans' benefits 
paid out by the federal government between 1914 and 1935, approximately 
$1 billion, the sums spent on soldier settlement were exorbitant. The 
equivalent of 13.6% of veterans' benefits was spent on just over 4% of 
the total number of able-bodied Canadian veterans!
But what of the survivors? Of the 24,998 soldier settlers who 
received loans from the SSB, 10,828 or 43% were still in possession of 
their farms. The precariousness of the situation was reflected by the 
equity grading system adopted by government officials which measured the 
likelihood of a settler's success. The table demonstrated that 32% of 
the settlers had an equity of 40% or more in their farms; 17% fell 
within the 20-40% bracket; 15% had less than 20% equity and 36% had no 
equity at all.183
What had gone wrong with Canada's soldier settlement policy? 
Undoubtedly, the international economic climate was a crucial factor 
which ultimately dictated the degree of 'success' or 'failure' of the 
scheme. The artificially high wheat prices created during the war and 
maintained by the immediate post-war boom, gave the policy's architects 
the illusion that their programme had been established on a secure and 
prosperous footing. Patriotism, a sense of national obligation to the 
returned man, and the relief of a return to normality clouded the minds 
of politicians, administrators and citizens alike to the dangers of 
establishing a national land settlement policy for a select few during 
an inflationary spiral of unprecedented proportions. The brave few who 
warned that high prices were no substitute for actual farming experience 
were unfortunately ignored.
Indeed, the unforseen severity of the collapse of prices for 
primary produce between 1920-22 and 1929-33 was a tremendous blow to 
soldier settlers because they were particularly vulnerable to wild price 
fluctuations. Many had purchased their farms at the peak of the 
inflationary period and were forced to sell their produce at the
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beginning of the deflationary cycle. This ensured long-term 
indebtedness and abandonment. Despite increased yields and the brief 
price recovery in the latter half of the decade it was by far too late 
for those surviving soldier settlers to recover. The utter collapse of 
the world wheat market in the early 1930s proved to be the final nail in 
the coffin for many more. Indebtedness, despite the government's policy 
of increased financial leniency, would haunt the decreasing number of 
hardy survivors until well into World War II.
Although the initial collapse of world grain markets and their 
indifferent performance throughout the inter-war period were a 
debilitating factor, one of the real problems was the ideological basis 
which underlined the pursuit of the policy. Throughout the 1920s 
Canadians continued to ignore the profound changes which were 
transforming their economy. The belief that prosperity, and hence 
national stability, depended upon the maintenance of a strong and 
vibrant agricultural sector ignored the industrial and urban 
transformation which was slowly changing the face of Canadian society. 
Already by 1921 just over one half of its citizens resided in urban 
environs. And yet the census takers revelled in the fact that almost 
one half of the population still lived in rural areas. Canada's 
insistence on pursuing a post-war back-to-the-land policy, of which 
soldier settlement was an integral part, was testimony to the power of 
the agrarian myth in Canadian society. By looking back to the "good old 
days" of pre-war Canada and attempting to revive the tried and tested 
policies of large-scale immigration, land settlement and resource 
development, it demonstrated her insecurity and uncertainty about the 
future. The way forward was through industrial integration and 
diversification not agricultural expansion and the specialisation in 
staple exports.18* The shortcomings of soldier settlement and the 
various empire migration schemes in the 1920s proved the economic and 
social fallacies inherent in the ideology of the soil. However, it took 
the events of the 1920s, in particular the depression of 1929-33, to 
bring home this message.
There was no question that the unpredictable economic climate and 
Canada's obsession with an outdated agrarian ideology which ignored 
current economic realities contributed to the misery and hardship 
suffered by many soldier settlers. However, there were numerous 
mistakes, oversights and miscalculations which had a more immediate 
impact on the scheme. Foremost amongst these was the type of settlement
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land available and its relative isolation. The areas targeted for 
settlement, such as the Peace River district and the northern park belt, 
were largely inaccessible, lacked proper communications facilities and 
possessed vast quantities of marginal land. It was this over-optimistic 
assumption that poor types of land could be brought under cultivation 
quickly and profitably which produced some of the SSB's most 
embarrassing admissions of failure.185
During the Royal Commission on Settlement and Immigration in 
Saskatchewan in 1930, Major John Barnett, former SSB chairman, admitted 
that there had been an inadequate supply of good Dominion land for 
soldier settlers in 1918. As a result there was a good deal of 
settlement in agriculturally marginal territory, in particular the 
inter-lake region of Manitoba. He estimated that of all the Crown land 
surveyed for settlement during his tenure in office only one-third was 
suitable for farming and even then that was being extremely generous. 
Therefore it was not surprising for some districts to report a high 
failure rate.186 Several other witnesses testified to the inability 
of the SSB to provide land near essential railway and road facilities. 
The federal government had always recognised this essential prerequisite 
and faithfully promised to build or finance additional branchlines and 
grid roads to new settlement areas. But construction took time. In the 
meantime farmers had to ship their grain to market. Soldier farmers 
wondered whether the government fully realised the implications several 
miles could make to the success or failure of their operation. ’The 
homestead areas are now so far back from the shipping points and from 
schools and roads, that new settlers are exposed to considerable 
hardships and are forced out to remote districts', remarked one witness. 
Another witness explained that in many instances the distance from the 
railway was more important than the quality of the land. It had been 
his experience that many settlers, both soldier and civilian, were not 
interested in land if it was more than seven or eight miles from the 
railroad.187 And yet soldier settlers in the Prairie River district 
of Saskatchewan were encouraged to settle over twenty miles from the 
nearest railway with no roads!
’Farming is not a calling in which easy profits may be expected', 
warned Commissioner Ashton after his two month tour of western 
operations in 1924. ’The margin of profit is small and easily 
disappears when poor methods are followed'.188 Everyone recognised 
that supervision was the key to success and that farm diversification or
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mixed farming allowed for greater security because it shielded the 
settler in time of market instability. But it was evident that many 
soldier settlers ignored this sound advice until it was too late. It 
was easier and more lucrative to gamble and hope that grain prices 
stayed buoyant despite the fact that such a risk left them exposed to 
the vagaries of the market. Besides, it took an enormous amount of 
time, effort and long-term capital to develop properly a successful herd 
of cattle or brood of pigs. And livestock prices were exorbitantly high 
immediately after the war making it more worthwhile in the short-term to 
harvest grain rather than raise stock.189 It was unfortunate, if not 
tragic, that inflation and the market dictated these conditions because 
the more northerly settlement areas were easily better suited for mixed 
farming. The collapse of the wheat market in 1920-21 compounded by a 
cycle of severe climatic conditions which adversely affected grain 
growing between 1919 and 1924 proved the harsh reality of the situation.
Another problem was the heavy financial burden which many soldier 
settlers experienced. Although the government clearly stipulated that 
candidates make a deposit of 10Z (and 20% for British ex-servicemen), in 
the case of many Canadian veterans it was waived. The burden of 
indebtedness was therefore 100Z for many men and as a result they had to 
shoulder a much heavier financial commitment than the average civilian 
farmer was allowed to carry. In 1930 the SSB admitted that the burden 
of payment in the present economic climate had been overwhelming and 
that ’soldier settlers [had] never received the supervision and 
directional assistance [that] the financial structure of their loans 
indicate[d] as desirable'.190
It was hinted by some government observers that the lack of 
personal investment in the majority of cases bred an attitude of 
indifference. They argued that because many soldier settlers did not 
have a large personal stake in their venture it was easier for them to 
bail out when the going became difficult or unmanageable rather than 
stay on and persevere. The corollary was that the more personal capital 
invested the greater the chance and the determination to succeed. Of 
the 4,785 settlers In 1929 graded as "barely holding their own" or 
"likely to fail" with 20% equity or less, the average indebtedness 
ranged from $3,700 to $4,450. This compared very unfavourably with the 
two top grades who possessed between 20-40% equity or more and whose 
debt load ranged between $2,300 and $3,180. The charge that soldier 
settlement was just another big loan venture came home to roost during
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the 1920s and the government was left holding the short end of the 
financial stick. These same experts concluded that the best settler for 
Canada was a man who possessed his own capital and was able to start 
farming on his own without help from anyone.191
The question whether soldier settlement was a success or failure 
poses an interesting problem. As a policy it was an outright failure. 
The expenditure of approximately $145 million by 1935 and the large sums 
which were written off and remained outstanding were damning 
indictments. The "failure" of 57% of the SSB's clients points to a 
similar conclusion. However, there were individual successes. These 
figures ignore the 6,500 soldier settlers who claimed their soldier 
grant and farmed without SSB assistance. Even abandoned farms were not 
lost as many were resold to neighbouring farmers or newly arrived 
immigrants. In fact, resold land usually brought in a slight profit, 
especially before land prices slumped in 1923. Expansion did not stop 
despite the gloomy economic climate. The number of soldier grant 
entries which were claimed after the initial rush, although small, 
reflected that some soldier settlers were able to expand and make a 
comfortable living. In fact, the Royal Commission on Immigration and 
Settlement recorded that very few of the successful soldier settlers 
operated on their minimum entitlement of 160 acres. Rather they had 
expanded to 320 acres. As Barnett astutely pointed out, everyone was 
aware of the failures but not the successes: 'very often your good man
is not known even by neighbouring farmers'.192
Barnett was adamant that although a 57X failure rate may have been 
high, as far as he was concerned, architects of any settlement scheme 
had to expect realistically a 40-50X failure rate. Besides, just 
because a large number of soldiers failed as farmers it did not mean 
that they were failures. 'There are a very very large number of them 
who shaken by war conditions and war service, recovered their 
equilibrium through this experience on the farm, and the work has meant 
the saving of a very large amount of money in other ways'.193 
Perhaps, but the remarks made by the former SSB chairman could be 
dismissed as bureaucratic bravado. Nevertheless, Canada had tried to 
honour its obligation to its returned men by providing them with an 
opportunity to re-establish themselves into civilian life and contribute 
to the future prosperity of the nation. Unfortunately, the general 
public did not realise how costly their sacrifice had been. Even more 
disconcerting was that the resettlement of British ex-servicemen was a
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complete fiasco. In the final analysis, despite some individual 
successes, Canada's soldier settlement policy was a disappointing 
failure. It is to the other Dominions which we must now turn our 
attention.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE POLITICISATION OF SOLDIER SETTLEMENT
I have often told (the Nationalists) that the British Empire is 
not an octopus, whose feelers enwrap all to their doom; but 
something greater, whose benevolent embraces will hold them for 
ever; from them they will never escape, and in a very little 
while, never want to.
Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, author, politician and landowner, 5 
May 1926.1
Since the early nineteenth century and until very recently,
Britain was the single largest source of white immigrants to South 
Africa. But compared to Canada and Australia, British emigration to 
South Africa was small, particularly in the first four decades of the 
twentieth century. It averaged only 10,000 annually before 1914, and 
after World War I it dropped to a mere 2,900 per year up to the outbreak 
of war in 1939. However, despite the modest numbers, its contribution 
to South African society, culture and politics was important.2
In January 1914 the fledgling Union government acknowledged that 
owing to the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), the shortage of unskilled 
labour, and recurrent labour unrest on the gold fields, there was little 
interest in emigration to South Africa. The 1921 census confirmed the 
inertia of post-Union immigration.3 Nevertheless, immigration was a 
major issue between the political parties in South Africa during the 
inter-war period. One of the protagonists was a small but determined 
group of individuals, the 1820 Memorial Settlers' Association, 
established in 1920, who attempted to reverse the downward trend of 
British immigration to South Africa and redress the growing numerical 
imbalance between Afrikaners and English by bringing British immigrants, 
particularly ex-servicemen, into the country as settlers. The 
Association's name referred to a policy originating after the Napoleonic 
Wars, when the major objectives had been to bolster colonial defence, 
promote colonial development and relieve domestic social problems. The 
policy was revived after the Boer War, motivated this time by the 
British government's attempt to foster white racial harmony and create a 
new rural order in South Africa. However, the creation of a large,
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united and prosperous rural English-speaking community in the conquered 
Boer republics faced a host of obstacles.
SECTION 5: THE MILNER LEGACY, 'POOR WHITEISM' AND THE OUTBREAK OF VAR
What made land settlement and immigration in South Africa so 
politically explosive? The answer can be found in the legacy of the 
reconstruction period after the Boer War, the growing political power of 
the bvwoners or ’poor whites' and the impact of World War I on party 
politics in South Africa. The architect of Britain's reconstruction 
policy was Sir Alfred Milner, British High Commissioner for South Africa 
and Governor of the Cape and Transvaal between 1897 and 1905. For 
Milner, economic recovery was the key to a new and vigorous British 
South Africa.* Milner's chief fear was Afrikaner nationalism which he 
regarded as the most dangerous and destabilising force in Southern 
Africa. But to foster racial harmony, Afrikaners had to be encouraged 
to participate in the new industrial order and British immigrants had to 
be attracted and resettled in large numbers in the rural areas.
Milner emphatically denied that his objective was to swamp the 
Afrikaner. He wrote, ’I do no more want to exterminate the Dutch than I 
want to exterminate the British' .5 However, his determination to 
introduce large numbers of English-speaking settlers to ensure British 
strategic and political dominance was made very clear in late December 
1900:
I attach the greatest importance of all to the increase of 
the British population. If, ten years hence, there are 
three men of British race to two of Dutch, the country will 
be safe and prosperous. If there are three of Dutch to two 
of British, we shall have perpetual difficulty.6
In order to offset Afrikaner political power, which was concentrated in 
the rural areas, Milner sought large numbers of loyal, English-speaking 
settlers to infiltrate the rural districts. The thousands of Imperial 
troops awaiting demobilisation provided an obvious source. He readily 
admitted that it would be difficult to settle these men, who were for 
the most part agriculturally inexperienced. However, Milner believed 
that if they could be induced to stay, they would inculcate loyalty (or 
fear) among the rural Afrikaners, provide a firm foundation for 
additional settlement from Britain, and, because of their military
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experience, prove invaluable as a trained militia in case the Boers 
attempted another insurrection.
Milner's policy failed miserably. Of the thousands of Imperial 
troops who had fought in South Africa less than 2,000 participated in 
the government-sponsored resettlement programme. According to the 
novelist John Buchan, a member of Milner's reconstruction administration 
and attached to the Land Settlement Department between 1902-03, the 
conditions which were essential to success were found wanting.7 For a 
start, the soldiers lacked the initial capital necessary to outfit 
properly a farm in South Africa. As a result, they showed little 
enthusiasm for the project. Moreover, the work of the Land Department 
which was to coordinate British settlement work was agonisingly slow. 
Essential surveys, inspections and land purchasing were neither quickly 
nor efficiently carried out. The general muddle fostered discontent and 
impatience amongst the more enterprising soldiers and they soon lost 
interest, returned to Britain or sought employment elsewhere. By July 
1902 very little had been accomplished. Despite a large injection of 
funds and the reorganisation of the entire settlement operation, the 
onset of a severe drought and a wide outbreak of cattle fever dampened 
official expectations and hampered further the efforts of those who had 
not already been ’choked off' by maladministration and unforseen natural 
calamities.8
Meanwhile, rural depopulation was becoming a major domestic 
problem. Ever since the 1880s rural whites, largely Afrikaners, were 
being forced off the land through speculation and the commercialisation 
of agriculture, and migrated to the urban and industrial centres to look 
for work. The rinderpest epidemic of 1896-7, the British army's 
scorched earth policy during the Boer War and poor yields due to 
sustained drought and disease between 1903 and 1908 dramatically 
increased an already alarming trend, with the greatest exodus occurring 
between 1911 and 1921.9 Impoverished, uneducated and unskilled, poor 
whites were put in direct competition with African labour. This led 
Afrikaners to argue that jobs were hard enough to find without 
immigrants competing in the same job markets. Why help the poor of 
other countries to relocate, argued Afrikaner nationalists, when there 
were enough poor in South Africa? The Dutch churches, instrumental in 
publicising the problem before the Boer War, advocated rehabilitation to 
stem poor whiteism. Their pleas were heard by the two leading Afrikaner 
political parties created in the aftermath of the Boer War, Het Volk and
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Orangie Unie, who endorsed a back to the land policy. It included 
supervised rural settlements and an education system to meet and 
safeguard the position of the poor whites vis-a-vis the non-white 
population.10 Another important stimulus to Afrikaner political 
consciousness derived from the expansion of South Africa's industrial 
base, as the result of which Afrikaner workers were increasingly exposed 
to English-speaking workers and their methods of industrial 
organisation. They began to assimilate these techniques until 
eventually they assumed complete control of several industrial unions in 
the gold fields. From this power base the unions cultivated important 
links between urban and rural Afrikaners, strengthened the cultural bond 
and widened the political potential of a reinvigorated Afrikanerdom.11 
The Afrikaners' ability to organise industrially signified a growing 
political power which could not be ignored.
The Unionist Party of South Africa, which represented the majority 
of the English-speaking population and the mining interests, had made 
the promotion of land settlement with state assistance a major plank of 
its party platform since 1910. Repeatedly it urged the vigorous 
development of South Africa's farming potential through the initiation 
of an effective land settlement policy and introduction of suitable 
British immigrants. The party executive deemed it imperative to 
initiate state-aided immigration, provide land on reasonable terms, and, 
if need be, acquire land by the state for settlement purposes. 
Furthermore, it advocated a tax on unimproved land. The latter measure, 
though controversial was essential because it would force the large 
speculative landowners and companies to unlock or develop their 
holdings, thereby promoting the general prosperity of the nation.12
Patrick Duncan, a former member of the reconstruction 
administration and a leading Unionist MP, advocated the establishment of 
a system of state-subsidised passages to promote the immigration and 
settlement of experienced agriculturalists in South Africa. He 
acknowledged, however, that Louis Botha's government was not willing to 
take the initiative. If anything was to be done at all it would be by 
private effort.13 Another Unionist MP, Sir Charles Crewe, was 
similarly convinced that the ruling South African Party (SAP) would not 
help immigrants at all. The issue was politically sensitive for Botha 
because his 'own people object and he is too afraid of losing 
[political] support to risk anything'.14
Indeed, Botha had to walk a fine line for fear of antagonising his
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Afrikaner support. Politicians from all bands of the political spectrum 
agreed that there was an urgent necessity to secure a larger white 
population on the land. The problem was who and from where. The 
Unionists supported state-aided immigration to reinforce the small, 
isolated white community in South Africa. The SAP remained non­
committal because of its delicate position in the middle ground between 
the two white political communities. The Nationalists, a militant 
Afrikaner wing which had split from the SAP in January 1914, were 
vehemently opposed to any form of state-aided immigration on the grounds 
that the money was better spent helping the poor whites to relocate back 
to the land. They condemned state-aided immigration as 'political 
immigration...the thin end of the wedge inserted by the Unionists'.15 
It was an astute political move. Not only did it allow the Nationalists 
to cultivate growing Afrikaner discontent and mould it into a firm 
political base, but it gave them political credibility within the 
Afrikaner community as the defenders of Afrikaner culture.
Afrikaner nationalism, accelerated by the war, enabled the 
Nationalists to gain important inroads within traditional SAP 
strongholds. The rebellion in September 1914 of hardline, anti-British 
Afrikaners who had remained uncomfortable under the yoke of British rule 
was easily suppressed, but it increased the polarisation within the 
Afrikaner community between the moderates and pro-war supporters of 
Botha and his political lieutenant J. C. Smuts, and the rebels and their 
sympathisers who supported the Nationalists led by General J. B. M. 
Hertzog. As the war intensified, the rift within the Afrikaner 
community widened as many more Afrikaners shifted allegiance from the 
SAP to the Nationalists because of South Africa's expanding commitment 
to the war and the support Botha and Smuts received from British 
interests in South Africa. Furthermore, Hertzog's cry of 'South Africa 
first' rekindled Afrikaner aspirations of republicanism and the goal of 
a new and independent South Africa outside the imperial framework.16
On the outbreak of war the majority of English-speaking South 
Africans were similarly swept up in a wave of patriotism which made 
loyalty to South Africa a constituent of a wider loyalty to Britain and 
the empire. The Governor-General of South Africa, Lord Buxton, 
confirmed this in a confidential cable to the Colonial Office in 1917: 
’The Unionists have always claimed to be the special guardians of the 
British connection and have taken every opportunity of pressing for a 
larger contribution to the cost of [empire]'.17 This was abhorrent to
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vast numbers of Afrikaners, who promptly rejected it and it merely 
contributed to resurgent republicanism. As nationalist attitudes 
hardened in both white communities it was evident that the breach 
between them and within the Afrikaner community itself had widened. 
Within this turbulent environment, the British government became anxious 
to support and keep Botha in power because it was through him that 
British imperial interests, and hence the British connection, would be 
maintained.18 British immigration also was looked to as an important 
though sensitive means of sustaining the connection.
SECTION 5.1: PRIVATE INITIATIVE DURING THE WAR
As predicted, the initiative was left to private enterprise during 
the war when a gigantic flood of prospective immigrants was expected to 
follow demobilisation.19 The campaign for increased British 
immigration and land settlement after the war was led by a group of 
ultra-loyalists within the Unionist party. These men included some of 
the most prominent and active English-speaking politicians, financiers 
and newspaper proprietors in South Africa. Leadership was provided by 
the examples of Sir Percy Fitzpatrick and Sir Thomas Smartt, two wealthy 
and influential entrepreneurs who had developed an avid interest in 
progressive agriculture.
Author, politician, former partner of the gold mining house H. 
Eckstein and Co. and devout Milnerite, the colourful Fitzpatrick was a 
leading pioneer of the citrus industry in South Africa. In 1913 he 
initiated the Sundays River Settlement irrigation project near Uitenhage 
in the Eastern Cape.20 Initially intended as a non-profit-seeking, 
cooperative, share-holding venture, the scheme was specifically designed 
to promote the settlement of British immigrants in South Africa. It was 
a task which absorbed his energies for the next ten years, consumed 
enormous amounts of capital and eventually defeated him. Nevertheless, 
it reflected his determination to increase the English-speaking 
population in South Africa by means of land settlement, spurred by his 
conviction that British immigration and settlement could defeat the 
political expectations of Afrikaner nationalism.21 In this respect, 
Fitzpatrick's efforts symbolised the continuation of Milner's original 
policies of the previous decade.
Sir Thomas Smartt was to irrigation development what Fitzpatrick
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was to citriculture. Doctor, progressive farmer and politician, Smartt 
practiced at Britstown in the arid north-western Cape or Karoo where he 
settled in 1880. Indeed, it was Smartt's interest in agriculture which 
embarked him upon his political career. In April 1912 he became 
Unionist party leader until its merger with the SAP in November 1920. 
After the general election in February 1921 he was appointed Minister of 
Agriculture in Smuts's second administration. He made his first land 
purchase for the Smartt syndicate in 1884, which he founded and which he 
served as its managing director until his death in 1929.22 At its 
peak, the syndicate owned 50,000 morgen (approximately 100,000 acres), 
which were developed as an agricultural showpiece and a tribute to 
Smartt's conviction that irrigation held the key to the successful 
development and expansion of South African agriculture.
The remaining members of the group included Sir Lionel Phillips, 
Sir Patrick Duncan and Sir Charles Crewe. Phillips, like Smartt and 
Fitzpatrick, was an avid agricultural enthusiast, and sat as a director 
on the boards of several private land settlement companies. However, he 
preferred to channel his interest in agriculture and land settlement 
mainly into voluntary efforts and causes. A man of great enthusiasm and 
energy for public affairs his significance lies with his organisational 
prowess1, administrative experience and financial contacts. As managing 
director of the Johannesburg office of the Central Mining and Investment 
Corporation, one of the largest and most powerful gold mining 
conglomerates in South Africa, he was able to employ his managerial 
skills in conjunction with his financial contacts for fund raising.
The outspoken Crewe was a prominent Eastern Cape politician, 
soldier and journalist. Wholly committed to the imperial cause in South 
Africa, his power and influence stemmed from his part-ownership of the 
East London Daily Dispatch. Determined and energetic, he possessed a 
strong sense of public duty. With the possible exception of 
Fitzpatrick, he was most vigorous in campaigning for an aggressive 
immigration policy to attract British settlers after the war.23 As a 
former member of Milner's 'kindergarten', Duncan had first hand 
knowledge of the aims and shortcomings of Milner's immigration and land 
settlement policies. Like most leading Unionists, he was deeply 
concerned about the relationship between the black and white races in 
South Africa and the ability of the European races to maintain their 
'permanent preponderance' in the population.24 In 1909 he proposed 
through the ’White Expansion Society' the placement of young emigrants
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possessing a limited amount of capital with South African farmers.
After 1910 he became the Unionist party's leading exponent of the need 
for a state-aided land settlement and assisted migration policy.25
Haggard's visit to South Africa in February-March 1916 rekindled 
the immigration issue at a time when English-Afrikaner relations were at 
their lowest. Buxton and J. X. Merriman, one of the Cape's shrewdest 
and most respected parliamentarians, warned Haggard while enroute of the 
need for caution and tact in South Africa. Owing to the delicate 
political situation and Afrikaner sensitivity to immigration, he was 
strongly advised to avoid making public pronouncements regarding the 
settlement of British ex-servicemen in South Africa after the war. 'Now 
is like a magazine full of high explosives teaming with sedition and 
anti-English feeling', explained Merriman. *Any... advocacy of the 
introduction of British immigrants will be made the text for fiery 
appeals to the backveld....Such a crusade will render poor Botha's task 
doubly hard' ,26 Botha was all too aware of the problem, according to 
Fitzpatrick. It was better to work quietly, avoid publicity and not 
give the Nationalists a chance to attack the government.27
Haggard had no intention of creating political waves and heeded 
the advice. He too was alive to the danger that an ill-timed remark 
would do unending damage to the imperial migration cause in South 
Africa. Conceding that it was unlikely the South African government 
would initiate an immigration policy, he admitted that the prospect of 
land settlement in the Dominion was poor, especially for the ordinary 
British working-class migrant, because the uncapitalised immigrant 
farmer could not compete with his African counterpart. South African 
agriculture required capital, much more than In the other Dominions, 
because of the emphasis on private investment and the need to develop 
new farming methods such as irrigation and other forms of water 
conservation. This situation was in part dictated by South Africa's 
climate, extremely demanding and sometimes inhospitable. Haggard 
concurred with leading Unionists that if anything was to be achieved it 
would be through private initiative. He therefore submitted that 
British half-pay and retired officers with capital provided a small but 
potentially useful class under the circumstances. Merriman agreed.
'The most we can hope for is for a special immigration of [half]-pay 
officers and the like with moderate means and no ambition beyond making 
a home instead of a fortune'.28
Despite the poor outlook in South Africa Haggard's mission spurred
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the English-speaking immigration enthusiasts into action. J. W. Jagger, 
a successful Cape businessman, Unionist politician and educationist, 
formed the South African Settlers' Information Committee (SASIC) shortly 
after Haggard's visit. He was a keen and energetic promoter of 
settlement in the Dominion and enlisted Smartt, Fitzpatrick, Duncan and 
several other prominent Unionist politicians to sit on the committee. A 
London committee was established soon afterwards. W. P. Schreiner,
South African High Commissioner, was asked to sit on the London 
committee; although he fully supported the objects of the SASIC, he did 
not see fit to accept the invitation because of his official status. 
However, he saw no reason for the Trades Commissioner not to serve 
provided the Union government did not object. Meanwhile, the SASIC was 
seeking recognition from the British government in connection with work 
on a future central migration authority.29
Private enterprise in South Africa did not go unnoticed in 
Britain, and Milner, for one, fully appreciated the effort. 'Nobody 
knows better than I that South Africa is the weakest link in the 
Imperial chain, and that link has certainly not been strengthened by the 
war'. He still maintained that the only way to prevent the imperial 
link from snapping and to increase British influence was a ’steady flow 
of settlers' to South Africa after the war.30 Amery agreed. British 
immigration would contribute to the future unity of South Africa.
If South African resources and agricultural possibilities 
are developed as they might be, there will be room for 
soldier settlers... all over the country who will soon help 
to bring a different atmosphere into place. My faith in the 
future is based on the fundamental belief that a great 
region like South Africa will inevitably develop. At each 
phase of development it will call for immigrants, and those 
immigrants will reinforce the principle of equal rights, and 
of South African as against purely racial patriotism.31
Afrikaner nationalism was on the ascendancy during the latter part 
of the war and Afrikaner race patriotism was indeed becoming an 
increasingly worrisome issue within the English-speaking community which 
put it on the defensive. Their concern stemmed from increasing demands 
from militant Afrikaners for independence whose achievement became a 
major objective of the Nationalists in 1917. Fitzpatrick explained to 
Amery that it was not simply the rebellion of 1914 or republicanism 
which bonded the Nationalist party together: it was their anti-Botha,
anti-Smuts feelings which gave them common ground. Afrikaner discontent
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was directed at Botha, Smuts and the SAP because they had ’given up the 
policy of a Dutch racial party'.32
Denying that they were attempting to swamp the Afrikaner 
population, many ultra-loyalists feared that the British element would 
itself be destroyed by these same Afrikaner supremacists if they got 
into power. As Crewe informed the Colonial Secretary, Walter Long, the 
Nationalists seemed to imagine that Afrikaner independence could be 
achieved using ’less dangerous methods' such as constitutional or 
parliamentary means rather than war or insurrection.33 According to 
Crewe the only effective countermeasure was a steady stream of British 
immigrants, preferably soldiers, with assistance from the Imperial 
government. ’Otherwise', he lamented, ’the Britisher in S[outh] Africa 
whose endurance is being strained to its limits will give up hope and 
will gradually become absorbed or leave the country'
There was a sense of desperation which permeated the 
correspondence arriving in Britain from Unionists in South Africa 
throughout 1917. This was reflected by Crewe and Fitzpatrick. Crewe 
was not optimistic about the immediate outlook for the English in South 
Africa unless a racial balance was struck in their favour.
I know them [the Boers] as a people and ultimately as 
individuals and there is going to be no fusion of races and 
the Boer who has not changed in sentiment in a hundred years 
will not alter in another hundred. There are already a 
great number of Englishmen out here who look upon the future 
of this country as certainly Dutch with Dutch government and 
who unless things...improve as the result of an active 
policy of introducing Englishmen after the War will sell out 
here...35
Fitzpatrick was much more succinct. The Boer ’will tolerate us, but we 
must be good: They will run the country. They own it. They are
it'.36
SECTION 5.2: SOLDIER SETTLEMENT AND FREE PASSAGE 1916-22
Haggard's visit forced the South African government to start 
thinking about its repatriation and post-war reconstruction policies.
In August 1916, the very capable and determined Minister for Lands, 
Hendrik Mentz, began to study in earnest the problem of post-war 
employment for discharged soldiers. Eager for ideas, he solicited the
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views of a number of local recruiting and employment committees. 
Suggestions ranged from public works programmes, education and railway 
administration to the civil service, police, forestry, posts and 
telegraphs, lands and irrigation. Of those who had returned from the 
front preliminary indications were that an agricultural career rated 
highly as a post-war occupation. The problem was that it was impossible 
to estimate how many were interested in farming because the government 
had not yet initiated a statistical survey with the local recruiting 
committees.37
When the British government first approached South Africa in 
September 1916 concerning its soldier settlement plans the reply was 
polite but non-committal. No decision had been made, but indications 
were that when it was it would be strictly limited to helping South 
African veterans. This was confirmed in February 1917. Schreiner was 
informed that it was impossible for South Africa to absorb considerable 
numbers of immigrants after the war. Ministers claimed that to make 
provision for British ex-servicemen would severely tax government 
resources. They argued that the large supply of native labour militated 
against the immigration of unskilled agricultural labour. Furthermore, 
the very limited quantity of small allotments for men with little or no 
capital, was barely sufficient to meet the needs of South African 
veterans, and although there were vast areas of vacant Crown land, they 
were located in isolated and waterless regions.38
Apart from the financial and logistical questions, however, there 
was a more deep-seated reason for the Union government to be cautious 
and that was the perennial issue of the poor white, a more serious and 
seemingly insoluble problem. The poor white problem resurfaced as a 
major political issue at the beginning of 1916. A severe drought had 
been raging since 1912, one of the worst in living memory. Pressure 
grew for the government to introduce a drought relief bill, a major 
component of which was the development of irrigation and water 
conservation projects. Not only would it provide permanent relief in 
specific drought-stricken regions but it would give employment to 
whites. By August, the government decided that the drought relief 
schemes provided an excellent opportunity for resettling South African 
veterans. This immediately opened up a political pandora's box which 
highlighted the worsening relations between the two white communities 
and demonstrated how sensitive and politically divisive the immigration 
issue had become.
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Nationalist politicians saw the development of irrigation as the 
country's salvation and the solution to the poor white problem. Arguing 
that charity began at home, they were convinced that these schemes 
provided much needed employment for impoverished white South Africans 
and potentially formed the cornerstone to the nation's continued 
agricultural prosperity.39 Similarly, Nationalists staunchly rejected 
Unionist calls for overseas immigrants, and dismissed the idea of 
assisted passage as political immigration, the subsidised importation of 
the poor of overseas nations.
Unionist members were quick to point out the continual failure of 
government-sponsored irrigation settlements ever since the 1880s. It 
was ’no use going in for a policy of false economy and settling third- 
class people on third-class lands'. Great care had to be taken as to 
the type and class of settler if taxpayers' money was not to be wasted 
and the policy defeated. What was needed was a system of government- 
sponsored agricultural education.*0 Furthermore, the cure for the poor 
white problem was not government handouts, preferential employment and 
high salaries on the railways or in the civil service. Development was 
the answer and immigration was the key in solving the problem.
Unionists argued that there were not enough whites in South Africa to 
develop the country, and the majority of them lacked the experience or 
knowledge to accomplish the task. Immigrants, on the other hand, 
brought skill, initiative, fresh ideas and capital.*1
The debate on the settlement provisions for returned soldiers 
created a furore in the House of Assembly in 1917. Unionists advocated 
preferential and generous treatment for ex-servicemen who had seen 
action and wanted to farm after demobilisation. The Nationalists 
expressed abhorrence at the suggestion, claiming that it favoured the 
ex-servicemen to the detriment of the poor white. Angrily, Mentz 
refused to be drawn on the issue of preference. Instead, he argued that 
the amendment to the 1912 Land Settlement Act, which increased the range 
of government assistance, was to help any and all South Africans 
interested in farming after the war. He emphatically denied that the 
government contemplated any special settlement legislation for veterans. 
The Nationalists remained unsatisfied and unconvinced.*2
Throughout 1917 and 1918 the South African government remained 
resolute in its determination not to introduce special soldier 
settlement projects or participate in an imperial free passage scheme. 
Schreiner reported disconsolately that the other Dominions were very
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active in promoting their own schemes in Britain. He pleaded with Botha 
to emulate their initiative. The government was unmoved.43 Nothing 
changed when Milner and Amery were appointed to the Colonial Office in 
1919. In January the South African government informed the Colonial 
Office that it was not in a position to undertake any state-aided 
immigration of British ex-servicemen to South Africa. It repeated that 
it was busy investigating what could be done for its own ex-servicemen, 
and that it could not encourage the emigration of British ex-soldiers 
unless they had substantial financial means or solid offers of 
guaranteed employment.44
The news was disappointing but not unexpected. The Colonial 
Office, though aware of the delicacy of the immigration issue and the 
political reasons why the South Africans were never eager to discuss 
post-war emigration except in very general terms, continued to hope that 
South Africa would be able to participate more actively in the near 
future.45 It was doubtful that this would happen. The very presence 
of Milner and Amery at the Colonial Office aggravated the problem. 
Unionists had greeted the appointments with rapture and looked forward 
to the prospect of a positive, determined Imperial policy in South 
Africa. But their presence also did much to ignite Afrikaner opposition 
to immigration.46
Government paralysis resulted in confusion and frustration among 
civil servants who found themselves lacking in clear policy directives, 
lines of command or resources to deal with the flood of applications 
that followed demobilisation. It also led private land companies and 
philanthropic agencies to play a much larger role in immigration matters 
than they would have had if Smuts, Botha's successor as Prime Minister 
in 1919, had carried out an aggressive immigration policy.47 Led by 
Fitzpatrick, South African immigration enthusiasts discussed the need to 
establish an office in London to attract prospective settlers, 
preferably of the ex-officer class.48 Into the breach stepped the 
SASIC. Phillips, who was in London doing war work for the Ministry of 
Munitions and the Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau, accepted the 
SASIC's offer of president in November 1918. The committee's first 
priority was to raise funds so that it could work more effectively. 
Phillips suggested canvassing landowning companies based in London.49 
The next step was to safeguard prospective settlers against exploitation 
by unscrupulous agents who might induce them to purchase land at 
exorbitant prices or under impossible conditions. In March 1919 the
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SASIC outlined a series of guidelines for settlers and purchasers 
interested in South Africa. They ranged from pointers on title, water 
supply, rainfall and altitude to issues such as location, labour supply 
and soil type. The SASIC emphasised that it was an impartial body. 
'While the committee cannot see their way to offer an opinion upon the 
merits or demerits of land offered to settlers or the price demanded, 
they are impelled to caution those who have under their consideration 
offers of this description not to make purchases without satisfying 
themselves on the following points'.50
It was sound advice because London was plagued by dubious and 
fraudulent South African land companies who misled prospective settlers 
about the quick and easy returns they could expect by farming in the 
Dominion. South Africa had become 'a land for large landlords', 
according to one commentator, a land where 'speculation is the greatest 
of all our industries', complained another.51 The companies which gave 
British and South African authorities constant trouble were those 
involved in irrigation and citriculture. For example, Letaba Orange 
Estates sought to entice soldier settlers and others to the Eastern 
Transvaal. But the region was notorious for malaria, blackwater fever 
and the dreaded tsetse fly.52 Zebediela Estates, another citrus 
venture in the same area, aroused governmental suspicions. Founded in 
1917, the company was suspected of using misleading advertising and 
making false claims about the scale of returns settlers could make in 
the first years of their investment. There was a host of smaller 
ventures scattered throughout the Transvaal and Eastern Cape promising 
an excellent lifestyle, easy returns and low risks. Most were unsound 
and unbusinesslike, aroused unending suspicion and soon disappeared with 
the 1920-22 depression.53
The problem became so acute in 1919 and 1920 that Amery kept in 
close contact with Mentz in an attempt to clarify the situation. The 
Colonial Office, concerned about the effect these swindlers were having 
on legitimate efforts to promote land settlement and agriculture in 
South Africa, wanted to know what measures the Department of Lands were 
implementing to counteract them.54 The reply was far from encouraging. 
Governor-General Buxton informed Amery that the hands of the South 
African authorities were tied because the necessary legislation did not 
exist to prevent these companies from operating. The government could 
not openly state that a specific scheme was a swindle as this laid the 
government open to libel charges and a great deal of bad and unwanted
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publicity. It was a feeble response to a growing problem which it was 
unwilling or unprepared to solve. Of equal importance was the lack of 
suitable Crown land in South Africa to enable the government to play a 
major role in land development. As long as the onus remained on private 
enterprise the South African government was content not to interfere.
But this was precisely the problem. The majority of these land selling 
companies were profit-making ventures. Because they were speculative 
investments they were rarely good settlement propositions.55
This did not mean that all private companies and projects were 
bogus. However, bad press generated by one or two scandals tainted the 
honest endeavours of others and were hard to put to rest. Buxton 
strongly recommended that the British government use the greatest 
caution when answering enquiries concerning South Africa, and make very 
clear to intending settlers not to purchase any land in South Africa 
without first examining it personally or obtaining recognised expert 
opinion.56 Similar instructions were issued by the South African High 
Commission. Nevertheless, complaints about misleading information and 
the purchase of worthless land continued to haunt South African 
immigration and settlement efforts throughout the 1920s.
Meanwhile the Department of Lands was coping as best it could with 
domestic soldier settlement. In August 1918 Mentz was told by his 
officials that the question of employment of returned soldiers was 
proving entirely unsatisfactory. By the end of September 531 South 
African veterans had been placed on approximately 860,000 acres valued 
at £331,000.57 Between 1918 and 1921 a plethora of grievances, demands 
and deputations requesting greater assistance for the returned man 
inundated the department. At the forefront was a variety of newly 
formed ex-servicemen's organisations who demanded a voice. They 
requested that a soldier representative be appointed to each provincial 
Land Board in order that the returned man receive a more sympathetic 
hearing. A number of local recruiting committees and returned soldiers' 
employment committees grew anxious about government policy. They 
complained that an increasing number of discharged ex-servicemen from 
the rural districts were drifting into the towns swelling the ranks of 
the unemployed. Most of them had been brought up on farms and were well 
versed in farming practices. Could not the government see fit to take 
immediate steps to help these men secure suitable employment in a land 
settlement scheme, thus relieving the burden on the towns?58
In 1920 pressure for assistance increased as the international
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depression began to bite. J. Sommerville, Under Secretary for Lands, 
was certain that his department would receive more applications for 
financial assistance from prospective soldier settlers than the budget 
allowed.59 In January 1921 the government acquiesced to demands by 
several veterans' organisations for a returned soldiers conference.
Smuts was eager to allay the fears of many ex-servicemen and reassure 
them that the government was doing its utmost to help the returned man. 
Pension scales topped the list of priorities and it was expected that 
their examination would take up most of the conference's time. But the 
Department of Lands was aware that land settlement would play a crucial 
part in the remaining time allocated. There was also the problem of the 
press. Department officials were subsequently advised to be 
'superlatively cautious', for if the position of the returned soldier 
with respect to land settlement was shown in 'too rosy a light' it would 
arouse Nationalist rebuke. The SAP was certainly not looking for 
another round of intense and acrimonious political wrangling involving 
soldier settlement and the poor white.60
The conference met in Johannesburg in May. Participants included 
representatives of a variety of ex-servicemen's organisations, regional 
advisory boards and government departments. Of the 130 resolutions 
passed, barely sixteen dealt with land settlement. As predicted, 
pension issues dominated the conference agenda. The major thrust of the 
settlement proposals however was veteran representation on the 
provincial Land Boards and the development of a national group 
settlement scheme.61 The government accepted the resolutions, but it 
was clear that as far as land settlement was concerned nothing was going 
to be done.
In 1919 enquiries from returned soldiers interested in land 
settlement averaged 100 per month. Of these 10Z were from men in the 
Witwatersrand area, 40Z from other urban areas, 30Z from the country and 
20Z from the various fronts and military hospitals in South Africa and 
overseas. The figures included a negligible amount from British ex- 
servicemen. The inquirers constituted three types: men with capital
and farming experience (largely ex-officers), men with experience but 
little or no capital, and men with neither experience nor capital.62 A 
large proportion of the returned soldier enquiries were from poor 
whites. This at least disproved the Nationalists' claim that soldiers 
were receiving preferential treatment when many soldiers had been poor 
whites prior to enlistment. Nevertheless, by March 1922 only 2,287, or
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21.51 of the applications received from South African soldiers, were 
settled under existing legislation. By February 1923 one-sixth had 
cancelled, surrendered or ceded their holdings.63 Ironically, South 
Africa received approximately three times more British ex-servicemen 
under the auspices of the British government's free passage scheme than 
it settled South African veterans under its settlement legislation. As
well, many embarked upon agriculture but by-passed the Dominion 
government, using their own resources or the facilities of the 1820 
Memorial Settlers' Association and private land companies. Nonetheless, 
of the Dominions, South Africa received the fewest number of British ex- 
servicemen and their families. Of the final total of 86,027 who 
participated in the imperial free passage scheme, South Africa received 
only 6,064 or 7Z.64
Private enterprise fared no better. In 1920 the Smartt Syndicate 
went public in an attempt to attract settlers to the estate and reap the 
benefit of a post-war boom in land prices. A tremendous amount of 
energy and investment capital was expended to prepare the estate for an 
expected rush. It never materialised. Thirteen soldier settlers 
eventually took possession of 775 acres of irrigable land. In 1925 one-
half abandoned their holdings and by 1930 not one soldier settler
remained.65
Fitzpatrick's Sundays River Settlement Scheme proved equally 
disappointing. In 1916 the project seemed financially sound with a 
share capital of £200,000. Both Haggard and the outspoken Director of 
Irrigation, F. E. Kanthack, strongly recommended it and firmly believed 
that it was one of the most promising land settlement schemes in the 
country - a showpiece of South African initiative and ingenuity.66 
Eager to push ahead during the war, Fitzpatrick endeavoured to enlist 
the weighty financial backing of the mining interests. Otto Beit and 
the Central Mining and Investment Corporation declined. Although he did 
not want to leave an old friend in the lurch, Beit was already committed 
to Smartt's venture. An additional reason, according to Beit, was the 
unreliability of Fitzpatrick's estimates and his expectations on the 
initial returns. Solly Joel, the mining magnate and owner of De Beers, 
was more encouraging. He intimated that De Beers was prepared to buy 
500 acres at £50 per acre in order to provide for the settlement of its 
employees who had joined the colours.67
Fitzpatrick had always expressed the need for action and planning 
to meet the expected rush of ex-service settlers once the war ended. In
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anticipation, he reserved 2,000 acres of prepared land for fruit growing 
in allotments ranging in size from ten to fifty acres and offered it to 
both South African and British ex-servicemen at a greatly reduced price. 
It was a sound strategy motivated by patriotism rather than profit, but 
the construction of new irrigation facilities was hopelessly behind 
schedule limiting the numbers of men who could be absorbed
immediately.68
_ »
The predicted flood of settlers never took place. By 1920 there
were sixty-five overseas settlers at Sundays River, but there is no 
indication of how many were ex-servicemen. In 1921-22, with the start 
of Britain's military retrenchment and naval disarmament programme, the 
original group was bolstered by an unspecified number of ex-officers, 
largely from the Royal Navy. They were a determined, articulate and 
highly organised group who worked closely with Fitzpatrick to promote 
Sundays River and encourage brother officers to immigrate from overseas. 
A naval settlers committee was formed in July 1922 and an option on 
1,000 acres was obtained from Fitzpatrick. Eager to promote land 
settlement and liaise with interested officers in Britain, the naval 
settlers committee proved a valuable adjunct to Fitzpatrick's efforts.
In late 1922, he applauded the formation of a complementary military 
settlers committee established to attract similarly redundant army 
officers to the valley. Unfortunately, it is impossible to estimate the 
number of ex-service settlers at Sundays River during this time.69
Problems continued to hamper Fitzpatrick's settlement work. The 
construction of a large Irrigation dam encountered delay and was not 
completed until 1922. Prosperity seemed assured, but the settlers had 
already experienced years of devastating drought. Even with the 
completion of Lake Mentz the drought persisted prolonging the settlers' 
suffering. Finally, in 1928 the irrigation facilities provided the 
settlers with the water they had been promised as early as 1918. But it 
was too little too late. In January 1923 the company had been forced 
into liquidation by the government who took control of the project.70
SECTION 5.3: SMUTS AND A BELATED ATTEMPT AT A POLICY
In January 1921 the South African government launched a publicity 
campaign in London to attract prospective agricultural settlers with a 
minimum of £1,000 capital. Why the apparent and sudden shift in policy?
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Its Implementation must be seen within the background of the merger 
between the Unionists and SAP the previous November and the general 
election scheduled for February 1921. Smuts, preoccupied with 
international events and policy making, had never paid much attention to 
the immigration issue. But with a critical election in the offing he 
realised that a positive move in this direction would earn him greater 
credibility with his new party allies and galvanise their support behind 
him. The publicity campaign's primary aim was to attract the attention 
of retiring officers who upon discharge were entitled to a substantial 
compensatory gratuity. Some leading Unionists were encouraged by 
Smuts's initiative and saw the publicity campaign as a step in the right 
direction and a sign of positive state intervention. Writing before the 
February election, Lionel Phillips, a former Unionist, was hopeful that 
a victory for Smuts was a victory for the immigration lobby. He was 
certain that Smuts would be more sympathetic, if not more forthcoming 
with active government assistance.71
The embarrassing picture painted by Kanthack and others certainly 
aroused the Union government to the state of affairs which existed in 
its London operation. Despite the disappointing news and the procedural 
problems, according to the High Commission, there was still a strong 
interest in Britain about agricultural opportunities in South Africa. 
There was a real possibility that South Africa could compete with its 
better organised Commonwealth cousins for specific types of settlers if 
it really wanted to. But Walton warned that, although public attention 
in Britain was 'rivetted' to the Union, the publicity campaign was 
useless in the absence of settler support which included immigrant 
reception facilities and training programmes.
A positive step was taken in May with the appointment to the High 
Commission of Dirk Boshoff, the former inspector of settlements with the 
Department of Lands, as a settlers' information, land and agricultural 
officer.72 The publicity campaign, however, was a limited success. It 
attracted a number of ex-officers with capital, the majority of whom 
wanted to pursue agriculture. Unfortunately for the government the 
overall numbers were small. In the first year of operation 244 men were 
encouraged to emigrate to South Africa bringing with them on average 
£6,000 each for a total of £1.6 million. By the end of March 1923, an 
unspecified number of settlers had taken approximately £4 million in 
investment capital to their new home. Boshoff, however, was far from 
satisfied. He argued that a great deal more could be accomplished if 'a
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bolder more progressive immigration policy were adopted...with better 
organisation in South Africa' J *  The lack of proper facilities to 
train and guide settlers in South Africa jeopardised the encouraging 
results being achieved in London. The situation was not helped by the 
persistent and harmful rumours about unscrupulous land companies. 
Boshoff also complained that he was continually hampered by poor and 
irregular supplies of settlement material.74
Boshoff's advice and pleas were ignored. When he returned to 
South Africa in January 1924 he pointed out that after two-and-a-half 
years he had sent out 1,000 British families to South Africa with an 
estimated capital reserve of £6 million. However, he was unsure of the 
consequences for South Africa. He noted that the government's minimum 
capital requirement introduced investors rather than farmers. The 
candidates may have had more than the £1,000 to £2,000 required, but 
they had little or no farming experience compared to those who had the 
experience but less capital. As far as he was concerned, the only 
organisation which was doing anything constructive for the settler was 
the 1820 Memorial Settlers' Association.75
SECTION 5.4: THE 1820 MEMORIAL SETTLERS' ASSOCIATION
The founding in 1920 of the 1820 Memorial Settlers' Association 
marked a new chapter in British immigration to South Africa. It was 
founded, in part, to commemorate the centenary of the landing of the 
3,500 British settlers at Algoa Bay in the Eastern Cape. The 
Association boasted that it could offer to those who had served during 
the war an opportunity of starting a new and productive life in a 
country which possessed vast agricultural, industrial and economic 
potential.76 Its real objective, however, was to restore British 
immigration to South Africa in an attempt to reinforce the English- 
speaking community. In that respect, it was an adjunct of Unionist 
party policy.
The first decade of the Association's history was spent catering 
to the half-pay officer and the British public school boy. It was a 
highly selective, socially exclusive policy and one which received its 
share of criticism. The Association attempted to attract men with 
capital 'represented either by money or training'.77 Preference was 
given to settlers who had already secured a rudimentary education in
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animal husbandry and agricultural science. However, the Association 
also clearly stipulated that single men were required to possess a 
minimum of £1,500 capital prior to emigrating and £2,000 was fixed for 
married men. These financial qualifications were above the minimum 
capital required by the government. According to the Association, a 
higher minimum requirement was necessary to ensure success. It 
certainly was a more realistic figure considering the enormous expense 
incurred by settlers in adapting to new environmental conditions and 
farming practices.78
The Association's major objectives were governmental and popular 
support, settlers of the ’right sort' and financial solvency. The most 
immediate problem facing the fledgling movement was to enlist support, 
and Sir Charles Crewe, the Association's first chairman between 1920 and 
1934, wasted no time. Within the first year he compiled an impressive 
list of honorary vice-presidents encompassing (with the exception of 
Hertzog's Nationalists) many within the mainstream of the political 
spectrum in South Africa.79 It was no surprise that Milner was offered 
and accepted the title of honorary president. Milner applauded Crewe's 
initiative but warned that the road ahead would be unyielding and the 
task a thankless one. *1 have no doubt', he told Crewe, ’British 
loyalists will have to continue to do all the work, and get few of the 
rewards. I am sure, by the way, that it is by your plan of quietly but 
steadily introducing men [of] good British blood that the position can 
alone be consolidated*,80
When Crewe solicited support from Merriman he revealed his intense 
desire to ’get together a really live body and get the ear of the 
Colonial Office' in London. This achievement would enable the 
Association ’not only to get... settlers but prevent exploitation by 
bogus [and] impossible schemes'.81 However, the Association would 
’rigidly abstain [from] embarking on any policy of land purchase for 
Settlement purposes'. Its primary concern was the scientific and 
’systematic introduction of the old strain of British blood on a scale 
which [would] ensure the predominance of the white race' in South 
Africa.82 Crewe, in extending an invitation to the OSC to attend the 
inaugural meeting of the London committee in August 1920, emphasised 
that the Association was ’neither political nor racial and presents an 
opportunity of assisting settlement in South Africa, which is not likely 
to occur again',83
The active participation in the Association of many former
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Milnerites and Unionist politicians from Smuts's English-speaking 
phalanx within the SAP after the party merger in November 1920, raised 
an additional problem. Although the Association's leaders stressed that 
their organisation was non-racial and apolitical these claims were 
dismissed by the Afrikaner community. Instead, Nationalists charged 
that the Association was indeed trying to contain the Afrikaner by 
promoting British immigration. In fact, some Unionists took a more 
defensive view. The only salvation for a British South Africa was the 
maintenance of the political status quo between the two white 
communities. A steady and constant flow of British immigrants to South 
Africa would ensure a numerical balance between the two white races.
Initially, the applicants were largely ex-officers who possessed 
some capital and were interested in farming. Many settlers in this 
class had possessed a farm prior to leaving the mother-country.84 But 
Smartt, the Minister of Agriculture, agreed with Sir Edgar Walton, a 
leading Unionist and Schreiner's successor as High Commissioner, that 
these same British officers held many misconceptions about farming in 
South Africa. They seemed ’to imagine that stepping out of the Army and 
onto a farm is an easy process, whereas it is one that requires
extremely close attention to nature and a good deal of hard work',85
Smartt argued that it would be better to have young experienced farmers 
with £600 than the inexperienced farmer with £1,500: ’Knowledge [and
experience with] farm life would be likely to do better than a man with 
four times the am[oun]t who might be inclined to imagine farming was a 
life of ease, enlivened by sounds of sport'.88
The highly selective policy of the Association contained important 
social overtones. The enormous supply of cheap black labour ensured 
that white agricultural labour could not compete on the same level. The 
emphasis was on the settler with capital who could establish himself as 
a gentleman farmer. At the same time an English farmer could not go to 
South Africa and ’think that he could simply walk around and leave all 
the dirty work to be done by natives', warned the Earl of Leven and
Melville, a member of the London executive.87 Phillips similarly
emphasised that discipline, respect, hard work and deference to one's 
place in society were vital qualities which had to be instilled into the 
native. Therefore it was essential to secure ’people of gentle breeding 
for the influence they [would] gradually exercise upon the native 
mind'.M
The maintenance of a social balance between the black and white
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races was believed to be essential for the Union's future social 
stability. The role of the native as the unskilled labourer and the 
dour, paternalistic white landowner as master remained a dominant theme 
in the social attitudes of the white South African farming community.
And baaskap was not an Afrikaner monopoly in light of the class of 
immigrant the Association was hoping to attract.89 However, the 
achievement of social stability also included striking a balance between 
the rural and urban communities. 'Domestic stability within the Union 
cannot be expected unless the normal unrest of industrial workers can be 
"ballasted" by a large stable agricultural population' preferably of 
Anglo-Saxon stock.90 This was the motive for the Association's 
determination to resettle British ex-officers in rural South Africa: 
social, racial and political stability.
Crewe's attempt to gain a sympathetic ear at the Colonial Office 
proved successful. Amery was delighted, welcomed the invitation and 
raised no objections for closer cooperation with the organisation. 
However, the Colonial Office made it clear that its participation would 
be in an advisory capacity only.91 Participation in an executive or 
administrative capacity was out of the question, as it contravened 
Colonial Office policy regarding voluntary agencies. The function of 
the Association as an 'honest broker' increased in importance, however, 
as it became clear to the Colonial Office that the political 
implications of British immigration to South Africa made it impossible 
for South Africa to participate officially in the imperial migration 
schemes which had caught the rest of the empire's imagination.92 This 
importance was not lost on South African authorities either.
The Association and the South African High Commission in London 
soon developed a harmonious and intimate working relationship. Part of 
the reason was the close personal friendship of Phillips, Schreiner and 
Walton and their commitment to sending the right type of settler to 
South Africa. Smartt, as Minister of Agriculture, provided an 
additional link in the network of influential and strategically placed 
personalities. He admitted that so far as the South African government 
was concerned, the Association was the most competent body to deal with 
prospective settlers. %[T]o have an organised body of disinterested 
people looking after settlers and seeing that they are not fleeced by 
designing speculators' was vital.93
The Association worked hard to maintain an untarnished reputation. 
The decision not to become involved in realty or land speculation was a
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conscious step designed to give the Association greater flexibility and 
influence within government circles. Its voluntary nature, integrity, 
emphasis on sound advice and assistance rather than booking fees, 
commissions and land sales, elevated it above official reproach. 
Enquiries received by the OSC concerning the standard of living in South 
Africa, employment prospects, agricultural potential and opportunities, 
and the cost of passages were either forwarded directly to the London 
executive or via the South African High Commission. Although the High 
Commission had the final word on the suitability of a settler and was 
responsible for screening and approving his application, the High 
Commission lacked the facilities to cope with large numbers of 
enquiries. Therefore, it resorted to sending information enquiries 
directly to the Association. Even when a more vigorous Union government 
policy was initiated in London in January 1921 the High Commission 
preferred to work closely with the Association because of its reputation 
and experience.
Such a privileged position, however, exposed the Association to 
ridicule and attack from several private South African land settlement 
and colonisation companies jealous of its status. Charges of 
favouritism were levelled by some companies who complained that the 
Association basked in the 'sunshine of official recognition' and used 
its privileged position to steer settlers away from those private 
operations it deemed unsafe.94 There was a grain of truth to these 
charges, but the Association had taken it upon itself to act as an 
immigration watch-dog. Complaints about misleading information and the 
purchase of worthless land continued to plague the Association's 
efforts. This prompted the Association to monitor closely the 
activities of these companies in London and their operations in South 
Africa to ensure that any complaints about one company did not damage 
the honest and competent work of others. Similarly, Phillips emphasised 
that settlers brought out under the auspices of the Association must be 
supervised closely during their probationary period.
In a movement of this kind considerable damage may result 
from reports spread by dissatisfied Settlers. To avert 
that, therefore, we must be active in enquiring into any 
complaints that arise, so that, if well-founded, we can see 
them remedied, and if not well-founded have the ammunition 
ready to scotch misrepresentations directly [as] they come 
to our notice.95
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It was obvious from the very beginning that the requisite capital 
stipulation would hinder the overall numbers wanting to go to South 
Africa. Phillips reported from London that his committee was being 
inundated with enquiries, but it was not easy to get applicants who met 
the financial conditions.96 Walton substantiated Phillips's claim that 
the Association would have no difficulty whatsoever getting large 
numbers of young ex-officer settlers if the monetary conditions were 
lowered. He informed Crewe that with the cutbacks in British military 
spending thousands of officers were being made redundant.
Unfortunately, according to Walton, the majority had little or no means 
of making a new start.97 Nevertheless, all three men agreed that to 
lower the financial conditions just as the depression was at its worst 
would be fatal to the settler and the Association.
India provided a partial solution. The British government, as 
part of its eco.nomy drive, decided to pare down its military commitment 
in India. The services of 2,400 Indian Army officers, the majority 
between the ages of twenty-three and twenty-eight, were to be terminated 
at the end of 1921. As very few would be absorbed into the Indian civil 
service, the India Office's attention was drawn to the immigration 
operations of the Association. It wanted to know the minimum capital 
requirement as most of the officers were likely to receive compensatory 
gratuities of between £1,000 and £2,000. It also tried to impress upon 
all the Dominions the urgency of the situation and advised them to open 
temporary offices in Bombay to disseminate reliable farming information. 
Walton was eager to act as he was certain that South Africa's rivals 
were already in the field. A shortage of funds prevented the South 
African government from establishing a Bombay office. In actual fact, 
it was a convenient excuse used by the South African authorities who 
really had no intention of participating.98 The Association were of a 
different mind.
Phillips was confident that there were a good number of ex­
officers in India eager to settle in South Africa. He told Crewe that 
the 'military officer who goes to India is as a rule a very serious type 
of man and is likely to make an excellent settler'." They most 
certainly had the experience necessary to deal with the native and were 
seasoned to a range of hostile climates similar to South Africa's.
Crewe needed no convincing. At the Indian government's invitation he 
despatched in December 1921 Colonel G. Morris, the Association's general 
manager and secretary, who received the full cooperation of both the
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Indian military and civilian authorities.100
Morris succeeded in establishing temporary offices in Delhi and 
Simla but it is unclear how many ex-Indian officers and civil servants 
actually emigrated to South Africa under the advice of the Association. 
It is also unclear how long the Association kept its India operations 
alive. A liberal estimate puts it at no more than four years as the 
numbers of ex-officers dried up by 1925. The Association certainly 
competed against several Australian interests for military settlers.
And it was not the only South African interest operating in India. As 
early as 1916, Fitzpatrick had combined settlement work with business 
during visits to the sub-continent.101
The Association's ability to attract settlers was based indirectly 
on its ability to raise funds. Crewe's threefold financial strategy was 
based on the necessity to get as broad a basis of support as possible 
from which he could tap the required operating capital of £250,000.
Large corporations and trust companies in Britain and South Africa were 
approached for large contributions. One hundred leading individuals and
middle ranking firms were also solicited for funds. The remainder was
sought in the form of donations, subscriptions and memberships from 
businessmen, farmers and others interested in promoting British 
immigration to, and land settlement in, South Africa. Crewe was 
confident, despite the onset of the depression, that the financial 
target would be made. And he assured Phillips that active and vital 
support from the English-speaking South African farming community was 
ensuring a constant supply of funds.102
Phillips agreed that it was critical to establish an adequate 
annual income but he was hesitant about Crewe's cheery financial 
forecast. He was acutely aware that the Association derived its funds 
from those who were ardent supporters of empire. 'It is only a question
of enthusiasm on the part of those of us who are fostering this movement
for it to grow in importance'. The success of the Association depended 
as much on organisation as it did on rallying, combining and tapping 
these patriotic sources simply for money.103 The determined Crewe 
seemed to ignore this sound advice and confided to Lady Violet Milner 
that so far as he was concerned, ’the money part is not difficult, the 
propaganda is what is most needed'.10* An energetic and well 
orchestrated publicity campaign would attract the necessary financial 
and popular support. Phillips strongly disagreed. ’The times are 
unpropitious for getting large donations', he cautioned in 1923, as it
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was 'quite fruitless' to try and get money in England. The bleak 
domestic economic picture after the depression set in during 1920 meant 
that 'purse strings [were] tightly laced and knotted'.105 His 
warnings proved correct. Efforts to raise money and keep the London 
committee operating became desperate. Crewe monitored the situation 
closely and was prepared to dip into the Cape Town area funds if 
required. Nonetheless, the situation remained acute over the summer.
In addition, the London executive experienced organisational problems 
which were affecting its performance. A complete reorganisation was 
needed.106
SECTION 5.5: A NEW ALLIANCE
The persistent shortage of operating capital in London was solved 
in August 1923. Under the terms of the Empire Settlement Act of 1922, 
enacted to promote and assist British emigration within the empire, the 
British government was entitled to negotiate settlement agreements with 
both public and private bodies. As a result, Crewe negotiated an 
agreement with the British government whereby a capitation grant of £10 
per settler, or per head of household in the case of families, would be 
paid to the Association. Payments were spread over two years. The 
entire scheme was to be administered for five years and was not to 
exceed £10,000 per annum. The London executive was convinced that this 
grant would enable them to meet their operating expenses and maintain an 
active propaganda campaign to attract more settlers. Quite simply, more 
settlers meant more grant money. Provided that the Association could 
find the settlers, it now had a guaranteed supply of money to prime the 
propaganda pump.107
Supplementary agreements were signed over the next three years.
In August 1925 the grant was increased to £16 although the Association 
asked for £20. In May 1926 the instalments were made yearly rather than 
quarterly. In order to enhance responsible financial management, the 
Treasury insisted that the Association provide up-to-date statements of 
expenditure. The Treasury considered the Association a responsible 
organisation but at the same time it disliked its slow and somewhat 
backward annual accounts procedure. With the annual call for money 
after 1923 the Treasury began to question more seriously the London 
executive's financial practices and acumen. By 1926 one Treasury
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official saw the agreements as simply a stop-gap measure employed by the 
Association to solve its ever worsening cash flow problem. The Colonial 
Office was quick to point out, however, that the Association had spent 
£70,000 in the promotion of British settlement between 1920 and 1926 
whereas the British government had contributed to the Association a mere 
£2,500 in subsidy grants. It was therefore inadvisable to quibble about 
procedure. The Treasury relented, agreeing with the Colonial Office 
that the task being met by the Association was, politically speaking, 
one of the most important in the empire.108
However, declining numbers of settlers forced a re-negotiation of 
the capitation grant in 1928. The British government decided to return 
to the 1923 sum of £10 and payments were spread over a three-year 
period. The Association complained that the reduction would seriously 
affect their London operations. As a concession, the British government 
agreed to contribute half the London executive's administrative costs 
including publicity, but placed a ceiling of £2,500 per year.109 The 
Association seemed finally to have found firm financial ground.
The British government's involvement went further than funding the 
Association's London operation and demonstrates its commitment to 
promoting British immigration to South Africa. During the 1923 Imperial 
Economic Conference preliminary negotiations between British and South 
African representatives were initiated regarding the settlement of 1,500 
British public school boys in South Africa. The British government 
would provide advances of £300 per settler to a maximum of 500 boys a 
year for three years. The advances were aimed at helping prospective 
settlers who did not meet the South African government's initial capital 
requirement but did have between £500 and £1,500. Candidates had to pay 
their own passage. Once in South Africa they had to enrol at one of the 
government's agricultural training schools and provide for their own 
tuition and upkeep. Upon completion of their training they were 
eligible for additional grants from the South African government. Under 
existing legislation, grants were provided amounting to four-fifths the 
purchase price of land together with certain advances on stock and 
equipment purchases. Debt losses would be shared by both governments. 
Interest was not to exceed 5X with repayments scheduled over a period of 
thirty to forty years. Settler selection was to be arranged by the 
South African government through the Association in London.110
Surprisingly, the Treasury kept relatively quiet apart from their 
usual questions concerning margins of security. The Treasury official,
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Sir Otto Niemeyer, argued that because the subsidy would not affect the 
general flow of British migration to South Africa it was better to 
endorse the scheme. For him, it was the less expensive option. To 
create a disturbance at the conference over a small and seemingly 
innocuous subsidy might alert the other Dominions to demand even greater 
settler subsidies and that had to be prevented. Neville Chamberlain, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, concurred.111 Bankes Amery, the OSC's 
financial officer, urged his Colonial Office and Treasury colleagues to 
deal generously with the South Africans and not adhere too closely to 
the ordinary financial guidelines. The value of British settlers in 
South Africa was of much greater importance to the empire 'and...we 
should be cheerfully prepared to face possible losses in some cases in 
the general interests of introducing men of the right sort into South 
Africa'.112 Throughout November and December 1923 the proposals were 
redrafted and refined, but Smuts refused to sign any formal agreement. 
The problem remained the political sensitivity of the issue. He 
suggested that an exchange of letters between the two governments was 
more convenient, would avoid publicity and Nationalist reproach. Such a 
procedure was legal and equally binding under the provisions of the 
Empire Settlement Act. The Colonial Office was sympathetic and saw no 
objection to the procedure.113
Crewe, however, was disappointed and worried. He pointed out to 
H. Handcock, secretary of the London executive, that a formal agreement 
would have bound successive South African governments to honour the 
scheme. Despite the political fracas that would no doubt ensue, the 
formal agreement would have given settlement in South Africa the long­
term financial stability it so badly needed. An exchange of letters 
would be binding only with Smuts's administration. Under the present 
agreement the danger was that if after the Association accepted the 
settlers, the government changed and the subsidies were not forthcoming, 
the settlers would suffer and the Association would be held responsible. 
Crewe was anxious to avoid such a situation because it held the 
potential of damaging irretrievably British settlement in South 
Africa.11*
Although the Treasury succumbed to the idea that an exchange of 
letters, was acceptable, Prime Minister Baldwin's defeat by Ramsay 
MacDonald and the Labour Party in January 1924, and Smuts's electoral 
defeat five months later, left everything in limbo. The importance of 
this episode was threefold. First, the negotiations demonstrated both
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the delicacy and the awkwardness with which South African domestic 
politics complicated the immigration and settlement issues. Secondly, 
it demonstrated how far the Colonial Office was prepared to go to 
accommodate and promote British immigration to and land settlement in 
South Africa. Finally, it highlighted and reinforced the central 
position occupied by the Association as the broker between the two 
governments which had important ramifications for the rest of the 
decade.
When Baldwin returned to power in November 1924 the question of 
settler advances was refloated. Hertzog's election made it impossible 
for the British government to strike any kind of agreement with the 
South African government. What if the settler advances were distributed 
through the Association rather than official channels? There was no 
problem using this approach under the terms of the Empire Settlement Act 
because the British government could cooperate with both public and 
private bodies to promote emigration. The entire administrative 
procedure and the security on the loans would be the sole responsibility 
of the Association. The Treasury raised no objections, but in the 
interests of financial security it insisted that a third party be 
installed as the financial agent through which settler advances were 
distributed. This guaranteed better management, improved channels of 
communication and above all protected British interests.115
An agreement was struck in August 1925 between the British 
government, the Association and the Standard Bank of South Africa. Each 
settler was entitled to advances to a maximum of £600 to be repaid over 
a fifteen year period at the market rate of interest. The advances were 
to be used to purchase land, buildings, stock, furniture and equipment. 
The Standard Bank acted as the lending agency through which the money 
was exchanged between the Association and the British government. To 
ensure that the money was being spent properly the bank had to provide 
detailed quarterly financial statements to the OSC. In turn, the 
Association was obliged to present statements of account detailing items 
of expenditure. The scheme was to run for ten years and expenditure was 
not to exceed the aggregate sum of £200,000.116
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SECTION 5.6: THE ELECTION OF THE FACT GOVERNMENT
The year 1924 was crucial for the Association's immigration and 
settlement strategy. As we have seen, the depression had made fund 
raising a difficult task for many local and several area branches.
Funds were also drying up in Britain as were the numbers of prospective 
settlers who could meet the £1,500 capital requirement. Reorganisation, 
therefore, became a priority with the Association at the end of 1924. 
Similarly, a large number of settlers were finding farming conditions 
much more of a challenge than anticipated and lodged complaints with the 
South African government about the high prices charged for land, stock 
and implements. The Association had always been aware of this dilemma 
and recognised that part of the problem was that many settlers lacked 
proper training and supervision. The government had offered positions 
on its agricultural training farms but the vacancies were few.117 The 
Association decided that the establishment of several training farms, 
sponsored and administered under its authority, would not only alleviate 
the present situation but would go a long way to increasing and 
maintaining the flow of settlers. It proved to be an imaginative but a 
fatally expensive departure.
Of greater significance, however, was Smuts's defeat by Hertzog's 
Nationalists and their coalition or pact partners, the South African 
Labour Party, in June 1924. Smuts had proven ineffective in combatting 
the problems brought about by the post-war depression. While 
unemployment and poor whiteism had grown at a phenomenal rate he 
launched his campaign aimed at accomplishing three objectives. Topping 
the list was the increased use of the country's natural resources 
through a greater utilisation of its agricultural potential. The 
introduction of European settlers and the improvement of the condition 
of the poor whites completed the election platform. These were sound 
objectives but the conditions required for their achievement were 
lacking. Depressed markets for primary produce, low prices and a three- 
year drought had certainly not helped farmers. Money was needed to 
educate and assist the poor white, but local authorities were hard 
pressed to meet their commitments. Unemployment was so severe that many 
South Africans were leaving the country to find work. In the 
circumstances what chance did an immigrant have of finding a job?11®
Smuts's electoral agenda, in particular his immigration policy,
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exposed him to violent Nationalist and Labour attacks and strengthened 
their cries for a domestic resettlement policy. But the greatest single 
event which led to his defeat was his mishandling of the Rand strike of 
1922. Smuts used extremely repressive methods to quash the miners 
strike which associated him with big business. It was this association 
and the government's poor economic record which the opposition used with 
great effect.119 Almost immediately, the SAP defeat cast immigration 
in a wholly pessimistic light.
The political situation in South Africa between 1925 and 1928 
deterred many British immigrants from making the Dominion their home. 
When Hertzog came to power elements within the British government and 
their English-speaking allies in South Africa feared that the 
Nationalists intended to declare South Africa a republic and secede from 
the empire.120 Whether he intended to take South Africa out of the 
empire or was in a position to do so remains a matter for 
conjecture.121 Nevertheless, Hertzog was determined at the 
forthcoming Imperial conference in late 1926 to hammer out an agreement 
which clearly defined Dominion status thus eliminating the frustrating 
ambiguity about the Dominions' international standing.
Meanwhile, the controversy that burst open the old racial wounds 
between English and Afrikaner was the Nationality and Flag Bill first 
tabled in May 1926. The controversy centred upon the Union government's 
proposal to adopt a flag that contained neither the Union Jack nor the 
former republican colours. An enormous row ensued as the Opposition 
immediately concluded that this implied secession. The matter was 
deferred until 1927. When re-introduced the feathers flew once more. A 
compromise was eventually reached after private talks between Smuts and 
Hertzog whereby both the old flags would be incorporated into the new 
one.122 But the damage had been done. The issue had rekindled the 
fires of race patriotism at a critical time when the Association was 
desperately trying to reorganise its resources and tap new sources of 
British immigrants.
The Colonial Office was convinced that any negotiations concerning 
South African settlement schemes and settler subsidies would be held in 
abeyance for the time being. For the moment it was Africa for the 
Afrikaner, the Colonial Office being warned that it should not expect 
sympathy or assistance from the new government in immigration matters.
In the meantime the only hope was for the Colonial Office to continue 
working through the Association until Smuts regained power.123
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For Crewe and his associates it seemed that their worst fears had 
been realised. The poor white problem would receive Hertzog's undivided 
attention to the further detriment of the immigration cause in South 
Africa. Phillips, however, struck a note of cautious optimism.
I quite understand that the Nationalist Government, for 
political reasons of its own, is not inclined to take a very 
open attitude regarding the encouragement of British 
settlers. At the same time, it cannot be oblivious to the 
danger to white civilisation in South Africa unless the 
stream of white emigration can be strengthened. Moreover, 
the Nationalist Government cannot be blind to the folly of 
attempting to re-establish the "poor whites" on the land, 
though they must, of course, for political purposes advocate 
and perhaps support schemes with the object in view, even 
with their tongues in their cheeks! But, unless they are 
very ill-informed, they must also know...that it is the 
active Englishmen and the up-to-date European who have done 
the development up to now and in whom the hope of the future 
lies. It is of course very difficult for any of us to gauge 
the true mentality of the Boer: it is right to say that he
has really no confirmed convictions and pursues a day to day 
policy according to the expediency of the moment.12*
Undaunted, Crewe battled on. He set about reorganising and 
reinvigorating the Transvaal, Natal and London executives. He reported 
to Lady Milner that the settlement work was progressing 'swimmingly' 
despite the Pact government's legislation to facilitate the 
rehabilitation of the poor white. And he praised her involvement in the 
Association and the wonderful work her sub-committee in London was 
accomplishing. ’[AJt last there is real life in the work in 
London' .125
Both Crewe and the British government remained unconvinced of the 
Pact government's sincerity to help the overseas immigrant as outlined 
in the Land Settlement Laws Further Amendment Bill of 1925. The Earl of 
Athlone, the newly appointed Governor-General, reported to the Colonial 
Office that the legislation at first glance appeared to indicate that 
the Nationalists were no longer opposed to immigration from overseas. 
However this was not the case. The legislation was introduced to 
’facilitate the rehabilitation of the 'poor white' on the land which the 
government hold to be the true solution of that problem'.126 Crewe's 
appraisal was more blunt: 'Hertzog is struggling [and] he knows that
putting the poor whites back on the land is no real solution of that 
question, they won't make farmers in the days of competition, but he 
does it for political reasons'.127
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Crewe's assessment was correct. The new South African government 
had no intention of embarking upon an intensive immigration policy in 
Europe. 'As state-aided immigration has never formed part of our 
policy', stated C. I. Pienaar, South African Commissioner for Commerce 
in Milan, 'I presume there is no intention on the part of the state to 
undertake any intensive immigration campaign'.128 There was not.
Also, the close working relationship between the Association and the 
High Commission in London suddenly but not unexpectedly came to an end 
upon Walton's resignation as High Commissioner in 1925. He was replaced 
by the aggressive Nationalist, J. S. Smit. The London executive was 
prepared to cooperate with the new High Commissioner, but Crewe was 
adamant that it was better not to have any contact with him whatsoever. 
Quite simply, he did not trust Smit or his new personnel. Neither did 
R. A. Blankenburg, a long-serving member of the High Commission staff 
and an important link between the High Commission and the Association. 
Becoming a.t\r\t>y*£with the office under Smit, he resigned in early 
1926.129
However, the Association still had a friend in Amery who had 
returned as Colonial Secretary in Baldwin's Conservative government in 
November 1924. Although concerned about the new outlook in South Africa 
and its bearing on the Association, he remained 'cautiously optimistic' 
about British immigration to South Africa.130 Above all, he was 
determined to advance the cause of British immigration to South Africa 
through the machinery of the Empire Settlement Act. He praised the 
Association's settlement work as the 'most hopeful thing being done in 
South Africa at this moment'.131
SECTION 5.7: TRAINING THE YEOMAN FARMER
The idea that the Association establish its own training farm 
received a great deal of support within its executive throughout 1924. 
The decision to do so was taken for a variety of reasons. When the 
Association was first conceived the executive decided that it was easier 
and cheaper for the settler to train with experienced local farmers.
The government agricultural colleges and training farms were too small 
and inadequate to handle the numbers contemplated by the Association. A 
list of 600 farmers prepared to assist the Association was quickly 
compiled, but in June 1925 Crewe reported that the few remaining offers
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would be filled by the end of the year. A more permanent facility such 
as a training farm managed and financed by the Association was needed.
Closely interwoven with the need for a training farm was the 
serious problem that the Association's pool of settlers was drying up. 
Between 1921 and 1924 the largest number of its settlers were drawn from 
the wealthier sections of the ex-officer class. By 1925 this source was 
exhausted and a new one had to be found. Young men from well-to-do 
British families provided a possible solution. Crewe had been thinking 
about this for some time and the failure of the public schoolboy scheme 
in 1923-24 may have been a contributory factor in the decision to start 
a training farm. These young men possessed the same social values, 
educational requirements, and to a limited extent, similar financial 
resources as the ex-officers. However, they lacked agricultural 
experience and discipline.
Plans were drafted in 1925 for the creation of a training farm at 
Tarka Bridge near Cradock in the Eastern Cape. The farm would cater to 
the settler who possessed £800 and would rely heavily upon the British 
public school element. Once established *we shall be able to deal more 
easily with the younger people who have not arrived at that stage of 
commonsense which is necessary if one is to begin farming, and who 
require a little discipline'.132 The farm would not only provide 
valuable experience and tuition in South African farming methods, but 
more importantly it would build character, foster discipline and develop 
an appreciation for hard work. Smartt applauded the move and agreed 
that these attributes were vital for young yeoman farmers, particularly 
those drawn from a milieu given to a life of sport and leisure. They 
would have to learn to work hard and not leave everything to the native 
servants if they expected to make a success. To ensure this no native 
labour was employed.133
In 1925 the Association purchased Tarka Bridge for £6,500 and 
negotiated a second property in the Northern Transvaal. Eager to 
attract subsidisation from the Imperial government, Crewe proposed in 
May 1925 that it cooperate with the Association on a pound for pound 
basis and bear half the cost of the equipment to a maximum of £3,000 for 
both farms. The Colonial Office was receptive and in July an agreement 
was struck between the two parties. The Association was responsible for 
the cost of upkeep, training and management. The settler paid only for 
his food and lodging while training, and the financial arrangements were 
exactly those outlined by Crewe in May.134
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Tarka Bridge began operation in January, but was not officially 
opened until March 1926. It was an immediate success. All training was 
of a practical nature, supplemented by lectures and demonstrations given 
by members of staff and officials from the Department of Agriculture. 
Instruction was given in dairy farming, pig, sheep and poultry rearing, 
horticulture, irrigation and general farm maintenance. But the farm was 
not just an instructional facility. It was a demonstration farm for the 
entire area. Each candidate remained in the training programme for at 
least one year before making his own start. Crewe boasted that the 
twelve, later twenty students, could easily be doubled and accommodated. 
By June the centre was full and in November Crewe expressed the need for 
expansion. 'Our future seems to me bound up in more [and] more 
accommodation for settlers at our training farms'.135
In the Transvaal the purchase and establishment in August 1926 of 
the Robian training farm north of Pretoria did not proceed as smoothly. 
Robian was intended to serve an equally challenging purpose. It was 
aimed at training the young, single, practical man of the yeoman farmer 
type who possessed £600 capital. The idea was to teach the new settlers 
techniques in irrigation and dry land farming. Each candidate was 
granted a lease of eighty to ninety acres which he had to work himself 
for one year under the supervision of the farm manager. The scheme was 
quickly abandoned as the candidates failed to adapt to the system. 
Instead, Robian reverted to the training methods practiced at Tarka 
Bridge.136 Another problem was money. The Transvaal committee had 
none, the outfitting of the farm proved expensive, only a handful of 
settlers were attracted to Robian; Crewe was unsure if the Association's 
bankers in the Transvaal would agree to additional financing to rectify 
the problem. Also, Crewe could no longer rely upon the generosity of 
Phillips and his financial connections at the Central Mining and 
Investment Corporation. Phillips had resigned as corporation chairman 
at the end of 1924, and Crewe complained that the new management's 
attitude toward the Association was lukewarm. In the end, the central 
executive took control of the Transvaal training farm at a cost of 
£5,000.137
Never content to stand still, Crewe wanted to establish a third 
training farm in Natal at Nels Rust south of Pietermaritzburg. But 
Natal proved equally troublesome. Its executive never had the energy or 
enthusiasm of the other area executives, and Crewe was constantly trying 
to reorganise and inject new energy into its membership. He had hoped
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to begin operations in 1926, however obligations at Tarka Bridge and the 
muddle in the Transvaal forced him to delay his plans until 1927.138
The expense of outfitting Tarka Bridge and Robian was seriously 
underestimated by the Association. A total of £12,000 was expended on 
equipment, forcing the Association to seek additional financial support 
from the Imperial government. The London executive was confident that 
the OSC would be amenable to its request. It was the Treasury that 
worried them. In September 1926 they approached the OSC for a revised 
agreement. The British government consented to pay half the cost of 
equipment for the three farms provided the total did not exceed £3,500 
per farm or £9,000 in all. The agreement was negotiated for two 
years.139 In 1928 the Association received additional funding from 
the British government. Arrangements were made whereby half of all the 
instructors' salaries were subsidised provided the cost did not exceed 
£1,700 per annum. This and the equipment subsidisation agreement 
remained in force in one form or another until World War II.140
The Association's ability to tap the British government for a 
variety of subsidies demonstrated the British government's commitment to 
bolster British immigration to South Africa. No other private 
immigration body in any Dominion experienced the degree and variety of 
funding enjoyed by the Association. As one Colonial Office official 
succinctly put it, *1 imagine that if it were not for the outstanding 
political importance of maintaining and increasing British settlement in 
South Africa, this Association would be no better off financially than 
any other'.141 There were serious problems, however.
Despite British generosity, the training farms were plagued by 
rising costs, declining numbers of settlers and poor management. 
Increased expenses and dwindling resources forced the Association to 
abandon plans of establishing a training farm in Natal. In October 1928 
Crewe reported to Lady Milner that losses of £3,000 per annum were being 
experienced at both Tarka Bridge and Robian. For example, it was 
costing more to feed the twenty to twenty-five trainees at Tarka Bridge 
than it was to feed the 110 students at the nearby grammar school in 
Grahamstown. Expenditure at Tarka Bridge was cut in half and the annual 
deficit at both farms slashed by £1,000 a year.142
Robian continued to run up a heavy deficit and in December 1930 
the Association closed it down. The persistent drought was one factor 
which led to the farm's closure. Consistently poor harvests and low 
returns failed to offset the farm's rising overhead costs. Declining
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numbers of interested settlers was another contributory factor. There 
were only six settlers at Robian during the 1928-29 fiscal year, which 
hardly justified the expenditure of thousands of pounds of capital which 
could be utilised elsewhere.1*3 The problem of attracting suitable 
settlers to the training farms was a costly and serious setback for the 
Association. When the idea of training facilities was first floated, 
Crewe was confident that the Association could train 200 settlers 
annually. This was an extremely optimistic target. At its peak the 
combined figure for the two farms was ninety-one trainees.1** The 
training farms proved to be a valiant but costly endeavour which despite 
British subsidisation drained the Association's limited financial 
resources. ’Work like this was very costly', confessed the Association 
in 1930, ’as training farms never paid'.1*5
The years 1927 and 1928 witnessed a slump in the number of British 
immigrants arriving in South Africa. A drought of unprecedented 
proportions was ravaging South Africa and the domestic political scene 
was in turmoil, ’which had the effect of turning the thoughts of 
intending settlers to other parts of the Empire'.1*6 The prime need 
was a determined publicity campaign designed to tap new sources of 
immigrants and counter the harmful effects of South Africa's turbulent 
political scene and persistent drought. Crewe made the appeal for an 
aggressive campaign during a visit to London in July 1927.1*7 In 
Britain, the Association relied on Geoffrey Dawson, a member of the 
London executive, former member of Milner's reconstruction government 
and editor of The Times. Reports of the Association's activities had 
been faithfully covered by this paper over the years and it was no 
trouble for Dawson to insert a favourable article or two describing its 
aims, achievements and objectives. In South Africa, Crewe laid more 
ambitious plans and in July 1929 the first edition of the Association's 
own magazine, The 1820. was released.1*8
The advertisements in Britain attracted a great number of 
enquiries but no substantial numbers of prospective settlers came 
forward. The campaign had fallen on deaf ears. Crewe informed Lady 
Milner in January 1929 that settler numbers were still declining through 
no fault of the London executive.1*9 The situation was becoming 
exasperating for Crewe. ’The most difficult work I have ever been 
engaged in is this job of settlement', he exclaimed to her. Numbers 
continued to decline stretching an already difficult financial 
situation. Crewe talked of resigning as chairman. His health was
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breaking down, no doubt attributable to the increasing strain of keeping 
the Association going during such difficult times. However, private 
matters kept him from embarking on his convalescence and he was 
reinstated as chairman until his resignation in 1934.150
SECTION 5.8: A FINAL ASSESSMENT
Despite the Association's valiant attempt to continue promoting 
British immigration, even the ever optimistic Crewe could not deny the 
effect the lack of funds, settlers and domestic government support were 
having on its work. The severe shortage of cheap accessible land, the 
priority received by the poor whites after 1924 and the perennial 
battles with shady land companies also continued to restrict 
settlement.151 From the political perspective the numbers game 
remained an important ideological principle in the race patriotism of 
Crewe and the Association. But as the 1920s progressed, revealing the 
political and economic realities which limited the number of British 
immigrants entering South Africa, they were forced to tone down the 
rhetoric. Instead, Crewe and his associates concentrated on the 
practical aspects of their policy such as publicity, fund raising, 
training, settler support and aftercare.
By the late 1920s, Crewe had resigned himself to the fact that 
numbers would be small, dictated by financial necessities and the class 
and type of settler it attempted to cultivate. The Association readily 
admitted that it could always do with more settlers but as they were not 
forthcoming it tried to hide behind the statement that quality was more 
important than quantity. But was it? The small numbers of settlers of 
the 'right type' were certainly not going to bring about the radical 
changes hoped for in the domestic political climate. By 1928, Crewe was 
forced to admit that the Association's efforts to maintain the British 
connection had not been as successful as originally anticipated. 
Nevertheless, he remained defiantly optimistic. The settlers were of 
'such a kind that character and push count for much more than numbers, 
and there is no doubt they are making their mark'.152 Maybe so, but 
it was large numbers of competent settlers that would have made a 
greater impact on the domestic scene, and they had not materialised.
The thick end of the wedge had splintered.
Rather than establishing an imperial yeomanry on the South African
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veldt, the Association had gone some way in creating an imperial gentry 
in rural South Africa. Nevertheless, the Association's achievements 
were noteworthy given the political environment. Between 1921 and 1930 
it introduced approximately 20% of the total number of British 
immigrants who arrived in South Africa during the same period. Of the 
5,414 British immigrants introduced since 1921, 4,810 still resided in 
the Union. Very few settlers failed, an achievement of which the 
Association was quite proud. Its failure rate was only 7.5Z, which was 
a tribute to its emphasis on thorough screening and settler aftercare. 
Indeed, the settlers were of a high standard and possessed an enormous 
amount of investment capital. More importantly, they were the type who 
distinguished the Association's efforts from the immigration policies of 
the other Dominions.153
It was the Association's highly selective, socially exclusive 
policy which prevented it from recruiting greater numbers of settlers. 
Politics aside, the abundance of cheap black labour and the demands 
inflicted upon agriculture by the region's climate and topography 
militated against South Africa being a favoured destination for the 
average British emigrant. The onslaught of the depression in the 1930s 
discouraged many British subjects from emigrating at all, thus making it 
equally difficult for any private body to promote the British connection 
anywhere in the empire. Plus there was the problem of farming on the 
veldt with its emphasis on substantial capital reserves.
Despite the Association's claim that it was non-racial and 
apolitical, its determination to introduce a large British element to 
counteract Afrikanerism smacked of Milnerism and British race 
patriotism. Many Afrikaners quite rightly distrusted the motives of the 
Association, and it was a foregone conclusion that when the Nationalists 
came to power the poor white would receive priority. Afrikaner race 
patriotism triumphed, eliminating the need for the Nationalists to 
attack British immigration as a tool of imperial interests. The 
unification of Afrikanerdom through the establishment of a coalition 
government between Smuts and Hertzog in March 1933 effectively ended any 
hope of promoting large-scale British immigration to South Africa.
Crewe for one certainly possessed no illusions as to the lack of support 
the Association had received from the authorities in South Africa. 
Irritated by the immigration rhetoric employed by both Smuts and Hertzog 
to woo the English vote, he exclaimed, 'as far as settlement was 
concerned It did not matter which Gov[ernmen]t was in office for I had
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had no serious help from either! Smuts now talks about a strong 
immigration policy when he gets back to power, but he won't do anything. 
Plus q.a change plus c'est la meme chose'.15* Perhaps the final 
testament belongs to Patrick Duncan. Writing to Lady Selborne he 
described a disheartening but all too common occurrence in Cape Town:
'I look out of the window at groups of English immigrants coming ashore 
from a ship just in, on its way to Australia....They pass our doors but 
do not stay here'.155
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CHAPTER SIX
AUSTRALIA: ENTHUSIASTIC BUT EXTRAVAGANT
During the inter-war period Australia was the Dominion to 
participate most enthusiastically in a host of high-minded imperial 
projects designed to reinforce the cultural and economic bonds of 
empire. This was certainly evident in the field of imperial migration. 
Australians were proud of their Anglo-Saxon ancestry, traditions and 
institutions. The ’White Australia' policy which barred 'coloured' 
immigration confirmed Australia's commitment to keep its racial heritage 
pure, vibrant and white. These Social-Darwinist attitudes were shared 
with varying degrees of intensity throughout the self-governing 
Dominions, but Australia clearly demonstrated the most aggressive 
stance.1
However, its eagerness to attract British immigrants disguised a 
turbulent domestic environment in which several sections of Australian 
society developed a growing hostility to all forms of immigration.
World War I widened divisions within Australian society along political, 
social and class lines. Politically, divisions were roughly drawn on a 
rural-urban axis between pastoral, nationalist conservatives and 
metropolitan, anti-war labourites. It is, however, dangerous to over­
simplify the demarcation of these political battle lines because rural 
conservatives shared some common ground with large and powerful urban 
anti-labour interests represented by big business, banking and industry. 
It was the conscription referenda of 1916 and 1917, however, which 
exposed and enhanced these deepening and increasingly bitter divisions; 
and it was conscription which introduced religion as a new and volatile 
component into the domestic fray.
Although most of Australia's working-class were British and 
Protestant in origin, questions were raised after 1915 concerning 
Australia's participation in the war, in particular the need for 
conscription, which the membership of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
vehemently opposed. As the war intensified opposition to it 
strengthened, especially among radicals and Catholics of Irish descent 
spurred by the Easter Uprising in Dublin in April 1916. Some Irish
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labourites began to increase their power and influence through the local 
machinery of several regional ALP districts such as Melbourne where 
there was a large Irish community. As a result, nationalists mistakenly 
but conveniently branded the labour movement as Catholic dominated, Sinn 
Fein in sympathy and therefore anti-British and unpatriotic. With the 
triumph of Bolshevism in Russia in 1917 nationalists easily equated the 
growing domestic industrial and social unrest with this dangerous 
international and apparently working-class malady. Bolshevism was 
quickly added to the nationalist^* list of anti-labour catchphrases and 
so far as they were concerned Catholics and Sinn Feiners were also 
Bolshevists.
When the war ended the issue of British immigration posed a 
problem for Australian labour. It conceded that Australia needed to 
look to Britain for immigrants, but it was cautious of supporting 
immigration while there was unemployment in the country. Immigration 
was useful so long as the employers did not use it to exploit Australian 
labour and the working-class. On the other hand, Irish labour activists 
denounced British immigration and protested against Australia's 
participation in any empire migration scheme. At the other end of the 
spectrum were the ultra-patriots led by reputable, middle-class British 
Protestants. They had enthusiastically supported the war, and when it 
ended, they looked forward to a massive influx of British immigrants who 
would simultaneously develop Australia's economic potential, shore up 
the domestic scene against Bolshevists, Catholics and Sinn Feiners, and 
reinforce the imperial link. Consequently, it is in this larger 
domestic context that Australian soldier settlement must be examined. 
Soldier settlement was not simply a patriotic policy designed to enhance 
national development and reward Australian manhood for its wartime 
sacrifices. Instead, it was a politically motivated policy used by the 
conservative and nationalist elements within Australian society to 
preserve their position vis-a-vis the new and increasingly militant 
forces of socialism.2
There are two other distinct but complementary issues, one 
economic and one constitutional, which need emphasising. The wartime 
wranglings between the Commonwealth and States over soldier settlement 
policy and its subsequent financial control marred and certainly impeded 
the ultimate objective of 'national development'. Constitutionally, the 
problem stemmed from the financial arrangements between the two levels 
of government. Prior to 1914 the Commonwealth was not a borrower of any
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size in the domestic or international money markets. Rather, it was the 
State treasuries which had the experience of raising capital overseas. 
However, with the advent of war the Commonwealth became a substantial 
borrower. This led to stiff competition for capital in a shrinking 
market between the federal and State levels during and immediately after 
the war. Rationalisation was needed to eliminate undue competition, but 
until 1930 the Commonwealth Treasury was nothing more than a glorified 
accounting house where the States queued for their annual grants. From 
1923, with the establishment of a voluntary Loan Council representing 
central and regional governments, the Commonwealth slowly began to 
assert itself. In 1928 the Loan Council became a statutory body and one 
year later it was in the position where it could impose its will and 
control borrowing for the entire country. The beginning of the 
depression in 1929 certainly helped the federal government to reinforce 
its position. However, it was not until 1942 that the Commonwealth 
finally attained financial supremacy. In the meantime, the Commonwealth 
and State governments continued to haggle and bicker over various 
aspects of finance and expenditure.3
But what was meant by 'national development'? It certainly did 
not refer to secondary industry and manufacturing. Instead, it referred 
to the development of Australia's seemingly limitless primary resources. 
Development meant land settlement, public works and immigration. 
Likewise, it reinforced the agrarian myth and rural society and ignored 
the areas where Australia's future wealth and prosperity truly lay.* 
Unlike Canada, there was no coordinated national plan for development 
because of the competition between the Commonwealth and the States for 
capital and their conflicting views of what national development 
entailed. Soldier settlement was a key component of Australian 
'national development' but because of inter-governmental rivalry and 
conflict throughout the 1920s it suffered from a lack of coordination 
and cooperation which left its indelible mark on Australian efforts to 
create a landed yeomanry.
SECTION 6: THE ANZAC LEGEND
'Our duty', proclaimed Senator E. D. Millen, Australia's Minister 
of Repatriation, ’is...to labour together and build, even upon the 
initial mistakes and apparent failure inevitable in a national
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undertaking of this magnitude, that in the final analysis our work shall 
be proven solvent, sound, and justified by its achievements'.5 The 
Australian experience of resettling ex-servicemen on the land after the 
World War I proved contrary to Millen's patriotic but misplaced 
optimism. In the final analysis, Australia's ’achievements' were a 
series of regional disasters whose overall failure plagued State and 
Commonwealth administrations throughout the inter-war period. What 
differentiated Australian efforts from those of her sister Dominions was 
the range, direction and variety of schemes undertaken.6
Land settlement had always been an integral part of the Australian 
experience and a necessary feature of State politics. According to one 
observer, soldier settlement ’was a policy which carried with it no 
implications that were either revolutionary or experimental. It simply 
meant that whereas the primary producers of the pre-war period were 
civilians, a large number of the primary producers of the post-war era 
would be civilians' who had served in the Australian Imperial Force 
(AIF). Soldier settlement was therefore not an innovation but simply a 
phase of Australian land settlement which was also one important aspect 
of Australia's repatriation programme.7 Generally speaking, this is 
true but it glosses over the social and political implications inherent 
in soldier settlement. It also ignores the imperial element: the
intended contribution of British ex-servicemen who settled in Australia, 
the role played by British capital which provided the financial basis of 
many soldier settlement projects and the utilisation of soldier 
settlement as a patriotic vehicle for ideas in social planning, economic 
regeneration and imperial solidarity.
Soldier settlement was seen as a national obligation, a patriotic 
gesture designed to demonstrate Australia's gratitude for the sacrifices 
her manhood had made in protecting individual freedom, international 
democracy and the empire. It was an emotional response sparked from a 
deep-seated sense of responsibility for the returned man. Furthermore, 
it was a constructive policy which would contribute to the continued 
economic prosperity and social well-being of both the individual and the 
state. Of central importance to this basic premise was the concept of 
the yeoman farmer and its relationship within the Australian agrarian 
myth.
The ideological basis of Australia's agrarian myth was two-fold 
and was firmly embedded in a neo-mercantilist doctrine which was 
rigorously endorsed during the 1920s under the banner ’Men, money and
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markets'. It was based on the exploitation and diversification of 
Australia's extensive and seemingly infinite land resources which, it 
was thought, could best be developed by small, independent farmers. 
Generated surpluses would be exported to Great Britain while the small 
farmer would provide a market for British manufactured goods.® 
Complementing the economic strand was the 'romantic, populist and 
arcadian idea that farming represented an idealistic way of life because 
it was 'close to nature', and was therefore in some way morally superior 
to urban industrial life'.9 In Australia's concept of rural arcadia 
the yeoman farmer was industrious, autonomous, dedicated and 
hardworking. He was the mainstay of society and his vocation was the 
life-blood of the nation. The maintenance of a large class of stalwart 
primary producers, it was believed, guaranteed Australia's economic, 
social, political, military and moral security because a healthy rural 
community ensured a vibrant and prosperous nation.10 The yeoman farmer 
was therefore both progenitor and protector of that legacy.
During the First World War a new legend and tradition emerged 
which not only paralleled the agrarian myth and the yeoman ideal but 
shared some of their common features. The 'Anzac' legend or ’digger' 
tradition was created during the unsuccessful Gallipoli campaign. For 
Australians, Gallipoli signified not just the first major test of its 
military prowess, but more importantly a coming of age. And by the end 
of the war it was assumed and believed by Australians that indeed 
Australia had achieved nationhood.11 The campaign created the Anzac 
*[o]ne of the most powerful and influential images in the [Australian] 
national consciousness'; one that was extremely important in moulding a 
distinctive national identity and character.12
What were the qualities of the Anzac myth? What were its origins? 
And how did they relate to the agrarian myth and the yeoman ideal? The 
Australian public saw the Anzac as 'tough and inventive, loyal to [his] 
mates beyond the call of duty, a bit undisciplined...chivalrous, 
gallant, sardonic'.13 Mateship, ‘that strange blend of individualism 
and interdependence', was an important quality which was reinforced time 
and time again under the stressful conditions of battle.14 But these 
attributes were not created at Anzac Cove. They were heightened and as 
a result ingrained deeper into the national character. Their roots 
extended from a truly Australian phenomenon which had been transformed 
into a myth in its own right - the tradition of the bush or 'outback'. 
Resourcefulness, initiative, perseverance, trustworthiness, manliness
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and mateship were values highly praised. Rekindled by the war this 
tradition and its values found fertile ground in the exploits of the 
Anzacs. For the Australian historian Geoffrey Serle, the Australian 
soldier or 'digger was only a new version of the bushmen'.15 
Conversely, these same attributes were contained in the yeoman ideal and 
had significant overtones for the soldier settler. For if the Anzac 
stereotype can be equated to a wartime version of the bushmen, then the 
soldier settler provides continuity between the pre-war concept of the 
yeoman ideal with the post-war concepts of the agrarian myth and the 
modern yeoman farmer.
The cross-fertilisation of the outback, yeoman and Anzac 
traditions had important political implications during the post-war era. 
Prior to 1914, the free thinking and self-sufficient yeoman symbolised 
stability, achievement and democracy. He was enshrined as the ideal 
Australian. During the war the digger became a role model because he 
too incorporated the best qualities of Australian character, manhood and 
citizenship. Once again, the soldier settler combined the ideals of the 
yeoman farmer with the Anzac tradition to become a symbol of post-war 
political stability. This was particularly important for the 
conservative elements of Australian society who wholeheartedly embraced 
soldier settlement because it was seen as a method of reinforcing 
Australian society against what they saw as the socially destructive 
forces of syndicalism, Bolshevism and militant trade unionism.16
SECTION 6.1: A DEBT OF HONOUR
In July 1915 the first casualties began arriving in Australia from 
Gallipoli, but the Commonwealth government had still to formulate a 
repatriation policy. Prime Minister Andrew Fisher, who was being 
attacked for the shabby reception of Australia's first group of 
returning heroes, was eager to make amends. At the end of July he 
announced his government's commitment to give returned ex-servicemen 
preference in government employment.17 By the beginning of August, the 
Commonwealth government produced a preliminary outline of a scheme to 
provide employment for returned servicemen. A Federal Parliamentary War 
Committee was established to supervise and coordinate work between the 
federal executive, the State governments, municipal authorities, 
commercial and industrial interests. A State Council would be set up in
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each State to liaise with the federal executive and the local 
authorities. The great fear was ’that a number of separately controlled 
organisations may spring up, and that confusion, inefficiency, and 
overlapping may result'.1® That the responsibility for the returned 
soldier was a national obligation which had to be met was obvious. More 
importantly, it was recognition that the state had to positively 
intervene in areas of social policy hitherto the realm of private 
initiative and philanthropy.
There was a more immediate political consideration, however, 
inextricably woven into Australia's war effort. As Marilyn Lake 
demonstrates in her recent study of soldier settlement in Victoria:
The discharged soldiers were highly visible in Australia's 
cities and if unemployed, destitute or in other ways 
seemingly ill used, became a hindrance to recruiting.
Australians relied on voluntary recruiting and from the 
beginning of the war, government spokesmen felt obliged to 
promise material rewards to prospective soldiers to entice 
them to enlist.19
As the slaughter in France stretched AIF manpower requirements, 
recruiters were faced with a daunting task. The need to maintain 
recruitment levels while at the same time mollify the returned soldier 
became a delicate political conundrum. Pension plans, promises of 
preferential treatment in employment and land settlement schemes were 
designed to solve the problem. The haste with which Australian 
administrators jumped at the idea of land settlement as a salvation to 
solving the recruitment problem was an emotional response to a problem 
that needed cool, calm and careful consideration. Recruits who went to 
the front believing that they would get farms under generous conditions 
after the war were being deceived by a government which had not properly 
examined the issue.20 At the same time the recruits were deceiving 
themselves, blinded by their patriotism and sense of duty.
In July 1915 Victoria and New South Wales announced that returned 
soldiers would be given preferential treatment under their respective 
Land Acts. However, New South Wales went one step further and outlined 
its intention to reserve special soldier settlement areas. The Governor 
of Western Australia, Major-General Sir Harry Barron, reported to the 
Colonial Office that immigration and especially soldier settlement were 
’receiving the serious consideration of the [State] Government'.21 
South Australia, which had been formulating a policy as early as June,
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announced its intentions in July too but warned that its chief obstacle 
would be to acquire enough land. Tasmania was slower to respond. 
Governor Sir William Macartney was informed by his ministers that the 
issue would be discussed at cabinet level once the Tasmanian 
Parliamentary War Council was constituted.22 Queensland, just as 
patriotic, was prepared to make definite arrangements assuming however 
that the Imperial government cooperated by providing railway facilities 
to serve land designated for soldier settlement. The Colonial Office 
was unsure if this meant building the railways or providing the capital. 
In any case, a non-committal answer was despatched to Queensland's Labor 
government.23
Meanwhile, the Federal Parliamentary War Committee slowly 
mobilised its administrative resources. At the end of August, J. C. 
Watson, a former Labor Prime Minister (April-August 1904), accepted the 
position as the committee's honorary organiser. On 17 September, Watson 
released a suggested plan of action which would ensure employment and 
land settlement opportunities for returned soldiers after the war. 'The 
problem of settling returned soldiers on the land', he explained, 'is, 
in the main, the problem of settling the moneyless man in a calling 
which requires capital, and presents some aspects of peculiar 
difficulty'. For example, apart from in Western Australia and 
Queensland, good and accessible Crown land suitable for settlement was 
in short supply. State War Councils would have to rely on purchasing 
privately owned land conveniently located to railway facilities. The 
scarcity and high prices of livestock complicated the matter, but Watson 
was cheerfully confident that these obstacles could be surmounted by 
enlisting the benevolence of the patriotic and public-spirited 
community.2*
What about the extension of the land settlement privileges to 
British ex-servicemen desirous of settling in Australia after the war? 
Preliminary indications were that nothing had been decided. South 
Australia reported that large areas of land were available for 
Australian and British ex-soldiers but for the time being no allowance 
could be made for British ex-servicemen until domestic requirements had 
been fulfilled. The New South Wales government concurred.25 
Queensland, on the other hand, had made its offer conditional on 
financial support from the Imperial Exchequer. Once again, Watson was 
confident that more land would be offered than was necessary to meet the 
requirements for Australian soldiers, and that the excess would be held
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at the disposal of discharged British ex-servicemen. ’Of these latter 
there is every reason to believe there will be a large number, and if 
they can be provided for they will represent a most desirable accession 
to the national strength of the Commonwealth',26
Haggard arrived in Australia at the beginning of April 1916, at 
exactly the moment Commonwealth and State officials were formulating a 
repatriation policy. Although all the States had promised concessions 
for returning soldiers in 1915 only South Australia had followed through 
on its earlier promises and formulated a somewhat limited policy. The 
remaining States proved very reluctant to initiate their own soldier 
settlement programmes. Premier John Scaddan of Western Australia 
dismissed State responsibility altogether believing that the initiative 
rested solely with the Commonwealth government. Apart from preferential 
treatment and a few minor concessions, at the beginning of 1916 there 
was no general scheme which gave form to the promises offered by the 
States in 1915. The difficulty was capital.
An essential pre-requisite was a financial plan of action which 
clearly delineated responsibility between the Commonwealth and State 
governments.27 In mid-February 1916 an interstate conference of 
Premiers and Ministers for Lands was convened in Melbourne to discuss 
the settlement of returned men on the land. A state of urgency shrouded 
the entire conference. Everyone concerned agreed that the necessary 
repatriation machinery had to be in place before the war ended so as to 
minimise social distress and economic dislocation. More significantly, 
an immediate and substantive policy had to be decided upon for certain 
social and political considerations. The Victorian government was 
especially apprehensive about the political implications of delay 
because of the harmful effects It could have on recruitment. As a 
result, it was important to ’settle and launch the scheme as soon as 
possible'. Watson stressed that in light of the recent and violent 
disturbances involving returned men in Melbourne it was crucial to get 
the returned soldiers away from the urban areas and on to the land at 
the earliest possible moment.28 He advocated this approach for several 
reasons. Labour was becoming increasingly restless and began to 
question seriously the extent of Australia's participation in the war. 
Conservative politicians feared that the growing number of returned men 
might be tempted to join forces with labour as a means of voicing their 
own grievances which in turn would effect recruitment and morale. 
Something had to done to prevent this situation from developing and to
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make the returned man an ally rather than a potential enemy of the 
state. As Marilyn Lake suggests, Australia was panicked into soldier 
settlement by the fear of 'cities... congested with idle men'.29
The conference eventually agreed on a general plan based on the 
recommendations laid down by Watson and a sub-committee of the Federal 
Parliamentary War Committee which had presented its report in mid- 
January. The Commonwealth and State governments pledged their 
cooperation in the promotion of soldier settlement, but the States 
remained hesitant and cautious about their role. It was made very clear 
that the provision of land rested solely with the States, therefore 
making them responsible for the administration and organisation of 
settlement policy. The Commonwealth provided the funds by means of 
loans to the States who advanced the money to the settler through their 
respective agricultural banks. Furthermore, to meet the special 
requirements of the soldier settler the States agreed to liberalise the 
conditions of repayment and charge reduced rates of interest. The 
establishment of training farms and settler qualification committees was 
stressed to ensure proper selection and screening of applicants.30
SECTION 6.2: BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF AUSTRALIAN RESPONSES 1916-20
Meanwhile, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, Governor-General of 
Australia, was asked to monitor Haggard's progress. Munro-Ferguson was 
sceptical of Australian land settlement schemes and the RCI initiative. 
When he first heard of Grey's imperial soldier settlement scheme he 
informed the Colonial Office that the situation in Australia was 
discouraging. The depressing feature was government incompetence to 
promote an effective and coordinated land utilisation policy. It was 
this indifference to inter-governmental cooperation, which according to 
Munro-Ferguson, 'discourages agriculture and concentrates upon wasteful 
and wild-cat projects all the available resources of the country - and 
renders labour the chief burden on the State instead of its main 
support'.31 The trade unions, he noted, had always been hostile toward 
immigration, white and coloured. Although some sections of Australian 
public opinion recognised the need to bolster the white population 
against the expanding Asian populations to the north, he believed 
Haggard's tour would aggravate trade union militancy against British 
immigration. *[T]he Unions control [immigration] Policy [which] is
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selfish, urban and short-sighted, arrogant, to an almost inconceivable 
degree. Haggard is quite likely to stir up this sleeping dog in the 
manger and bring this antagonism into organised activity'. Moreover, 
Munro-Ferguson placed little confidence in Haggard's abilities or 
usefulness.32
To the surprise and chagrin of Colonial Office officials in London 
and several British plenipotentiaries in Australia, Haggard's tour of 
Australia was a resounding success.33 Haggard knew how vital it was to 
score an initial success right from the start because he realised that 
if one of the wealthier States like Victoria refused assistance the 
others might be inclined to follow. There were anxious moments, 
especially in Labor controlled New South Wales and Queensland, but the 
tremendous popular enthusiasm which his speeches and mission generated 
made it very difficult for the States not to offer some concessions to 
British soldier settlers.34 'Thanks partly to Sir Rider Haggard who 
found public opinion on the turn', Munro-Ferguson informed Bonar Law, 
'there has been a change in public sentiment on the subject' of 
immigration.35 His timing had been critical. Haggard cabled the RCI 
from Adelaide in May that there ’is an open door throughout Australia 
for our ex-servicemen'. This endorsement was received at the Premiers' 
Conference, attended by Haggard, in which the participants resolved 'to 
treat...returned British soldiers in a manner similar to that in which 
returned Australian soldiers are treated'. Of course, the various 
promises of land and equal treatment for British soldier settlers would 
depend upon how the British government reacted to Australian generosity. 
'It is quite a toss up, with odds against', recorded Haggard, 'as the 
[British] Government or the permanent officials...are sure to be openly 
or secretly obstructive, unless distress and tumult force them to 
action'
The chief difficulty remained money. The States' attitude towards 
the Commonwealth's role as the financial arbiter was varied. Naturally, 
they were anxious to get as much out of the federal authorities as 
possible. W. Hutchinson, Victoria's Minister of Crown Lands and Survey, 
reminded his colleagues that to make land available railways would have 
to be built. He hinted that the Commonwealth should assist in building 
the necessary communications infrastructure if the States were to be 
Ie-F with organising and administering soldier settlement. The 
Assistant Treasurer for New South Wales, H. C. Hoyle, pointed out that 
buying land would involve considerable expenditure at a time when money
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markets were stagnant. If the money was obtained for soldier settlement 
it might prove impossible to get money for other public works projects. 
This rational approach to the problem was contrasted with the ’strangely 
confident' mood of Western Australia and Queensland who submitted 
expensive estimates and claimed that their ambitious projects could be 
fulfilled provided the money was available. W. D. Johnson, Minister of 
Lands and Agriculture for Western Australia, boasted that his state 
could easily settle 40,000 veterans. The difficulty, he saw, would be 
finding them.37
By mid-1916 the Commonwealth faced an ever increasing war debt.
The financial strain on the London money market was enormous forcing the 
British Exchequer to close the marketplace to small short-term borrowers 
such as the Australian States. The Imperial government now regarded the 
Commonwealth as the sole Australian borrower on the London market, which 
the State governments reluctantly agreed to the previous November. W.
G. Higgs, the Commonwealth Treasurer, reassured his State colleagues 
that the Australian government would try and raise money for public 
works on their behalf, but he warned that the markets were extremely 
tight.38 How then were the State governments going to honour their 
promises?
The Imperial government posed the same question. It recognised 
that the speed of land settlement was dictated by the States' ability to 
borrow money to facilitate road and railway construction. Colonial 
Office officials were convinced that the money supply would remain tight 
after the war limiting the scope of these projects. As far as they were 
concerned Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania were the only 
States to which substantial numbers of British ex-servicemen were likely 
to migrate because of a genuine desire on the part of those States to 
encourage their settlement.39 Moreover, snapped one permanent 
official, ’the Australians are too much inclined already to spend money 
and energy on public works which would be better devoted to carrying on 
the war'.40 But this was precisely the point which British authorities 
only partially recognised. As the war dragged on limiting the sources 
of capital available to the States it began to emerge that their support 
for soldier settlement was really an indirect means of getting 
development capital in wartime for a host of road, rail and irrigation 
schemes.
There were other reservations. Farming was a heartbreaking 
endeavour for most settlers and the idea of an inexperienced British
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soldier clearing his own farm, unaccustomed to the tedious, heavy manual 
labour and carrying an enormous long-term debt, made British officials 
doubt the practicality of the exercise.*1 Besides, the Colonial Office 
insisted on maintaining a wait-and-see attitude in 1916 vis-A-vis post­
war migration. 'We are still ignorant of what the post-war conditions 
will be, and whether it will be right to encourage or discourage 
emigration, or simply to pursue the neutral policy of the period before 
the war'.*2
The promise of a farm was a valuable recruiting tool in 1916. 
During the state election in New South Wales, Governor Sir Gerald 
Strickland observed that both political parties were cultivating the 
votes of the returned man. Although recruitment was up Strickland took 
exception to the expenditure involved in fulfilling the election 
promises: 'I have warned Ministers that ardour to win the General
Election should not be carried too far, and 1 have asked them to reflect 
on the financial consequences of their promises'.*3 For the remainder 
of 1916 the political situation centred on the conscription referendum 
and overshadowed all other issues in Australia. Soldier settlement 
therefore remained in limbo. Tasmania and New South Wales did pass 
legislation but the numbers of returned men eager to take up farming 
were small and usually unfit. Some States, particularly Queensland, 
Western Australia and Victoria, began to realise that financial aspects 
would dictate and govern a scheme's ultimate success. This was hammered 
home when the Commonwealth advances promised in February and May were 
not forthcoming because of the Commonwealth government's failure to 
raise the money in Britain.**
It was resolved at the Premiers' Conference of January 1917 that 
British veterans would be granted unconditionally the same soldier 
settlement facilities as Australians. The Commonwealth was prepared to 
advance a total of £2 million for soldier settlement in 1917 which 
comprised of an advance to the States of a grant to a maximum of £500 
per settler. The States complained that this figure was inadequate and 
wanted it raised to £700.*5 On the other hand, Munro-Ferguson 
questioned both the sincerity to put British soldier settlers on an 
equal footing and the reality behind the settlement projects open to 
British settlers. It was his belief that the general opinion in 
Australia was that it was not bound to provide the same terms for 
overseas immigrants. Repatriation would be a costly affair and Munro- 
Ferguson realised that the £10 million already earmarked for public
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works was inadequate for Australian veterans. It was also clear that 
the estimates for the settler advance were too low and would soon have 
to be raised. He concluded that such gloomy prospects did not inspire 
much confidence in Australia for prospective overseas candidates.46 
'One effect of the high cost of settlement', wrote the Governor-General, 
'will be that the British Tommy will not have a look in [and] that all 
hope of strengthening Australia by immigration is once more lost. It 
sometimes seems to me as if Australia were determined to commit Harri 
Kari',47
Problems associated with domestic demobilisation and repatriation 
absorbed the attention of both the Commonwealth and State governments 
between 1917 and 1920. As 1917 unfolded it became painfully obvious 
that soldier settlement would become ensnared in the perennial battle 
over States rights. The battle lines were drawn during the Premiers' 
Conference of January 1917. National defence was a Commonwealth matter 
and as such the Commonwealth was responsible for the recruitment, 
training and outfitting of Australia's troops. Naturally, this included 
their subsequent repatriation. Prime Minister Hughes reaffirmed this 
pledge to the returned soldier during the conference. But he attempted 
unsuccessfully to give the Commonwealth a more positive and constructive 
role in the formulation of a uniform soldier settlement policy which 
would guarantee equal treatment for the returned man nationwide. He 
argued that as long as the Commonwealth was required to find the money 
to pay for repatriation and soldier settlement it was entitled to know 
what measures the States were proposing to implement. He did not go as 
far as to demand that the Commonwealth should directly Intervene in 
State administration. Rather, he pleaded for some kind of central 
authority which would monitor and coordinate the various State 
activities.
Alarmed, the States interpreted Hughes's demands as a claim for 
control and would have none of it. They refused to be bullied by 
Hughes's financial strong-arm tactics. Land settlement was clearly a 
State responsibility and the Premiers ensured that it, and hence soldier 
settlement, remained separate from the general repatriation policy.4® 
Intolerant of Commonwealth interference, each State embarked on its own 
soldier settlement scheme. The result, according to the historical 
geographer J. M. Powell, 'was a bewildering variety of approaches in 
which the distinctive common ingredient was this jealously protected 
unequal alliance with the federal government'.49 Furthermore, the
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fragility of the alliance was intensified as the States, who regarded 
the Commonwealth as simply 'a mere lending machine', tried to squeeze 
the maximum amount of subsidy money from the federal partner.50
But Hughes was no fool. He clearly recognised that the 
Commonwealth's negotiating position vis-a-vis the States on inter- 
govemment financial matters had been substantially enhanced by 
Britain's decision to restrict the London money market to the 
Commonwealth for the duration of the war. Hughes was presented with an 
opportunity to bring the States into line and allow for greater central 
control in specific policy areas such as 'national development'. During 
the conference he re-emphasised the precariousness of Australia's 
financial situation, in particular the States' desire to continue their 
public works programmes. *1 should like to get this matter quite 
clear', he reminded his State counterparts, ’Our chances of getting 
money largely depend upon the extent of the facilities we will offer 
British soldiers to take up land in Australia' .51 The extension of 
soldier settlement privileges to British ex-servicemen therefore must 
not be seen simply as a patriotic gesture. Politically, it was a means 
by which the Commonwealth government could assert itself in the federal 
arena. More importantly, British ex-servicemen became a vehicle which 
allowed access to British capital.
Meanwhile, Munro-Ferguson was concerned that the Commonwealth 
government was unprepared to deal with the problems of repatriation. He 
was extremely doubtful that the Commonwealth could provide the resources 
for the contemplated resettlement of 40,000 Australian soldier settlers 
at an estimated cost of £60 million. And he was alarmed by Senator 
Millen's apparent nonchalant attitude towards the cost.52 The initial 
enthusiasm for resettling British ex-servicemen began to wane as well. 
South Australia, which was the first State to extend an invitation to 
British ex-servicemen and the first to initiate a soldier settlement 
policy, was the first to overturn its previous offer because of the 
difficulties it was having establishing its own returned men. It was 
forced to suspend its offer to British ex-servicemen until domestic 
arrangements were completed. Only Western Australia remained steadfast 
in its determination to assist British veterans but even here there was 
concern as to how expensive the invitation would prove to be and who 
would pay for it.53
William.Macartney, now Governor of Western Australia, advised the 
British government to treat post-war soldier settlement in Australia
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with 'great caution'. He warned that there were better chances, more 
opportunities and less risk for the small farmer in Britain than in 
Western Australia.54 Much of the land targeted for development was of 
inferior quality, heavily forested and required an enormous amount of 
capital and back breaking work to bring under cultivation. The optimum 
size of a farm which ensured the best possibility of success was 1,000 
acres. However, cost made this type of settlement impossible on a large 
scale and out of reach for the vast majority of British ex-servicemen.
He also discounted the enthusiastic claims made by Premier James 
Mitchell, himself a large and successful farmer, that mixed farming 
could be conducted by soldier settlers in the southwest on a profitable 
basis with holdings of just fifty acres. Macartney doubted the 
soundness of Mitchell's claims because of the cost, isolation and 
limited amount of suitable farm land in the region.55 On the other 
hand, men with capital could ’no doubt find plenty of land fit for 
cattle raising or sheep on a large scale but the small man would be 
beaten by the high cost of handling the great distances and the absence 
of local markets'. Labour costs and railway rates were high, 
exacerbated by a cumbersome, inflexible and irksome Lands 
administration. Without sheep or cattle rearing to ballast the farmer's 
revenue, agriculture was an enterprise Macartney advised British 
soldiers not to undertake in Western Australia. *At the present moment 
the position is very unsatisfactory and contains the elements of much 
future trouble'. Macartney therefore advised careful scrutiny of each 
proposed soldier settlement scheme before ex-Imperials were induced to 
come out.56
There was another problem, which according to Macartney and Sir H. 
L. Galway, Governor of South Australia, was just as serious and 
potentially more dangerous than extravagant State expenditure. It was 
the ’human' factor. ’The average returned soldier is not an easy 
individual to handle', wrote Galway.57 Macartney agreed. War service 
had definitely unsettled a large number of returned men which rendered 
them ’unfit or unwilling to resume what they now look upon as a very 
monotonous and dreary life, devoid of any excitement and also 
necessitating steady and continuous work'.58
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SECTION 6.3: THE RETURNED SERVICEMEN'S LEAGUE AND FREE PASSAGE
Rather than being a threat to the state, most returned soldiers 
were loyal, trustworthy defenders of the status quo. Although some 
returned soldiers proved to be an increasingly disruptive element in 
Australian society after 1915, the majority of veterans staunchly 
supported the Hughes government and its prosecution of the war. 
Represented by the influential Returned Soldiers' and Sailors' Imperial 
League of Australia (the national body established in 1916 out of the 
various state Returned Servicemen's Associations and better known as the 
Returned Servicemen's League or RSL) the returned soldier movement 
became an important ally of the government. The Commonwealth government 
realised it needed to maintain RSL support for its wartime policies 
because it realised the RSL's importance in furthering its repatriation 
programme. The government's willingness to recognise the RSL as the 
official representative body of returned soldiers, and the announcement 
in September 1917 that the government was prepared to offer it financial 
assistance, confirmed the RSL's role as chief arbiter between the 
Commonwealth and the vast majority of Australian ex-servicemen.59 As 
well, the RSL was under the direction of men of moderate views, it being 
primarily concerned with developing a reputation as a responsible, 
orderly, disciplined body. As a result, the political power and 
influence of the RSL grew steadily. And although the RSL made a 
conscious effort to remain apolitical, it exerted a powerful political 
influence during recruitment drives and for the "Yes" vote during the 
conscription referenda.
There was little indication of soldiers joining revolutionary 
Soldiers' and Workers' Councils. According to Sir F. A. Newdegate, 
Macartney's successor as Governor of Western Australia, ’[t]he root idea 
of the League is to combat "Bolshevism" and individually to put the same 
energy into the development of Australia as their service at the Front, 
and be a power for good in Australia' .60 Very few disputed the loyalty 
of the majority of the veterans. However, there were radical elements 
among the returned soldiery and within the RSL itself. Although 
essentially an organisation of the right, the government's recognition 
of the RSL as the official voice of the returned soldier was designed in 
part to keep it in line. The federal authorities also monitored the 
political activity of many returned soldiers, in particular, Labor's
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efforts to organise them. As industrial militancy spread in 1917 and 
class divisions widened Hughes's Nationalist government became 
increasingly worried about the loyalty of the returned man. The 
factionalism and disharmony among the returned soldiers in 1919 seemed 
to confirm the government's worst fears as some joined in support of 
striking trade unionists.61 However, most diggers were a force of law 
and order who would, if called upon, keep the peace during times of 
civil disobedience. Indeed, there were violent clashes involving 
returned soldiers representing right-wing nationalist opinion and 
militant trade unionists, the most serious occurring in 1918 and 1919. 
But the RSL worked hard to prevent violence, divert this energy into 
constructive not destructive channels and avoid embarrassing the 
government and itself.62
It was not until 1920 that the first wave of British ex-servicemen 
began arriving in Australia under the auspices of the Imperial 
government's free passage scheme. Throughout 1919 discussions between 
the OSC and Australian representatives focussed on passage rates, fare 
equalisation and shipping accommodation. Once the free passage scheme 
was in full swing the scarcity of shipping began to hamper severely 
Australian operations. Munro-Ferguson called upon the Colonial Office 
to discuss the problem with the Ministry of Shipping. The Australians 
were anxious that if the free passage scheme was terminated at the end 
of 1920 hardly any advantage would have accrued. Consequently, they put 
tremendous pressure on Amery to extend the scheme.63 It was Australian 
pressure in concert with British domestic considerations which gave 
Amery the leverage to make the Treasury agree to extend the scheme for 
another year. When it was terminated at the end of 1921, it was 
Australia that received the largest share of British ex-servicemen, 
their wives and families. Of the final total of 86,027, Australia 
received 37,576 or 43X.64
SECTION 6.4: COMMONWEALTH VERSUS STATES' RIGHTS
Australia proved the most energetic and yet at the same time the 
most frustrating Dominion with which the British government had to deal. 
Unlike Canada, Australia did not have a paternalistic and centralised 
immigration or land settlement administration. Furthermore, it failed 
to develop a national soldier settlement or economic development
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strategy. In London, both the Commonwealth and the States possessed 
their own individual immigration offices and conducted separate 
propaganda campaigns to attract prospective settlers. Lack of 
cooperation and coordination between the States and the Commonwealth led 
to fierce competition. Friction increased as wealthier States like New 
South Vales and Victoria offered larger inducements and enticed more 
immigrants to the detriment of their weaker, poorer and less organised 
rivals. The same was true within Australia itself. The lack of Inter- 
State cooperation and the unnecessary competition between the States and 
Commonwealth spoilt any chance of formulating a harmonious national land 
settlement policy.65
Attempts were made in 1920 to rationalise the selection process in 
London and the immigration procedure in general. At the Premiers' 
Conferences held in Melbourne in May and July, Prime Minister Hughes 
hammered out a series of proposals, approved by the State 
representatives and implemented by Millen during a trip to London later 
that year. The Commonwealth would have full control of immigration 
operations overseas which included administration and organisation of 
transport facilities. The Commonwealth also assumed full financial 
responsibility. The primary objective was to settle these immigrants on 
the land in large settlement projects with the backing of the Imperial 
government. The Australian Agents-General in London would form a 
consultive committee to coordinate efforts between the States and 
Commonwealth. Upon arrival in Australia the States assumed complete 
responsibility for the settlement and employment of the immigrants; the 
definite and detailed financial arrangements of which would be 
negotiated between State and Commonwealth authorities.66
The immigration agreement of 1920 was a victory for Hughes in his 
battle with the States over control of immigration policy. He followed 
up this success with another in 1921 when he succeeded in pressing for 
Commonwealth control of loan money in agreements negotiated between 
Australia and Britain under the Empire Settlement Act. Proponents of 
States' rights grew anxious as they feared that the relationship between 
immigration and farm settlement forged by Hughes was a ploy to gain 
control over land policy, which was strictly a State jurisdiction.67 
The incident harked back to Hughes's bullying tactics at the Premiers' 
Conference of 1916. These fears and anxieties increased as the 
Commonwealth and State governments became embroiled over the question of 
increased funding for the soldier settlement programme in 1920 and 1921.
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At the conference of Commonwealth and State ministers held In 
Melbourne in October-November 1921 the States were accused by Senator 
Millen of evading their responsibility to ordinary settlement which they 
had shouldered willingly prior to the war. ’They have been making it 
all soldier settlement, and looking to the Commonwealth for an undue 
proportion of the financial responsibility associated with it', he 
declared.68 This angered the Minister of Lands for New South Wales, P.
F. Lough1in, whose State was singled out by Millen as backward because 
it had fulfilled only 75% of its soldier settlement quota. Loughlin 
countered by stating that if the Commonwealth wanted to share in the 
control of soldier settlement policy it had to share some of the 
responsibility and not just simply act as the financial broker. Hughes 
tried to calm the troubled waters and stated that the Commonwealth did 
not want to 'poach on State preserves'. However,
...we want to have a fair and reasonable proposition from the 
States. We must guarantee that the money will be used for the 
purpose for which it is borrowed. The Commonwealth will borrow 
the money, and therefore the Commonwealth must have some system of 
joint control.69
The reason for Hughes's request was the mounting cost of soldier 
settlement. The original figure of £28 million agreed upon in 1916 to 
settle 21,000 veterans at £500 per soldier settler had risen to £35 
million and 23,000 men at £625 per man by 1919. During the 1920 
conference the subsidy was raised to £48 million to assist 36,000 
veterans at £1,000 each.
What of the British ex-servicemen? The news was not good.
Because of the increased expenditure Hughes announced that the 
Commonwealth would not now subsidise British ex-servicemen in Australian 
soldier settlement projects. He argued that it was unfair owing to the 
present financial uncertainties for these men to travel thousands of 
miles under promises that the Australian government could not fulfil. 
However, those men who had arrived or were coming under arrangements 
previously made would be treated under existing legislation. Millen 
reiterated this point in the Australian Senate in late 1921. The 
government's primary obligation was to meet the demand of Australian 
veterans. Until that obligation was fulfilled, warned Millen, Australia 
would be extremely cautious about making * indiscriminate promises even 
to our cousins from the Old Country' .70 What of the promise made to
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Haggard in 1916 asked Premier Lawson of Victoria? 'Fair and nebulous 
words, that is all', replied Millen.71 The onus therefore remained on 
the States to decide how many British ex-servicemen they wanted to 
assist.
As in Canada, Australians soon complained about the number of ex- 
Imperials who arrived physically unfit and unable to undertake 
employment of any kind. Reports emerged that several State authorities 
were not looking after the ex-Imperials as promised. 'So many of the 
men you have sent out are wandering the streets here workless and 
destitute', pleaded a representative of the Imperial Service Men's 
Association to the Colonial Office, 'that something ought to be 
done' J *  Some Australians began to wonder about the wisdom of the free 
passage scheme, and as the depression of 1920-22 deepened and 
unemployment rose steadily popular opposition to assisted immigrants, 
particularly in the trade union movement, hardened.
SECTION 6.5: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND SCANDAL IN VICTORIA
Assistance under the free passage scheme stopped at the end of 
1921, although people were allowed to sail up and until March 1923 
provided their applications had been submitted prior to the December 
1921 deadline. However, this did not stop British ex-servicemen from 
coming to Australia nor did it prevent them from participating in 
specific settlement schemes. There were two particularly scandalous 
schemes, one initiated by the private company Australian Farms Limited 
(AFL) and the other by the Victorian government. Settlers were enticed 
to a land which promised easy returns, bountiful harvests and some of 
the best supervision, settler support and aftercare possible. Instead, 
they found an ill-equipped company which had no idea of how to run a 
settlement operation. Even worse, they encountered an uncaring, 
uncooperative State government. The majority of settlers experienced 
years of hardship and deprivation. Despite the award of compensation 
for most participants in 1933, it was a hollow victory compared to the 
tragic circumstances these people had endured.
Headquartered in Melbourne and founded after the war, the AFL 
wanted to tap, what it thought, was an excellent type of settler— the 
public school man and the British ex-officer with limited capital. Its 
secretary, R. V. Billis, was despatched to London in late 1919 to seek
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moral and financial support not only from the Imperial government, but 
from British shipping and banking interests in Australia, the small but 
influential Imperial Ex-Officers' Association and the Public Schools' 
Association.73
The AFL's settlement strategy was twofold. Openings were 
available in Victoria for 100 ex-officers on prepared fruit growing 
allotments under irrigation. Applicants were required to possess a 
minimum of £500 and accept company supervision until they were well 
established on their holding. The company also reserved the right to 
decide what types of fruit tree and vine were planted on at least 40Z of 
each holding and controlled the type of instruction each settler 
received. The AFL stated that these measures were necessary to ensure 
the production of sufficient quantities of specific fruit on a regular 
basis. Provisions were also made by the company for the packing and 
marketing of produce. Similarly, it maintained that it would cooperate 
closely with its clients, and that so far as it was possible, not 
interfere with the interests of individual settlers.74
The cost of a fifteen acre plot was £1,275 of which £700 was due 
in the first six months of operation. The remainder was due over a 
period of twenty years at no more than 1% interest. The company 
recognised that it took at least three years for a holding to start 
bearing fruit, therefore it decided to advance the sum of £75 per annum 
for living expenses to each settler for a period of three years. 
Applicants were reminded that they were eligible for assistance under 
the Victorian soldier settlement scheme.75
The second part of the AFL's settlement operation was wool 
production and sheep fattening on large grazing areas established in 
Victoria and New South Wales. Similar plans were afoot to expand 
grazing operations into South and Western Australia. The minimum 
capital requirement was £1,500 with each estate accommodating between 
ten and twenty-five men. A skilled supervisor was allocated to each 
estate and the company agreed to supply the equipment, buy and sell 
stock, arrange for shearing, wool grading and packing. It was estimated 
that each settler could operate between 600 and 800 sheep. A series of 
financial arrangements and repayment schedules were outlined including a 
supervision fee of £50 per annum.76
Billis succeeded in getting the backing of the Ex-Officers' 
Association who committed £12,500 to the venture. In May the joint 
committee of the OSC and the National Relief Fund (a fund raised from
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public subscriptions during the war to help people who suffered material 
damage as a result of war) earmarked £25,000 for the benefit of ex- 
servicemen accepted by the company.77 Billis was pleased. Sir George 
Murray, a member of the National Relief Fund was not. He pointed out 
that the Fund had exposed itself to criticism in which a grant had been
made to a company whose business it was to make a profit. He quickly
denied responsibility on the grounds that he was absent when the 
decision was made.
The Treasury voiced its displeasure on the same grounds and 
emphasised the importance for the OSC not to commit the government to 
the scheme in anyway. Macnaghten replied testily that it was satisfying 
to know that the Treasury was taking an active interest in OSC business. 
He tried to reassure it, however, that the company commanded an 
exceptional measure of support throughout Australia. Among its 'special 
sponsors' was W. A. Watt, the Commonwealth Treasurer.78 As Amery 
informed the shipping magnate, Lord Inchcape, Billis and Watt
represented the 'Imperial School of thought in Australia which is
engaged in combatting the powerful Bolshevist and Sinn Fein elements' In 
the Dominion.79 Here was a crucial admission. Amery and the OSC were 
favourably inclined to the company not simply because of its settlement 
plans but because of the political implications involved. Macnaghten 
reinforced this idea.
It is generally recognised that the extreme labour, Sinn 
Fein and Catholic elements are a serious menace in 
Australia. We may hope - and there is some evidence - that 
the extremists are losing ground there as here. The OSC 
hope that a forward settlement policy may have a 
considerable effect in weakening the extreme elements.80
Billis left Britain in July 1920 thoroughly satisfied with the 
support and cooperation he had received. The first group of four 
settlers arrived in Western Australia in September. At first, the State 
government was not very receptive to the idea of a private company 
encroaching on what it believed was a government responsibility. J. D. 
Connolly, Agent-General for Western Australia, thought the money was 
better spent through a Dominion government rather than a private company 
no matter how altruistic its motives. Why should a company receive 
preferential treatment over a sovereign state? These objections were 
quickly cast aside as Premier Mitchell, with a modicum of pressure from
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Governor Newdegate, welcomed the advent of the company and assured it 
that the government would assist its operations in every possible 
way.81
It was in Victoria, however, where the company laid its most 
ambitious plans establishing two types of settlement for two different 
groups of ex-officer. The settlements at Melville Forest, Leslie Manor 
and Kongbool were set up as cooperative sheep stations designed to 
attract ex-officers from the Indian Army. With assistance from the 
Imperial government and the Ex-Officers Association a fruit-growing 
settlement was established at Tresco West aimed at settling ex-officers 
from the British Army.82
It was in 1921 that Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, 
first approached the AFL concerning the settlement of surplus India Army 
officers in Victoria. Both the company and the Victorian government 
were eager to attract these men. They were young, healthy, well- 
educated and possessed the necessary financial means. For the Victorian 
authorities these officers were a particularly important source because 
they would be the foundation of a new and ambitious settlement programme 
currently under negotiation with the British government. Major Alan 
Currie, a retired officer and a director of the AFL, was despatched to 
India on behalf of the company and with the tacit approval of the 
Victorian government. His mission was to travel to all the major 
military centres in India to generate interest and promote the benefits 
of settlement in Victoria, and, as a trial exercise, recruit a minimum 
of 200 settlers.83
Currie's mission was a success for not only did he catch the 
attention of retiring officers but succeeded in attracting a number 
still on active service. For its part, the Victorian government agreed 
to make land available to the settlers through the AFL. The company 
undertook to provide housing, stock, implements and training for a 
three-year period. It guaranteed that the settlement estates were well 
watered and possessed all the necessary out buildings, fencing and other 
suitable improvements. Furthermore, ’no land will be offered which has 
not been inspected and approved by the Company whose Directors are 
experts in land values. Under this scheme settlers are not only assured 
of a first-class training, but will receive returns from the outset'.
The ease with which settlers could turn an immediate profit was 
substantiated by Currie who proclaimed that settlers were assured to 
make between £500 and £1,000 per annum.84
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Currie returned to Melbourne to discover that in fact the 
Victorian government had failed to honour its promises and had not 
acquired the properties as arranged. The situation was urgent as the 
first group of settlers were due to arrive in September 1922. The 
government immediately offered to purchase alternative properties two of 
which were distinctly inferior to the original estates of Woolongoon and 
Challicum. The government admitted that the substitute estates of 
Melville Forest and Kongbool could support only one sheep for every 
three acres as opposed much better figures for the original estates. 
Currie explained the grim situation to the settlers, admitting that the 
land was not that which he had based his projections, and understood if 
they refused it.85 The men, however, had been handed a fait accompli. 
They had invested heavily, committing most if not all of their 
compensatory gratuity in the form of a bond to the company. They 
certainly could not return to the army in light of Britain's commitment 
to military retrenchment. What choice did they have but to stick it 
out?
The estates were hurriedly purchased in late November 1922 but 
they were not subdivided into individual allotments until June 1923.
When they were at last subdivided the Victorian government charged each 
settler an adjustment fee of £200 stating that until the allotment was 
surveyed the land was still the property of the government. The 
settlers cried foul but the stubborn W. Mclver, state director of the 
Closer Settlement Board (CSB), ignored them.86 There was another 
setback. Though it was originally envisaged as a joint venture, the 
Victorian government was forced to withdraw its support shortly 
afterwards. An amendment to the Closer Settlement Act of 1922, enacted 
in 1923, precluded the Victorian government from cooperating with any 
private organisation in connection with settlement work. This turn of 
events severely hampered the company's efforts and forced it to limit 
its operations to land already acquired. It was an ominous start to 
what became an ill-fated venture.
During the three-year period in which the AFL administered the 
cooperative-based sheep rearing estates there were profits to be shared 
but not at the levels originally envisaged by Currie. The price of wool 
had remained high and because a return was generated the settlements 
were considered a success. Problems surfaced immediately, however, when 
the company's agreement expired and the estates were dissolved. Buoyant 
wool markets had disguised the fact that the settlers had not acquired
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the proper practical experience in sheep raising and breeding, and 
therefore they could not cope. The subsequent drop in wool prices 
compounded the hardship and destitution.87 Furthermore, the AFL was 
liquidated shortly after the termination of its agreement in 1926. The 
Victorian government agreed to place the settlers under the supervision 
of the CSB but for those who had survived enough was enough. Many felt 
that they could not work with or under the draconian CSB, refused the 
government's terms and left. Others sought compensation.
Take the case of ex-India Army Captain B. Godly, a Melville Forest 
settler. It took the company eight months at considerable personal 
expense to the young settler before he was put on his holding. He 
testified to the ridiculous adjustment charges the State government 
insisted on extracting from its new settlers. It was these fees, 
according to Godly, that were the single largest cause of disappointment 
among the ex-India Army settlers. This fostered bitter resentment among 
the settlers who grew frustrated because they had no way of airing their 
grievances. Even more galling was their characterisation in certain 
sections of the Australian press: 'We are dubbed by certain rags as
"Society pets", morning coated Farmers etc., whilst Cartoons have 
appeared of us in Silk hats dipping sheep and so on'
Similar complaints were voiced by settlers at Kongbool, probably 
the poorest and worst off of the three AFL sheep properties. The 
acreage was just too small to support the number of settlers and their 
stock. Holdings were abandoned and those settlers who remained eked out 
a living, all the while complaining that the pledges given at the time 
of their settlement, in particular advance preparation, had not been 
fulfilled.89 At Leslie Manor, established as a mixed farming 
proposition, settlers were in a similar predicament and testified to the 
inadequacies of the scheme. Captain C. R. Jessop was struck by the 
AFL's determination to push the Melville Forest operation and ignore the 
promotion of Leslie Manor. In his opinion, Leslie Manor was better 
situated for sheep rearing because the general quality of the land was 
better. His criticisms were directed at the company. There was no 
organised system of instruction or demonstration and the settlement had 
not been prepared in advance. The estate's management left much to be 
desired as well. For example, the first manager on the estate was 
ignorant of cultivation techniques, was unable to adjust a plough or a 
reaper and binder. The second manager was incompetent and lost 100 
sheep in one day by dipping them in unfavourable weather. The third
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manager was no better. When entrusted by Jessop to purchase 500 sheep 
he returned with a shipment of tick-infested animals which had to be 
dipped out of season at the risk of considerable loss.90 Although 
Jessop admitted that he was lucky to have selected a good allotment he 
was one of the first settlers to leave once his property had been 
revalued.
The fruit irrigated farming operation at Tresco West suffered a 
similar fate. It was described by one Victorian MLA, F. E. Old, an 
experienced farmer who championed the cause of many impoverished soldier 
farmers, as 'one of the most ghastly failures perpetrated on 
unsuspecting settlers'.91 As with wool, the markets for fruit were 
extremely depressed. This was compounded by the fact that orchards 
needed time to mature. Therefore, the financial burden proved enormous 
in the early stages of fruit farming because it involved a large 
injection of capital with little or no return. But the area was 
unsuitable for profitable fruit production. In 1925 the majority report 
of the Victorian Royal Commission on soldier settlement blamed poor 
drainage as the reason for low citrus yield in the region. Old went 
further in his condemnation of the project. The entire settlement was 
unsuitable for irrigation because of the soil's high salinity. It may 
have been a legitimate endeavour, argued Old, but it was a proposition 
founded on the wrong principles. The AFL directors knew nothing of land 
settlement, in particular irrigation, and therefore never gave their 
clients a proper chance. Another problem was poor supervision and 
management. By March 1927 only twenty-two of the original sixty-two ex- 
British Army officers were still settled or employed on Tresco West in 
rural occupations. Twenty-one had left their holdings for more secure 
employment in business and commerce, five had returned to Britain, three 
had emigrated to New Zealand, four had joined the Royal Australian Air 
Force and the local constabulary, six had disappeared and one was 
dead.92 The situation in Victoria worsened.
In 1923 Victoria embarked upon its own overly ambitious project to 
establish 10,000 British settlers on their own farms. The scheme aimed 
to attract men who possessed approximately £1,000 of their own capital 
and the Victorian government once again looked to India for potential 
investors. The projected cost, excluding passage, was £3 million. The 
Commonwealth government raised the loan and the interest was shared 
equally between the Imperial, federal and State governments. The first 
stage of the programme was to settle 2,000 immigrants and their
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dependents. State authorities estimated that it would have to provide 
an additional £1,500 per farm in the way of loans repayable under 
generous terms. The settlers were promised complete financial control 
of their own money and twelve months practical experience before taking 
over their holding.93
The scheme was an absolute fiasco. Only 814 British settlers, of 
which 75X were ex-servicemen, entered Australia between 1923 and 1927. 
After examining the districts where land was available, 455 decided not 
to embark upon the venture.9* The biggest complaint was that the price 
of land was too high and that there was not much freedom of choice.
Fears were raised by William Bankes Amery, Britain's migration 
representative in Australia (1925-28), that British settlers tended to 
receive blocks of land rejected or abandoned by native Australians. His 
claim was substantiated as more complaints arrived condemning the land 
as uneconomic, second rate and unsuitable for agriculture. Of the 
remaining 361, only a paltry fifty achieved partial success.95
Some settler accounts have survived giving a startling picture of 
what many ex-officers in this particular scheme encountered. In 
September 1923 Frank Thompson, a former lieutenant in the Royal 
Engineers, settled on the Red Cliffs estate, a soldier settlement scheme 
originally established for Australian veterans. The land was over­
valued, not properly drained and therefore unsuitable for fruit farming. 
Thompson charged that he did not receive equal treatment and did not 
receive wages during the first two years of operation. The four acres 
planted in citrus yielded nothing but poor returns and an £800 deficit. 
The remaining twelve acres were much more promising but only because 
Thompson, at enormous expense, drained the land. Land purchased at £20 
per acre had cost an additional £15 per acre to drain.
And what had he achieved? In four years he had produced sixty- 
eight and one-half tons of dried fruit, twenty-five tons of currants and 
forty-three and one-half tons of sultanas. He had worked the holding 
for six years and estimated that his financial return over the same 
period was a mere £120. However, all he had to show for his hard work 
and determination was a bank statement showing a debit of £500. During 
1927-28 the state Board of Inquiry visited his holding and agreed that 
it was over-capitalised and advised revaluation. The absurd part of the 
revaluation process, according to Thompson, was that one of the valuers 
was a former area supervisor who had given him a steady stream of 
misleading advice. Even more damning was Thompson's claim that during
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the three years Mr. Brynes was area supervisor he had visited him once 
for three minutes! For a State that prided itself on its claims of 
expert advice and close supervision this was indeed damaging.
Thompson's censure, however, was against the conduct of certain 
individuals and he admitted that he found no specific reason to complain 
against the Victorian government.96
Another ex-officer, W. H. Voyle, certainly had grounds to 
complain. He arrived in the wheat growing Mallee district in 1925, an 
area targeted for soldier settlement during the war. It became 
painfully obvious to him that the area could not grow wheat in 
sufficient quantities, ‘and that the settlers had been made the victims 
of an unjustifiable and disastrous experiment'. He charged that the 
Victorian government was guilty of *a colossal blunder and sheer 
incompetence' and that they had deliberately gambled with the lives of 
innocent men, women and children. Similarly, he insisted that the State 
government bear the costs - moral, legal and financial - of official 
misrepresentation and inefficiency. Voyle was not alone in his 
condemnations.97
Charges of misrepresentation and breach of faith were levelled 
against the Victorian government by the remaining survivors of both the 
AFL and government schemes. Legal proceedings were launched in 1927 
with the full support and backing of the British and Indian governments. 
Victoria's Governor, Baron Somers, reported to the Dominions Office that 
nothing short of a Royal Commission would solve the parlous state of 
affairs in Victoria.98 But he warned his superiors that it was not 
going to be easy to resolve the matter as the State politicians had 
quickly absolved themselves from any responsibility on the grounds that 
some of the ex-officer settlements were conducted under the auspices of 
a private company and outside the parameters of the Empire Settlement 
Act. If there was to be an investigation into the entire gamut of 
settlement issues in Victoria, explained Mclver of the CSB, it was 
strictly a State matter. The Imperial and Commonwealth governments were 
politely told il k/a_s k o k &  o l
Pressure for a full and impartial enquiry mounted throughout 1927 
and 1928. Governor Somers reported that the new Labor government was 
growing increasingly uncomfortable under the strain of persistent 
pressure, and the unpopular Mclver was doing his utmost to wriggle out 
of the sticky situation. Determined to press home the claims of British 
ex-officers, both Somers and Bankes Amery refused to give up. Lord
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Lovat, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions, was 
equally adamant that the matter be properly and carefully investigated 
and that a satisfactory conclusion be obtained. He reminded them: 'the
complete failure of this scheme would have unfortunate repercussions on 
the migration to Australia as a whole'.100 However, the damage to 
future assisted migration programmes had already been done. By 1927 
animosity ran so high that according to one Colonial Office report the 
Labor governments of Victoria and New South Wales were 'anxious to 
hinder British settlement in Australia'.101
In the face of mounting pressure the Victorian government finally 
relented and appointed a board of inquiry to investigate the complaints 
of the ex-Indian Army officers. Somers was far from satisfied. He 
cabled London that the membership of the board of inquiry was weighted 
heavily in favour of the CSB. When the inquiry's findings were 
completed its report indicated a strong claim for compensation against 
the State government. Unfortunately for the settlers the board had no 
power to make recommendations and it looked like the issue was going to 
be shelved.102 Disappointed, Somers maintained the pressure on the 
Labor Premier E. J. Hogan to take more direct action and appoint a Royal 
Commission. The government remained intransigent and ignored the pleas 
for compensation on behalf of the settlers.
It was not until Hogan regained the premiership in December 1929 
that constructive steps were taken. In 1930 a Royal Commission was 
finally appointed, although the actual recommendations were carried out 
by a Nationalist government. In its report released In 1933 it found 
that of the 311 complaints all but seventeen were justified. The 
findings were willingly accepted by the State government and 
compensation was paid to 284 claimants, of whom 116 promptly returned to 
Britain. The cost of settling fifty British settlers and compensating 
approximately 300 more was an astronomical £5 million.103
What had gone wrong with Australian soldier settlement and the 
attempts to establish a permanent and productive landed imperial 
yeomanry? Economic factors played a key role. Fuelled by wartime 
speculation and post-war inflation the States were forced to buy land at 
extremely high prices. Compounding the problem was the shortage of 
livestock, building materials and farm equipment which raised operating 
costs. Those soldier settlers who were encouraged to settle in fruit­
growing areas or irrigation settlements had the extra burden of having 
to buy specialised equipment for which they had no training. Besides
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the need for additional capital, the problem with these types of 
settlement was that it took longer for settlers to realise a return on 
their investment when compared to soldier settlers who took up grain 
farming or sheep rearing. But it was the depression of 1920-22 which 
exposed the vulnerability of the entire policy. Administrators 
incorrectly assumed that the prices for primary products would remain 
buoyant throughout the initial stages of soldier settlement allowing the 
settler to reap the benefits of high prices and establish his operations 
on a strong footing. However, plummeting commodity prices hit many 
soldier settlers just as they were moving into full production. The 
result was that the soldier settlers were caught in a vicious cost-price 
squeeze which forced many to abandon their farms and ensured the 
survivors a long period of indebtedness.10*
Many of the settlers were hopelessly unsuited for the heavy manual 
labour required. The rush to satisfy as many applicants as quickly as 
possible led to poor settler selection. Veterans returned from Europe 
with a variety of physical and mental disorders which recurred or were 
aggravated by intense physical exertion. The British veterans had the 
added handicap of trying to farm in a foreign, often hostile environment 
with new and different techniques. The root of the problem, however, 
was the haste, lack of forethought and unpreparedness with which 
Australia's soldier settlement policy was implemented. Munro-Ferguson's 
assessment that the Australian government's lack of pre-planning would 
slow down the repatriation process and hamper post-war reconstruction 
was correct. In 1925 the Victorian government, in its report of the 
Royal Commission on soldier settlement, admitted that it was 'common 
knowledge that there was a great rush of returned men in 1919 and 1920, 
and the machinery for handling them was taxed to the breaking 
point'.105 What was worse for the British ex-service settlers was 
that they arrived at the peak of the screening process, adding to the 
strain, and at the time when land prices were at their highest. The 
promises of expert supervision and agricultural training never 
materialised. There was a glaring absence of a variety of preparatory 
scientific surveys on land reserved for soldier settlement. This 
resulted in the development of marginal land by inexperienced settlers 
with little or no. knowledge of soil conditions, climate, drainage and 
other physical, seasonal or economic characteristics of the settlement 
region.106
The blame for the ’failure' of Australia's soldier settlement
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policy must lay with the Commonwealth and State governments. The 
decentralised nature of Australia's soldier settlement administration 
which led to the constant bickering over areas of Commonwealth-State 
jurisdiction, and the States' parasitic attitude toward Commonwealth 
subsidies 'exposed the fragility of [Australia's] immature federal 
system*.107 The degree of responsibility between the two levels of 
government was never confirmed, and according to Justice Pike's report 
of 1929 which examined the losses due to soldier settlement, it remained 
confused and unclear.108 The rationale behind the entire policy also 
became confused. What had begun as a debt of gratitude became an 
expensive and politically motivated exercise to create another sturdy 
yeoman class on Australian soil. In reality, the attempt to establish a 
new yeomanry in Australia was based on romantic illusions of the past 
generated by over-optimistic and misplaced assumptions of the potential 
of the returned man.109
What of the imperial element? Australia proved to be as 
enthusiastic as the rest of the empire in its attempt to resettle 
British ex-servicemen. But its eagerness to participate also 
highlighted and reinforced Australia's dependence on British investment 
and the closer, less diversified commercial relationship between the two 
countries. According to sketchy official sources, Australia settled 
more British ex-servicemen than any other Dominion, between one and two 
thousand, but at a greater financial and social cost.110 As well, its 
insistence that land alone held the key to continued prosperity and its 
refusal to give up the yeoman ideal made for some very extravagant 
experiments in the face of a changing imperial relationship. It was an 
expensive and trying lesson.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
NEW ZEALAND: A MOST DISAPPOINTING RESULT
Like her sister Dominions New Zealand witnessed several small- 
scale experiments in military colonisation prior to 1914. In 1851 the 
Imperial government decided that it would be advantageous to grant 
special land concessions to those retired British officers who had 
participated in the internecine conflict with the Maoris, a fiercely 
proud and warlike native people. The policy's main objective was the 
improvement of the colony's internal security through the settlement of 
these men in areas where the native population was disaffected. 
Agricultural development and the use of scrip as a payment for services 
rendered were also used to justify the settlement policy but in reality 
they were of secondary importance. Security remained the paramount 
objective. The Maoris were seen as a constant source of trouble by the 
settlers throughout the 1850s and 1860s. This resulted in the enactment 
of a series of regulations designed to entice retiring military and 
naval personnel to stay and settle in the colony, principally on the 
North Island. In all, 7,692 military and naval personnel were awarded 
land grants under the multifarious provisions established between 1851 
and 1892.1
Immediately after the Boer War intense pressure was exerted upon 
the New Zealand government to give preferential treatment to those 
veterans wanting to farm upon their return. The opponents of Prime 
Minister Seddon's government argued that an excellent opportunity 
existed for settling healthy, eager veterans who were prepared to 
venture limited amounts of capital in agriculture. Critics warned that 
such an opportunity should not be squandered because the moral fibre of 
these valiant men was at stake. ‘Such a policy would be far better than 
allowing them to knock about the hotels, drinking bad whiskey...and 
knocking their cheques down, or competing with the workers of the city 
for employment'.2 Even more galling for the opposition members were 
advertisements in English newspapers offering two million acres of 
freehold land to intending British immigrants when no land was available 
for returning New Zealand veterans. 'These young men had been appealing
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to the Government for land, but could not get it, and here was the 
Government pushing land on people in the United Kingdom who had not 
asked for it, and perhaps did not want it at all' .3 Seddon was unmoved 
and no preferential treatment was given to New Zealand veterans.
The most patriotic and 'British' of the Dominions, New Zealand was 
the first Dominion to initiate and enact soldier settlement legislation 
in October 1915. The Discharged Soldier Settlement Act empowered the 
Minister of Finance to raise £50,000 for settlement purposes. In a 
series of amendments between 1916 and 1919 the initial sum was increased 
to £1.5 million. The Bill was to provide for two types of soldier, 
those who returned fit and well and those who returned partially 
disabled but able to do light farm work. Legislators envisaged 
settlement on Crown land and on land obtained by the government under 
the Land for Settlement Act of 1908. In 1917 an amendment was passed 
extending financial assistance to soldier settlers to help them clear, 
fence and drain land. It also provided them with assistance to purchase 
private farm land and gave the Minister of Lands authority to reserve 
land in urban areas for the construction of veterans' housing. More 
importantly, soldier settlers were not allowed to transfer lands 
acquired under the scheme for ten years, except with the permission of 
the local Land Board and the Minister of Lands. The measure was 
incorporated to add an element of stability and prevent them from 
selling their holdings to hungry land speculators eager to turn a quick 
profit and benefit from wartime inflation.*
W. F. Massey's Reform government, which was heavily dependent upon 
rural support, was wholeheartedly committed to helping the returned man. 
And its quick legislative response was proof of its intent. When the 
Prime Minister, in his dual capacity as Minister of Lands, introduced 
the 1915 legislation, he equated New Zealand's efforts with those of 
ancient Rome. Just as the Roman legionnaire possessed the patriotic 
traditions of Rome, claimed Massey, it was New Zealand's soldier 
citizens who were the modern day heirs to those most noble and 
democratic ideals.5 There was a great deal of discussion and support 
for the soldier settlement legislation right across the New Zealand 
political spectrum. However, numerous speakers warned that the land had 
to be purchased at a fair and decent price. They did not want the 
soldiers to be always dependent on borrowed money. Nor did they want to 
see these men gouged by profiteers demanding high prices for land that 
could make any type of settlement prohibitive.6
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Land settlement was a prominent feature of party politics in New 
Zealand, and after World War I was seen as an indispensable component of 
its reconstruction strategy. In this respect, official attitudes were 
similarly centralist to those of their Canadian counterparts, and like 
Australia involved the active support of the local conservative 
orientated Agricultural and Pastoral Associations. Sir Francis Bell, 
who administered New Zealand's land policy during several of Massey's 
absences in London during the war, was especially aware of the 
government's responsibility. He steadfastly refused to open up any 
Crown land which was suitable for civilian settlement, insisting that it 
be reserved for ex-servicemen.^ In 1919-20 soldier settlement reached 
its peak. Prior to demobilisation, approximately 1,700 ex-servicemen 
were authorised to settle on 508,000 acres at a cost of £1.15 million. 
Two years later the government responded to veteran demand and settled 
9,041 ex-servicemen on 3.1 million acres at a cost of £12 million. 
Despite the enormous expenditure, argues one observer, the Massey 
government failed to cope with the volume of returning veterans, 
exposing it to hostile attacks from the press, the New Zealand Farmers' 
Union and an impatient New Zealand Returned Soldiers' Association 
(NZRSA).8
These critics bitterly complained that the government was wasting 
money buying cultivated land at highly inflated prices when large areas 
of Crown land remained undeveloped. Indeed, the scale of land 
speculation in New Zealand during World War I was frenetic. It was 
estimated that one-half of the rural land in the Dominion changed hands 
between 1916 and 1924.9 Therefore, what was the government to do?
Crown land suitable for agricultural development was scattered, isolated 
and scarce. Committed to reserving its meagre land resources to New 
Zealand veterans, Massey's government was forced to buy private land at 
prices inflated by wartime speculation in order to meet veteran demand. 
Clearly, Massey's administration faced a dilemma. It was a conflict 
between the government's desire to take advantage of the agricultural 
prosperity fostered by secure wartime markets, on the one hand, and the 
huge financial burden of buying land at grossly inflated prices, on the 
other.10
What were the implications for British ex-servicemen wanting to 
emigrate after the war? The granting of equal treatment to ex-Imperials 
was restricted by New Zealand's limited resources and its commitment to 
its own troops. Only after these claims had been honoured was the New
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Zealand government willing to consider applications from British 
veterans. During the Haggard mission.Massey reiterated this point. 
Haggard recorded that Massey was most sympathetic and generally eager to 
help but far from definite on the form or substance of the 
assistance.11 When hostilities ended and the free passage scheme was 
formulated the New Zealand government once again stressed its desire to 
help British ex-servicemen settle in New Zealand on the same terms as
New Zealand veterans, but only after New Zealand claims had been
satisfied. Furthermore, it would not allow the conveyance of British 
ex-servicemen to New Zealand until all New Zealand troops had been 
repatriated. And at that point, it warned there was a strong 
possibility that there would be no government land available beyond the 
needs of domestic requirements.12
A shortage of shipping throughout 1920-21 further aggravated a 
frustrating situation for prospective British ex-service migrants and a 
Dominion keen on restocking its Anglo-Saxon heritage. There was 
another, even more serious problem: a severe housing shortage in 1920
that threatened to stifle all British migration to the Dominion. The 
problem became more acute in 1921 as the world's economy slumped,
inflation spiralled and unemployment sharply increased. In March 1921,
the Massey government informed the OSC that after examining New 
Zealand's commercial, industrial and financial outlook in relation to 
the depressed labour market, the free passage scheme would have to be 
curtailed. The OSC was instructed 'that no approved Imperial Overseas 
Settlement applicant, whether single or married, be allowed to proceed 
to New Zealand unless employment and accommodation await him on 
arrival'.13 This was a critical blow to those who advocated an 
unrestricted 'white' immigration policy. There was unrelenting 
hostility in some sections of New Zealand society, including elements of 
the NZRSA towards the entry and influx of Asiatics. And equally 
strident warnings from the same quarters that from a racial and 
strategic viewpoint to limit the flow of immigrants from Britain was 
extremely dangerous, unnecessary and unpatriotic.1* Cooler heads 
prevailed, however. After a vigorous debate at the 1922 NZRSA annual 
conference the association agreed to support the government's temporary 
restriction of the free passage scheme. The recent dumping of hundreds 
of unemployed, homeless and destitute ex-Imperials in Auckland 
emphasised the necessity for such action. Confident that the economic 
downturn was a passing phase, the NZRSA endorsed the government's
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policy.15 At the conclusion of the free passage scheme New Zealand had 
received 15.5% or 13,349 British ex-servicemen and their families.16
Land offered for civilian settlement remained limited throughout 
1921 as New Zealand authorities maintained their policy of preference 
for the returned man. However, there were signs that the demand by ex- 
servicemen, especially for pastoral properties, was slackening. The 
fall in wool and mutton prices made soldier settlement less attractive 
thereby allowing the government to throw open previously reserved areas 
to civilian settlement. By January 1922 there was little demand for any 
class of farm land by ex-servicemen and the proclamations which had 
reserved these specific settlement areas were annulled. The worsening 
depression, however, made civilian settlement less attractive and the 
disposal of the previously reserved 340,000 acres difficult.17
The depression of 1920-22 and the consequent fall in prices of 
primary produce severely tested the resolve and determination of the 
bulk of the settlers, particularly the pastoralists. The government 
found it necessary to postpone soldiers' rent payments and give interest 
relief on their mortgages. However, it confidently expected prices 
would recover in the near future and it was willing to temporarily 
forego payments due from soldier settlers in an attempt to relieve the 
financial pressure. The NZRSA were far from satisfied and demanded a 
full inquiry into the plight of the soldier settlers. As the number of 
distressed cases multiplied and agricultural prices failed to recover 
the government appointed special Boards of Inquiry in 1923 to report on 
the matter.18
The Boards of Inquiry conducted a comprehensive investigation but 
mistakenly concluded that the depression was the principal cause of 
settler failure. Well before its onset many soldier settlers were 
experiencing severe difficulties largely attributable to inflated land 
prices. The depression simply 'hastened and accentuated a process 
already begun'.19 The New Zealand government remained steadfast in its 
determination to help the soldier settler and its response to the crisis 
was similar to that of the other Dominions. However, the generous 
gesture of postponing rent and interest payments during the depression, 
and keeping the number of foreclosures to an absolute minimum, was 
unheard of in the other Dominions. It was evident, however, that 
despite a most sympathetic stance a more permanent form of relief was 
needed. Led by the NZRSA, the cry went up for the initiation of 
revaluation proceedings. The Boards of Inquiry recommended it and the
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government reacted quickly by establishing twenty-four district 
revaluation committees. Of the total of 5,347 who applied by mid-1925, 
5,284 had been dealt with. In March 1928 reductions totalled £2.68 
million.20
What was the final cost to the New Zealand government? The entire 
repatriation process cost New Zealand just over £31 million. The losses 
accrued to soldier settlement, including revaluations, remissions and 
outstanding debts, was £7 million or 25% of the total amount 
expended.21 Despite these losses the government were satisfied with 
its 'success' on behalf of the returned soldier. The figures were 
certainly in line with those written off by Canada and Australia and as 
one commentator writes:
Considering the [New Zealand] Government's adoption of an 
ill-advised policy of settling soldiers on improved lands 
bought at inflated prices, and its insistence on carrying on 
with such policy despite widespread and constructive 
criticism; and taking into account the inefficient 
administration of this policy by the Lands Department, the 
inexperience of the soldier settlers, the faulty subdivision 
of many of the estates, the second class quality of much of 
the supposedly first class land, the inadequacy of financial 
advances, and finally the effects of the slump, it is quite 
remarkable that the loss of 25 per cent sustained by the 
Government was not much greater.22
And what of the British ex-service migrant? As far as soldier 
settlement is concerned he made no impact. Without the benefit of 
examining primary source material, this study must rely on the 
exhaustive and detailed soldier settlement reports compiled by the 
Department of Lands between 1921 and 1930, and these fail to record one 
case of a British soldier settler.23 Therefore what happened to those 
who participated in the free passage scheme? When it was launched the 
New Zealand government emphasised that the greatest demand was for 
single female domestics and single male farm labourers. At first, 
families were encouraged to immigrate but the chronic housing shortage 
in 1920 forced the New Zealand authorities to discourage them from 
arriving. Instead, efforts were confined to the able-bodied single ex- 
servicemen both skilled and unskilled and the single woman or war widow 
without encumbrances to take up domestic service.2* Moreover, its 
warning that New Zealand veterans received preferential treatment and 
placement on the land, and that it was highly unlikely that there was 
enough land to satisfy domestic requirements, no doubt intimidated all
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but the most determined or financially independent British soldier 
settlers. Even then, it would have been a very small number indeed. 
Therefore, it must be assumed that the vast majority found employment in 
secondary and tertiary industries or as unskilled labour.
Likewise, New Zealanders soon complained that many of the British 
immigrants, in particular the ex-Imperials, arrived destitute and 
penniless adding to an already serious unemployment problem. Hence the 
government's curtailment of the free passage scheme except for those who 
had both assured employment and accommodation. Once these restrictions 
were in place very few British ex-servicemen embarked for New 
Zealand.25 New Zealand's response to the free passage scheme was 
undoubtedly as patriotic as Canada's and Australia's. However, despite 
the fact that she was the third largest beneficiary under the scheme, 
the final results were exceedingly disappointing. Local economic 
conditions certainly had a quicker and more immediate impact on the 
government's repatriation programme than in the other Dominions and had 
more of a direct bearing on the fortunes of the British participants. 
Similarly, it demonstrated New Zealand's vulnerability to outside 
economic factors, its increased dependence on imperial trading links, 
especially the markets for its primary produce, and its lack of 
industrial diversification.26 Finally, New Zealand's efforts to settle 
her own veterans on the land may have been a mixed success, but so far 
as being able to reinforce its landed yeomanry with an imperial 
component the policy was an absolute disaster.
291
ENDNOTES
1. W. R. Jourdain, Land Legislation and Settlement in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Government Printer, 1925), pp. 22-3; W. R. Mayhew, 'The
Returned Services Association, 1916-1943', M.A. thesis, University of 
Otago, 1943, pp. 131-3.
2. NZPD. 1903, CXXIII, p. 34.
3. Ibid., 1903, CXXVI, p. 265.
4. Jourdain, pp. 46-9 and pp. 189-99; J. 0. Melling, ’The New Zealand
Returned Soldiers Association, 1916-23', M.A. thesis, Victoria University 
College, 1952, pp. 78-98; J. M. Powell, ’Soldier Settlement in New Zealand,
1915-1923', Australian Geographical Studies. IX (1971), pp. 144-60; The New 
Zealand Official Year Book (hereafter NZYB), 1917, pp. 433-5.
5. Powell, ’Debt of Honour', p. 64.
6. NZPD. 1917, CLXXVIII, p. 247, p. 367; ibid., 1919, CLXXXIV, p. 343.
7. NZPD. 1917, CLXXVIII, p. 631; Mayhew, p. 24; Melling, p. 82; ’New 
Zealand I. Immigration', Round Table. XII (1921-22), pp. 913-17; M. 
Fairbum, ’The Rural Myth and the New Urban Frontier' , New Zealand Journal 
of History. IX, 1 (April 1975), pp. 3-21. In October 1916, Lord Liverpool, 
Governor of New Zealand, informed Bonar Law that the Tuwharetoa tribe near 
Napier on the eastern coast of the North Island had reserved 25,000 acres 
of native land for Maoris veterans irrespective of the tribe or tribes they 
belonged. Both Liverpool and the British government were impressed with 
this patriotic gesture. PRO, CO 209/289/55606, Liverpool to Bonar Law, 5 
October 1916. Maoris soldier settlement was discussed regularly in the New 
Zealand Parliament. For example, see NZPD. 1917, CLXXVIII, p. 731.
8. Mayhew, p. 136; Appendix. Journals of the House of Representatives 
(hereafter AJHR). 1921-22, C-9, pp. 1-2; PRO, CO 209/309/41033, Lord 
Jellicoe, Governor-General of New Zealand, to Churchill, Colonial 
Secretary, 11 July 1921; Melling, pp. 80-93; D. J. George, ’The Depression 
of 1921-22 in New Zealand', M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1969, pp. 
146-70; M. R. Sharpe, ’Anzac Day in New Zealand 1916-1939', New Zealand 
Journal of History. XV, 2 (October 1981), pp. 97-114.
9. W. H. Oliver, ed. , The Oxford History of New Zealand (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), p. 232.
10. Melling, pp. 80-1; NZPD. 1921, CXCII, pp. 467-77 and pp. 630-1.
11. Oliver, p. 232; Haggard, After-War Settlement and Employment, pp. 22- 
4; Higgins, pp. 65-6; PRO, CO 532/84/33878, Liverpool to Bonar Law, 9 June 
1916.
292
12. Tumor, Land Settlement, pp. 29-30; PRO, CO 721/5/f. 82, New Zealand 
government to J. Allen, New Zealand High Commissioner, 13 March 1919, 
tabled at meeting of OSC advisory committee, 14 March 1919; PRO, CO 
209/303/24178, Liverpool to Milner, 31 March 1920.
13. PRO, CO 721/26/3825, Allen to Amery, 2 April 1921; CO 721/25/3825, 
Cameron to Plant, 30 March 1921.
14. Quick March, monthly magazine of the NZRSA, 10 March 1921, p. 36;
ibid.. 11 July 1921, p. 55, p. 57 and p. 59; P. S. O'Connor, ’Keeping New 
Zealand White, 1908-1920', New Zealand Journal of History. II, 1 (April 
1968), pp. 47-65.
15. PRO, CO 721/25/3825, Allen to Macnaghten, 4 January 1921; CO 
721/40/OSO 95447, Jellicoe to Churchill, 27 July 1922; Quick March. 10 July 
1922, pp. 33-4.
16. Plant, p. 74.
17. PRO, CO 209/309/56217, Jellicoe to Churchill, 28 September 1921; CO 
209/312/9200, ibid.. 13 January 1922.
18. PRO, CO 209/312/9200, Jellicoe to Churchill, 13 January 1922; 
Jourdain, p. 48; AJHR. 1923, C-9a, p. 3.
19. AJHR. 1923, C-9, p. 5; George, pp. 160-3.
20. AJHR. 1924, C-9, p. 2; George, p. 167; ’New Zealand I. The Twenty-
Second Session of Parliament', Round Table. XIV (1923-24), pp. 187-9.
21. George, p. 168.
22. George, pp. 169-70. Of all the Dominions, the quarterly secret 
reports from the New Zealand Governors-General between 1917 and 1930 
provided some of the most informative and up-to-date material on land 
settlement, repatriation and immigration. Even after reserved lands had 
been thrown open to civilian settlement the statistical progress of New 
Zealand repatriation was maintained. Of particular interest are those of 
Governor-General C. Fergusson (1924-30). For example, see his quarterly 
secret reports between 1926 and 1930 in DO 35/4, 24, 48 and 69.
23. No statistics exist for British soldier settlers in the annual reports 
contained in the AJHR or the NZYB from 1921 to 1930 and 1915 to 1931 
respectively.
24. National Archives of New Zealand (Wellington), LI Burnt File, Box 130, 
1920/533, memorandum by H. Thomson, Secretary, Immigration Department, to 
Minister of Immigration, 4 August 1920. I am deeply indebted to Dr. 
Stephen Constantine, Senior Lecturer at the University of Lancaster for the 
use of these sources and notes.
25. Ibid.. telegram to High Commission, 20 October 1921; High Commissioner 
to Massey, 22 August 1922.
26. G. R. Hawke, The Making of New Zealand: An Economic History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 7-17.
293
CONCLUSION
FOREDOOMED TO FAILURE?
In a survey of the British government's migration policy conducted 
in 1930, the Overseas Settlement Department concluded that assisted 
migration since World War I had been 'fostered largely for social and 
political reasons, and that the economic aspects of it [had] been more 
or less secondary'.1 This was undeniably true. Although important 
economic arguments were used to popularise and justify soldier 
settlement, free passage and empire settlement, it was the parallel 
objectives of political stability and social cohesion which lay at the 
root of these policies designed to reinforce the physical and emotional 
bonds of empire. Whereas strategic motives had governed the pursuit of 
military colonisation in the past, it was the political necessity of 
shoring up society's ramparts against the destructive forces of 
socialism released by the war which became increasingly emphasised in 
the 1920s. However, it was the economic uncertainties of the 1920s, in 
particular the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, which ultimately 
defeated soldier settlement, assisted migration and overseas settlement.
Unquestionably, as a policy, soldier settlement was an outright 
failure. From an imperial standpoint, the attempt to create a landed 
yeomanry was a spectacular disaster. Officially, Australia established 
between one and two thousand ex-Imperials on the land, Canada less than 
300, and South Africa and New Zealand none. Even with the inclusion of 
perhaps several hundred ex-officers settled by private initiative in 
South Africa, a liberal estimate would put the total number of landed 
ex-Imperials in the self-governing Dominions at no more than 3,000. 
Considering that Britain demobilised four million men after World War I, 
of which 750,000 expressed an initial interest in agriculture, the 
enormous gulf between official estimates and actual results is 
staggering. Of course, the picture is slightly distorted because it 
does not include those ex-servicemen who settled in the Crown colonies, 
such as Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. Similarly, it ignores those who 
established themselves on the land independent of government or 
philanthropic agencies. Therefore it is impossible to estimate the
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number of independently settled ex-servicemen. Arriving as ordinary 
immigrants they were quickly absorbed into their new economic and social 
environments making them extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
trace. Nevertheless, the numbers must have been minuscule because this 
category of soldier settler would have needed large amounts of private 
capital to safely ignore the variety of state assistance which was 
offered. Once again, so far as those who settled in the Crown colonies 
and mandated territories are concerned the numbers were small, maybe 
several hundred.2
Britain's free passage scheme for ex-service personnel provides 
another insight. Ultimately, it was an administrative landmark which 
provided the cornerstone for the expansion of assisted migration 
encompassed in the Empire Settlement Act of 1922, itself a 'major 
revolution of policy'.3 Statistically, its architects regarded the 
free passage scheme as a tremendous success. Just over 86,000 people 
were assisted at approximately £28 per head at a total cost of 
£2,418,263 between April 1919 and March 1923. The scheme accounted for 
12Z of the total number of British emigrants who settled in the empire 
between 1919 and 1922.4 For the emigrants themselves it provided the 
chance at a new life overseas; an opportunity that may never have 
existed had they had to rely upon their own means. This was 
particularly important for those who embarked for Australia and New 
Zealand. Under normal circumstances these fares would have been the 
highest deterring many who instead might have travelled to Canada. Fare 
equalisation through government subsidisation allowed for cheaper access 
to the Antipodes somewhat nullifying Canada's geographical advantage.
However, the final tally was a far cry from the initial estimates 
of over 400,000 discussed in early 1919. It is true that the shortage 
of shipping during the first eighteen months hampered efforts. However, 
it was the onset of the short, sharp post-war depression of 1920-22 
which paradoxically both made and broke the scheme. It was clear that 
had unemployment not been such a serious problem the British government 
would not have supported the idea of free passage and its subsequent 
extension. But at the same time the Dominions were suffering from the 
same economic and social problems created by the post-war depression.
The inability of the Dominion governments to satiate the demands from 
their own veterans for jobs and housing led to the growing animosity 
toward the ex-Imperial and the subsequent tightening of immigration 
regulations.
295
The underlying problem, however, was the rationale behind imperial 
soldier settlement. The emphasis on agricultural settlement in the 
Dominions, the creation of a landed imperial yeomanry which would 
strengthen imperial defence, enhance primary production and act as a 
protected market for British manufactured goods, ignored the profound 
economic and social changes which were transforming the imperial 
relationship. The empire 'as an organic system, harmoniously balanced 
between industrial metropole and agricultural periphery' was quietly 
dissolving as the Dominions began to develop, expand and intensify their 
own industrial base.5 The failure of the numerous soldier settlement 
policies throughout the empire had as much to do with the incorrect 
presuppositions in Britain and the Dominions about the economic 
relationship between them as it did with over-optimistic administrators 
settling inexperienced settlers on marginal land at a time of depressed 
prices for primary produce.
Economic factors aside, the failure to establish a landed imperial 
yeomanry was in part attributable to the growth of a 'sturdy' Dominion 
nationalism. E. T. Crutchley, Bankes Amery's successor as Britain's 
migration representative in Australia, reported in 1932 that the growth 
of Dominion nationalism in the 1920s, which was strengthened by the 
equality of status conferred by the Imperial Conference of 1926 and 
confirmed in the Statute of Westminster in 1931, revealed 'a manifest 
determination to view questions of population and migration from the 
national point of view only'.6 No longer would the needs of the mother 
country dictate migration policy unless it coincided with circumstances 
or conditions in the Dominions which favoured a large incursion of 
British subjects.
This signal, which was being sounded in the late 1920s, was heard 
loud and clear by British policy makers during the severe depression of 
1929-33. Similarly, it emerged that these same policy makers were 
becoming increasingly sensitive to the Dominions' viewpoint regarding 
British immigration and overseas settlement. Previously, the Dominions 
had bitterly complained that they were being used as the dumping ground 
for Britain's impoverished and industrial unemployed; that the British 
government was transferring its domestic responsibilities and 
difficulties to their shoulders. As the economic uncertainties of the 
1920s and early 1930s intensified, the Dominions felt justified in 
imposing tighter entry regulations which restricted access to those 
immigrants who contributed immediately to industries which suffered from
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a shortage of experienced manpower. The policy of 'passing all 
immigrants through a fine sieve' was also designed to allay the fears of 
Dominion labour which staunchly believed that British immigrants 
competed for jobs, lowered wages and increased unemployment. In July 
1928, Amery explained to Stanley Baldwin, the Conservative Prime 
Minister, that there was a 'considerable divergence between the national 
situation and outlook in Great Britain and in the Dominions in 
connection with oversea settlement. We cannot hope to bridge that gulf 
except by a policy of conciliation and forbearance'.7
The depression of 1929-33 effectively ended assisted migration to 
the Dominions. However, it failed to stifle the debate on the pros and 
cons of imperial migration. Throughout the 1930s and well into World 
War II, the political issues which imperial migration raised, 
particularly vis-a-vis the Dominions, remained in the foreground of 
British policy making and forced a re-examination of the entire issue. 
For example, British officials concluded that public opinion would be 
more exacting in future and it was vital to ensure a continuity of 
policy in this respect. 'On the other hand, the support of a Dominion 
Government for migration into that Dominion is contingent upon public 
opinion there and this is influenced very largely by current economic 
issues'.8 Therefore a realistic economic appraisal was needed well 
before the incubation of a new migration scheme; something that was 
never done during the 1920s.9
It was also recognised that migration should not be used simply as 
a bargaining tool in Anglo-Dominion relations or be solely directed to 
the complementary issues of how to increase Dominion productivity, 
expand markets for Dominion produce and safeguard markets for British 
manufacturing. Imperial migration was a joint venture which required 
active support and encouragement on both sides. Cooperation not 
confrontation was the new watchword. Conversely, the Dominions could 
not have it all their own way. British officials argued that in future 
assisted settlement schemes the Dominions would have to be prepared to 
contribute on an equal share financially. More importantly, the onus 
was on the Dominions to provide better settler support and aftercare.10
What of the various Dominion soldier settlement policies? The 
answer depends upon the Dominion but nevertheless their schemes were a 
resounding and collective failure. Just over one million Dominion men 
and women enlisted during World War I. Of this total, approximately
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80,000 or 7.62 embarked upon agriculture under the auspices of their 
respective soldier settlement schemes. By 1930 less than half were 
still in possession of their homesteads and of these many were barely 
holding their own. Combined with the number of British veterans who 
were settled in Britain the final total of landed ex-servicemen barely 
reached 100,000.
The depression of 1920-22 was a critical factor in the failure of 
many soldier settlers. Depressed prices for primary produce made it 
extremely difficult for many of these new producers to make a return on 
their investment. However, the depression cannot be blamed for the 
policy's failure. Many settlers were already experiencing problems 
during the post-war boom. It was post-war inflation rather than the 
depression which laid the foundation for the settlers' future 
difficulties. Over-inflated prices for land, livestock and equipment 
forced many settlers to invest all of their capital and any immediate 
returns they may have accrued from the first harvest. Because many were 
carrying a 1002 debt load, a sharp drop in prices for primary products 
demonstrated their extreme vulnerability.
Why did the Dominions embrace the idea of soldier settlement so 
willingly, when, with decades of settlement experience, they knew that 
soldiers made poor settlers? The patriotic hysteria created by the war 
and the subsequent public pressure for a policy was one factor. The 
soldiers deserved a reward for the hardships and sacrifices they had 
endured defending 'King, Country and Empire'. Most politicians were 
certainly not going to be foolhardy and oppose such a noble cause if 
they wanted to stay in office after the war. Similarly, patriotism 
dulled the memory of many civil servants and policy makers who had 
previously opposed or had remained sceptical about the usefulness of 
soldier farmers before the war. Besides, the war had presented social 
planners and politicians alike with an opportunity to start afresh and 
build a new society. Maybe, just maybe, the soldier farmer could redeem 
himself if given the proper supervision and state assistance.
But this was precisely the complaint lodged by many Canadian 
soldiers; that they did not receive the proper supervision or support 
which was promised. Although Canada possessed the most centralised 
soldier settlement administration and had a federal government which was 
prepared to take the initiative in policy formulation, many settlers 
harboured an acute dislike for the early activities of the SSB. It was 
charged as being over-bearing, inflexible, coercive and bureaucratically
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sluggish. Moreover, supervision had become 'subservient to the 
collection of dues...which was scarcely assisted by the knowledge that 
the Board had powers of seizure and sale far exceeding those of normal 
business practice'.11 The federal government's claim that it would 
conduct soldier settlement along normal business principles was 
misleading and therefore incorrect. At the same time, as long as wheat 
remained the primary cash crop soldiers were not going to heed the 
government's advice that farm diversification was the safer course of 
action. When the bottom fell out of the grain markets in September 1920 
it was too late for many settlers to shift operations. Heavily 
indebted, it proved impossible for the majority of Canada's surviving 
soldier settlers to change to mixed farming. Those that did found the 
going very difficult. Even if a degree of success was obtained the 
prices for their produce were equally poor.
Contrasted with Australia, Canada's soldier settlement strategy 
seemed relatively simple and straightforward. Unlike Canada, Australia 
did not have a national or centralised soldier settlement policy. 
Similarly, Australia did not have a unified national development 
strategy. However, Australian soldier settlers encountered the same 
problems with bureaucratic red-tape, post-war inflationary pressures, 
depressed markets and prices, and harsh climatic fluctuations. But 
unlike their Canadian or New Zealand counterparts, Australian veterans 
suffered from the vagaries of an evolving and immature federal system. 
The profound lack of inter-State cooperation and the harmful competition 
which fostered unnecessary political friction between the Commonwealth 
and States was certainly more significant in Australia than her sister 
Dominions. There was also a ’marked inequality in treatment' of the 
returned man. They may have fought as Australians but pre-war 
partisanship and regionalism resurfaced after hostilities ceased. 
Instead, the men were settled as Victorians, Western Australians and 
Tasmanians not Australians.12
Like Canada, New Zealand developed a centralised approach to 
soldier settlement. Meanwhile, because of regional environmental 
differences, there was a degree of parochialism which resembled the 
deeply divisive Australian example. And unlike the senior Dominion, 
where the central authority kept a firm administrative grip on all 
aspects of policy, a pivotal role was played by the eleven regional Land 
Boards. As one observer suggests, New Zealand's approach was a 
’decentralised system under national coordination'.13 New Zealand was
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as generous and determined as Canada and Australia to provide the 
necessary assistance to its ex-servicemen. But New Zealand's policy 
suffered from a fundamental flaw which did not seriously handicap the 
efforts of her Dominion colleagues. Most of New Zealand's best farm 
land was privately owned which forced the government to buy land at 
exorbitantly inflated prices. What little Crown land was available was 
isolated, thickly forested, expensive to clear, and when it was 
subdivided the allotments were too small and subsequently uneconomical. 
Compounding this problem was New Zealand's utter dependence upon British 
markets for its primary produce. Of all the Dominions, New Zealand had 
the least diversified economy and was therefore the most dependent upon 
the mother country for capital to develop its primary resource base. As 
one historian remarks the Antipodean Dominions were 'bound closely to 
Britain by preference and necessity'.1^  Unlike Canada which was 
diversifying internationally and developing closer ties with the United 
States.
South Africa was a unique case because of the political 
sensitivity of both the immigration and land settlement issues. Its 
persistent refusal to participate in the free passage scheme or any 
empire settlement project, or give its own veterans preferential 
treatment, was testimony to the delicate nature of South Africa's 
domestic political scene. It might be argued that Dominion nationalism 
played a much more significant role in the defeat of the imperial dream 
than in any of the other Dominions. More precisely, it was Afrikaner 
nationalism, as represented by the poor white problem, which triumphed 
over British interests. Yet, in the face of such obstacles the 1820 
Memorial Settlers' Association was able to make some notable 
achievements and contribute, however small, to the flow of British 
immigration to South Africa.
The pressure exerted by the RCI throughout the war and the popular 
enthusiasm generated by the Haggard mission in 1916 must be acknowledged 
for it was significant. But even popular enthusiasm had its role to 
play in the failure of soldier settlement. The citizens of empire 
expected that something would be done for their returned men. With the 
sudden ending of the war in November 1918, haste to implement a policy 
based on over-optimistic and misplaced assumptions about the soldier as 
the 'right type' of settler and the economic capacity of the 'new' lands 
were factors which contributed to failure. Even more fundamental was 
the mystique that land settlement offered political, social and economic
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security. The 'agrarian myth' although powerful was archaic. In some 
ways it hindered rather than promoted development because it blinded 
many people to the economic realities of a new, industrial and 
increasingly urbanised age. Some grudgingly gave it up. For others the 
fog never lifted.15
Was the establishment of a yeoman class moulded from the survivors 
of World War I nothing more than a hollow dream? It most certainly was 
despite the hopes expressed by conservative elements throughout the 
empire that the yeoman was a viable solution to post-war economic 
dislocation and social unrest. In the final analysis, soldier 
settlement neither solved unemployment nor produced untold national 
wealth. Instead, it created indebtedness, hardship and disappointment. 
Unemployment remained a seemingly insoluble problem and ex-servicemen 
and their families suffered more than their share of misery. Equally, 
the War Office noted that the economic value of the ex-soldier was 
'practically nil in many industries whilst that of his civilian 
confreres [had] been rising with experience'.16 Even reservists who 
had served with the colours for seven years found that serving their 
country was a serious handicap from the perspective of post-service 
employment. Out of touch with the market place skills became rusty and 
outdated. Once again, the promise to provide adequate industrial and 
technical training had fallen through because of a lack of preparation, 
funding and resources. In Britain, by the late 1920s veterans comprised 
80X of the unemployed between the ages of thirty and thirty-four, and 
58X of the total unemployed.17
Of course, no one could have predicted the depression of 1920-22 
which did so much to shatter the dreams and quash the honest endeavours 
of thousands of soldier settlers. The fact remains, however, that the 
entire policy contained inherent and fundamental structural defects - 
ideological, political and administrative. Those brave souls who 
succeeded despite the low prices, hollow promises and bureaucratic 
bungling did so because of their good fortune and their determination to 
succeed. But so far as the vast majority were concerned they had been 
foredoomed to failure.
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